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Introduction: Counterfactual Conditionals in the Philosophy of Language 
 
There is an intense debate in the philosophy of language and linguistics on so-called 
counterfactual conditionals. I shall introduce what I take to be the standard view:  
 
First, counterfactuals have truth–conditions.  
Second, these truth–conditions can be spelled out in terms of possible worlds. 
Third, the possible worlds deciding on the truth or falsity of a counterfactual are those that 
minimally differ from the actual world. 
 
Then I shall point out selected challenges to the standard view. I shall discuss proposals how to 
deal with these challenges within and outside of the standard semantics. I am especially 
interested in discussing in how far the standard view can be preserved and amended in a friendly 
way. I do not aim at comprehensively covering the main topics in the debate. Given how huge 
and complicated the debate has become, any selection is inevitably idiosyncratic. I admit that 
my selection could be more balanced. It is guided by my personal interests and my intellectual 
biography. The most salient lacuna may be that I set aside the highly important debate on 
counterfactuals and causal modeling. Another imbalance is that I focus on details of particular 
positions. My defence is that the positions discussed are paradigmatic. Delving into these 
positions in some detail, I aim at sharpening our sensitivities for the level of details at which 
the pertinent problems have to be tackled. I hope to give the reader some idea of the complexity 
of the issues involved and to motivate her to further pursue the topics considered, filling the 
gaps my discussion has left. 
Besides my research interests in the philosophy of language, I am also interested in the 
history of philosophy. One of the main reasons why I take the history of philosophy to be 
interesting is that it allows us to appreciate why certain issues rouse to salience as contrasted to 
other issues that might as well merit our interest; why certain background assumptions and 
methodological presuppositions became commonly shared as contrasted to others that might as 
well be true and relevant; and how these salient issues and background assumptions shaped the 
development of the debate. I shall use this book as an opportunity to deepen my perspective by 
a historical dimension. I am not only interested in following the main arguments, but also in the 
meanderings that gave rise to the richness and variety of current debate.  
The book is divided into two parts. The first part is mainly reconstructive. I survey the 
development that has led to the standard account. I construe this development as driven by one 
main issue: motivating general truth–conditions for counterfactuals. My main aim is to identify 
the critical breaking points at which the problems outlined in the second part arise. I shall focus 
on four paradigmatic accounts: Goodman’s discovery of what he calls the problem of 
cotenability, Stalnaker’s version of the standard semantics, Lewis’s refinements of Stalnaker’s 
version, and eventually Kratzer’s integration of the standard account into a more general 
semantics for modal expressions.1 
The second part is more original, comprising research on the problems identified in the 
first part. Again I emphasize that I do not aim at being exhaustive. Rather I focus on highly 
selective interventions at particular neuralgic points in the debate. My selective interventions 
illustrate the pertinent problems and exemplary ways of reacting to them. I shall give an 
overview of my interventions.  
 
1 Nelson Goodman, ‘The Problem of Counterfactual Conditionals’, The Journal of Philosophy, 44 (1947), 113–
128; Robert Stalnaker, ‘A Theory of Conditionals’, Studies in Logical Theory. American Philosophical Quarterly 
Monograph, 2 (1968), 98–112; David Lewis, Counterfactuals (Oxford: Blackwell, 1973); Angelika Kratzer, 
‘Modality’, in Semantics, ed. by Arnim von Stechow and Dieter Wunderlich (Berlin: DeGruyter, 1991), pp. 639-
650. 
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I shall start with (2.) the logics that was an important achievement of Lewis’s version of 
the standard account. That logics invalidates certain principles which hold e.g. for simple 
material conditionals, in particular transitivity, strengthening the antecedent, and 
contraposition. In section (2.1.) I consider an exemplary attempt at restoring these principles. 
My second intervention concerns the assumption that counterfactuals have truth–conditions. In 
section (2.2.), I consider whether Gibbard’s counterexamples, which are purported to show that 
indicative conditionals lack truth–conditions, can be transferred to counterfactuals. The third 
challenge to be considered arises from the interaction of counterfactuals and probability. In 
(2.3.) I shall present some problematic intuitions about counterfactuals with ‘probably’. I shall 
discuss two paradigmatic semantics which accommodate such intuitions before introducing my 
own proposal, which preserves the letter of the standard account. In section (2.4.), I shall 
address the notorious future similarity objection to Lewis’s proposal how to measure minimal 
divergence from the actual world. Among the ramifications of the future similarity objection, I 
shall discuss Morgenbesser cases in section (2.4.1.) and problems with further counterexamples 
to Lewis’s similarity metrics in the sections (2.4.2.) and (2.4.3.). The latter counterexamples all 
deal with Lewis’s claim that antecedent worlds easily diverge from but not so easily converge 
on the actual world. In section (2.5.), I shall further discuss issues about minimally diverging 
worlds, in particular what happens if these worlds turn out to be relevantly ‘deviant’ or atypical. 
I close with discussing intricacies of future-directed ‘would’ in section (2.6.). As indicated, the 
thrust of my debate is to see in how far we can preserve the cherished standard semantics as 
summarized in section (1.) and where the breaking points might be. 
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1. The Basics 
1.1. Goodman and the Problem of Cotenability 
 
A nice starting point for a study on counterfactuals is a google n–gram search. Such a search 
quickly reveals that the widespread use of the term ‘counterfactual’ is of recent origin. Two key 
texts by Chisholm and Goodman mark the beginning of the debate.2 I shall focus on the latter. 
Goodman’s work was instrumental in spreading the label ‘counterfactual’ for a kind of 
expression which Chisholm had still called the ‘contrary-to-fact’ conditional. Goodman also 
assembled some key topics, which would shape the debate to come. Goodman’s interest was 
driven by the relevance of counterfactual conditionals to the debate on central terms in the 
philosophy of science. He pointed out difficulties for understanding the semantics of 
counterfactuals, and he outlined a paradigmatic way of tackling them, which led to a well-
known problem. I shall take a closer look at Goodman’s seminal work. Since I am also 
interested in how the debate historically evolved, in the changing patterns of interest, research 
programs, and paradigms, I find it important to give the reader a sense of how Goodman’s 
argument evolves up to his famous problem of cotenability. 
Goodman starts with noting that the analysis of counterfactual conditionals is crucial to 
understanding natural laws, theory confirmation, dispositions, and causality (p. 113). Useful as 
counterfactuals seem, they nevertheless posit substantial difficulties, as can be shown by 
confining attention to genuine counterfactuals, i.e. those with actually false antecedent and 
consequent. For these, the tempting truth-functional analysis as a material conditional is 
obviously false. A material conditional is true precisely if either the antecedent is false or the 
consequent is true. Consider a piece of butter which has always been kept in the refrigerator: 
 
(A1) If the butter had been heated to 150°, it would have melted. 
(A2) If the butter had been heated to 150°, it would not have melted.   
 
Obviously, the first is true and the second is false, but the material conditional is true in both 
cases.  
Our intuitions need to be accounted for. Such an account cannot simply consist in 
collecting empirical evidence, say by heating the butter to see whether it melts or not, as that 
would lead to losing the contrary-to-fact–status of the counterfactual. Given the unavailability 
of these alternatives, Goodman claims that we have to address the peculiar connection between 
the antecedent and the consequent. The consequence that there must be some connection 
between the antecedent and the consequent is tempting but not trivial. As we shall see, Stalnaker 
rejects it, pointing to counterfactuals which are made true simply because the consequent holds 
irrespectively of whether the antecedent is true or not. 
Goodman suggests that the antecedent has to bear on the consequent, but the relationship 
rarely is one of logical consequence. For instance, take a dry match which is not struck:  
 
(A3) If the match had been struck, it would have lighted.  
 
(A3) seems true, but the consequent is not logically entailed by the antecedent. The same 
obviously goes for (A1). There must be something inexplicit that mediates the connection, 
certain background conditions S like: the match is dry, well-made, there is oxygen, and so on.  
The question becomes how to construe their mediating role. One suggestive proposal is 
that the transition is mediated by logical entailment. The consequent is logically entailed by the 
conjunction of S&A. In accepting a counterfactual, we do not merely claim that the consequent 
 
2 Roderick Chisholm, ‘The Contrary–to–Fact Conditional’, Mind, 55 (1946), 289–307; Goodman, ‘The Problem 
of Counterfactuals’. 
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follows from the antecedent if background conditions S are satisfied. Rather we commit 
ourselves to their being satisfied.  
However, how are we to confine S? We cannot simply add everything that is actually 
true as among these truths is the denial of the antecedent A the match has been struck. Actually, 
it is not the case that the match has been struck. We cannot either state the condition as follows: 
there is a set of actually true sentences or propositions from which in conjunction with A C 
follows. For from A and not–A everything follows.  
It is not sufficient either to exclude not–A as there are other true sentences whose 
conjunction entails everything. Take  
 
(A4) If that radiator had been frozen, it would have broken.  
 
Now take empty and thus true generalizations like ‘all radiators which freeze without 
reaching 0°C freeze’ and ‘all radiators which freeze without reaching 0° don’t freeze’. 
Conjoining these, everything follows, including that the radiator does not break. Another 
example: assume Jones is not in Carolina. Consider 
 
(A5) If Jones had been in Carolina, he would have been in North Carolina. 
(A6) If Jones had been in Carolina, he would have been in South Carolina. 
 
Jones being in Carolina together with ‘Jones is not in North Carolina’ and ‘Jones is not in South 
Carolina’ again entails everything. 
It won’t work either to require that the conjunction of A and S not entail a contradiction, 
as we can get the truth of (A5) from A and ‘Jones is not in South Carolina’ and the truth of (A6) 
from A and ‘Jones is not in North Carolina’. Yet we can well imagine circumstances under 
which neither of these would be true. It is simply not settled where Jones would have been. 
Up to this point, I have only considered the positive requirement that S and A must entail 
the consequent. Goodman considers adding a negative requirement: there should be no S* either 
such that S*&A entail non–C without entailing a contradiction. However, there are 
counterexamples even to this condition.  
Consider again  
 
(A3)  If the match had been struck, it would have lighted.  
 
(A3) seems true under normal circumstances. Moreover, the following seems false: 
 
(A7) If the match had been struck, it would not have been dry.  
 
Among the candidates for S is also the actual truth that the match did not light. If we conjoin 
this truth with A and the other background conditions save the match being dry, we get that the 
match cannot have been dry. For the match not to light, one of the normal conditions under 
which a match lights when struck must be given up. If we uphold all the other conditions, we 
get that the match cannot have been dry.  
At this point, Goodman sees only one way to ascertain the right result: we must require 
that no P be part of S such that  
 
If A had been the case, P would not have been the case. 
 
This gives us the requirement of cotenability. The facts S that are conjoined with A must be 
cotenable with A. A must not counterfactually entail that these facts do not obtain. We get the 
following conditions: 
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A counterfactual A>>C (If A had been the case, C would have been the case) is true 
precisely if C is entailed by A in conjunction with a set of true sentences S such that any 
sentence P that forms part of S is cotenable with A. 
 
A sentence P is cotenable with A precisely if  
 
Not (A>> not–C) 
 
As Goodman admits, this leaves us with a problem rather than a solution:  
 
‘Thus we find ourselves involved in an infinite regressus or a circle; for cotenability is defined in terms of 
counterfactuals, yet the meaning of counterfactuals is defined in terms of cotenability. In other words, to 
establish any counterfactual, it seems that we first have to determine the truth of another. If so, we can never 
explain a counterfactual except in terms of others, so that the problem of counterfactuals must remain 
unsolved. Though unwilling to accept this conclusion, I do not at present see any way of meeting the 
difficulty.’(p. 121) 
 
This, then, is the notorious problem of cotenability. We cannot determine the truth of a 
counterfactual without determining which actual truths are cotenable with the antecedent A. 
Yet we cannot determine which actual truths are cotenable with the antecedent A without 
considering another counterfactual, and so on.  
Goodman has shaped the debate to come not only by leaving us with the conundrum of 
cotenability. He also raised a number of further important issues. Among these issues is the 
status of laws. Laws not only are often formulated by exploiting their counterfactual stability, 
they also figure prominently among the cotenable facts that are used in deriving a consequent 
like ‘the match lights’ from an antecedent like ‘the match is struck’. It will therefore be 
important to see what role the distinction of laws and facts has played in the debate. One 
particular nuance of this distinction concerns antecedents which are unlawful or even 
impossible in a stronger sense (if such there is). Goodman’s example is  
 
(A8) If triangles were squares,… 
 
An account of counterfactuals must take stance on such counterlegals or counterpossibles, as 
they are called in more recent debate. 
As we have seen, Goodman takes a further important theoretical decision. He conceives 
the relationship between the antecedent, the background conditions, and the consequent as one 
of entailment. The conjunction of background condition together with the antecedent A 
logically entails the consequent C. Lewis called the resulting view ‘meta-linguistic’.3 Tempting 
as it may seem, this decision of Goodman’s again is not trivial and might be resisted. Perhaps 
it is this decision that leads to the cotenability problem in the first place. 
 
 
3 Lewis, Counterfactuals, section 3.1.. 
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1.2. Minimal Difference/Divergence/Departure: The Stalnaker–Lewis Semantics 
1.2.1. Stalnaker 
 
I shall now come to one of the most influential paradigms in the floating world of philosophy, 
so influential that it is often called the standard semantics for counterfactual conditionals. I refer 
to the standard semantics as orthodoxy in the title of this book. The first version of the standard 
semantics is due to Stalnaker, A Theory of Conditionals. Stalnaker’s declared aim is to provide 
a general semantics for the concept more or less tightly connected to the everyday use of would–
conditionals. This semantics is to allow him to single out the contributions of semantics and 
pragmatics to the truth–conditions of particular counterfactual utterance tokens.  
Stalnaker uses an epistemic heuristic to determine the semantics. He asks how we figure 
out whether a counterfactual is true. Eventually, he settles for the so-called Ramsey test: 
 
‘First, add the antecedent hypothetically to your stock of beliefs; second, make whatever adjustments are 
required to maintain consistency (without modifying the hypothetical belief in the antecedent); finally, 
consider whether or not the consequent is then true.’(p. 102) 
 
The Ramsey test leads Stalnaker to the following truth–condition: 
 
‘Consider a possible world in which A is true, and which otherwise differs minimally from the actual 
world. ‘If A, then B’ is true (false) just in case B is true (false) in that possible world.’(p. 102, m.e.) 
 
I shall call an approach along these lines minimal difference/divergence/departure account. I 
shall sometimes also talk of closeness or similarity of worlds, worlds being the closer and more 
similar to each other the less they diverge from each other.  
Stalnaker uses Kripkean modal logic to make this truth–condition more precise. Take 
the set of all possible worlds. Define a relation of accessibility between worlds, which either 
obtains among all possible worlds or a subset thereof. Add the absurd world at which everything 
is true.  Define a selection function which has a proposition (simplifying, the thought expressed 
by a declarative sentence, e.g. that the butter melted for the sentence the butter melted) and a 
world as its input and a world as its output. The selection function f(A,w) selects for each 
antecedent A and each world w precisely one world w*. A conditional A>>C is true precisely 
if the consequent C is true at the selected world w*. The selection function has to satisfy the 
following conditions, letting we be the world at which the conditional is assessed as to whether 
it is true at we, in the normal case the actual world @. 
 
 
S1. A has to be true at w*.  
S2. The selection function selects the absurd world precisely if A is inaccessible from we. 
S3. If A is true at we, f(A,we)=we 
 
This condition S3 ensures that any world is closest to itself in the ordering. 
 
S4. For any we and any antecedents A, A*, if A is true in f(A*,we) and A* is true in f(A,we), 
then f(A*, we) = f(A, we). 
 
I find it most convenient to express what Stalnaker aims at by this condition as follows: 
 
For any worlds w* and w** that are possible relative to w, either w* or w** is closer to w or 
both are equally close.  
These conditions confine 
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Stalnaker’s Truth–Condition: 
A counterfactual A>>C is vacuously true at w precisely if there is no A–world accessible 
from w. 
A>>C is non-vacuously true at world w precisely if the accessible A–world that is 
minimally different from w is a C–world. 
 
 
Coming to a critical assessment, I shall take a closer look at the transition between the 
Ramsey test and Stalnaker’s constructive proposal. Stalnaker says: 
 
‘The concept of a possible world is just what we need to make this transition, since a possible 
world is the ontological analogue to a stock of hypothetical beliefs.’(p. 102) 
 
What does Stalnaker mean by an ‘ontological analogue’? Stalnaker does not characterize 
worlds, but we may as a first stab think of them as maximal states of affairs, and of our universe 
as an example of a world. Assume possible worlds are part of our ontology. Then for any 
consistent set of beliefs, there is a set of possible worlds at which these beliefs are true.  
However, this does not bring home the transition from the Ramsey test to Stalnaker’s 
intuitive truth–condition. It is not clear how a world that minimally diverges from ours save for 
the antecedent A relates to Ramsey’s procedure of hypothetically revising one’s beliefs by A. 
There are several transitions which must give us pause.  
First, it is not at all clear in what way Ramsey’s procedure invites a minimal revision. 
One suggestion is that the revision should be conservative in preserving as much of our current 
belief system as possible. But conservatism is not a matter of course. It would need additional 
motivation. A more immediately plausible idea is that the revision should preserve just the right 
beliefs. It should pay due respect to the evidential relationships among beliefs. If the 
hypothetically accommodated belief sufficiently strongly counts against previously held ones, 
they ought to be revised, if not, they should be preserved. In sum, it is not obvious in what sense 
belief revision à la Ramsey is to be minimal.  
Even if we grant that the Ramsey test comes with a requirement that the revision be 
minimal in some sense, it is highly doubtful that this sense is the same in which the world 
selected by the selection function minimally diverges from the actual world. Stalnaker indicates 
that pragmatic factors may play a role in both, but that does not forge a suitable connection 
between the two kinds of minimal revision. In fact, Stalnaker himself provides reasons why 
such a connection should not be expected. In addressing the problem of how to gather empirical 
evidence for counterfactuals, Stalnaker himself emphasizes the role of those facts shared by the 
actual world and the antecedent world closest to it that go beyond what we know or believe (pp. 
111–112). We invoke closeness to the actual world to take care of facts we do not know. These 
facts are taken to be the same as in the actual world. But such facts obviously can play no role 
in the Ramsey test as they do not form part of our belief system.  
I surmise that the problem here lies in Stalnaker’s lack of recognition for the distinction 
between counterfactual and indicative conditionals. Stalnaker in A Theory of Conditionals does 
not mention the difference. As a matter of fact, given his endorsement of the Ramsey test as a 
method of figuring out counterfactuals, it is not fully clear that he can make room for a deep 
difference among conditionals. However, the difference was later highlighted by Adams using 
the famous example:4 
 
(A9) If Oswald did not kill Kennedy, someone else did it. 
(A10) If Oswald had not killed Kennedy, someone else would have done it. 
 
4 Ernest Adams, ‘Subjunctive and Indicative Conditionals’, Foundations of Language, 6 (1970), 89–94. 
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Most participants in the debate agree that (given we know that Kennedy was actually killed) 
(A9) is true but (A10) is false. I find the following example more compelling: 
 
(A11) If Shakespeare did not write Hamlet, someone else did. 
(A12) If Shakespeare had not written Hamlet, no one else would have. 
 
(A11) seems true, (A12) seems false. The Shakespeare example is more convincing. It would 
seem a more tremendous coincidence if another person had written that very same play than if 
someone else had been poised to kill Kennedy. As a consequence, (A12) seems more obviously 
false than (A10). 
Later Stalnaker saw the requirement to account for the distinction. He suggested that the 
counterfactual and the indicative conditionals have different felicity conditions.5 The felicity 
condition of an indicative is that the antecedent is not ruled out by the common ground in a 
conversation. For instance, it seems odd to say:  
 
‘I know that Shakespeare wrote Hamlet.  
(A11) If Shakespeare did not write Hamlet, someone else did.’ 
 
At least we need to deal with the intuitive contrast, for instance by stressing ‘If’. 
In contrast, it is perfectly fine to say: 
 
‘I know that Shakespeare wrote Hamlet.  
(A12) If Shakespeare had not written Hamlet, no one else would have.’ 
 
While Stalnaker’s ingenious approach in terms of minimal departure has some intuitive 
appeal, so far we do not have a general motivation for it. A more promising line of motivation 
would be to consider the idea of minimal departure as a constructive solution to Goodman’s 
cotenability problem: Stalnaker does not explicitly mention the problem. Moreover, he 
explicitly rejects the idea that we have to spell out a connection of relevance between the 
antecedent and the consequent (p. 101). Stalnaker wants his account to cover counterfactuals in 
general, including counterfactuals which are true simply because the consequent holds whether 
the antecedent holds or not, so-called semi–factuals, and counterfactuals which are simply true 
because the antecedent and the consequent happen to be actually true. In contrast, Goodman 
held the view that the real category to carve at the joints does not include semi–factuals. Still it 
seems somewhat plausible to follow the linguistic surface form here, which does not make a 
difference between counterfactuals and semi–factuals except in the possibility to insert ‘even’ 
in the case of the latter.  
Another difference between Stalnaker and Goodman is the following: Stalnaker does 
not commit himself to Goodman’s view that the connection between the antecedent and the 
consequent has to be one of entailment. In contrast, Stalnaker’s selection function avoids the 
commitment to such a connection, which is replaced by truth at a certain world.  
Notwithstanding such differences, there surely is a close connection between solving 
the cotenability problem and the paradigm of minimal divergence. The facts that the antecedent 
world closest to actuality shares with the actual world together with the antecedent are good 
candidates for approximating the set of facts from which Goodman’s S and S’ are to be taken. 
The closest antecedent world selected by the antecedent A of A>>C easily meets the condition 
imposed by Goodman on S: no actual P such that A>>not–P forms part of the set of facts from 
which the consequent is somehow derived, i.e. the set of facts which hold at the world at which 
 
5 Robert Stalnaker, ‘Indicative Conditionals’, Philosophia, 5 (1975), 269–286. 
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A and C have to hold for A>>C to be true. Moreover, no facts which meet Goodman’s 
requirement can be expected to fail to be true at that world. The minimum divergence account 
makes good on the idea that we should assemble the maximum number of actual facts which 
are eligible for S.  
Still the cotenability problem is not sufficient to motivate the minimal divergence 
approach. The cotenability problem arises from Goodman’s meta-linguistic view. According to 
that view, there must be a relationship of entailment between the antecedent A, some suitable 
set of propositions S which are true at the actual world and the consequent C. Yet nothing in 
Stalnaker’s approach ensures that the facts which obtain both at the actual world and at the 
closest antecedent world together with the antecedent entail the consequent. Thus, the account 
does not solve the cotenability problem. Rather it amounts to an alternative proposal how to 
mediate the transition from the antecedent to the consequent. 
There is a further potential motive for the minimal divergence account, which 
presumably had a strong impact on Stalnaker: the convenience of using the logics of possible 
worlds developed by Kripke and the neat logics for counterfactuals that could be attained by 
using it. Stalnaker’s logics is neat in that it validates inferences which are intuitively valid and 
invalidates principles which are intuitively invalid. Among the valid inferences are modus 
ponens and modus tollens: 
 
Modus ponens: P>>Q; P; thus Q 
Modus tollens: P>>Q; not–Q; thus not–P 
 
Among the invalid inference patterns are strengthening the antecedent, transitivity, and 
contraposition.  
 
Strengthening the antecedent: P>>Q; thus P&R >>Q  
Transitivity: P>>Q; Q>>R; thus P>>R 
Contraposition: P>>Q; thus not–Q>>not–P 
 
Whether conditional excluded middle holds is highly contentious:6 
 
(P>>Q)˅(P>>not–Q) 
It is not the case that both are false: P>>Q and P>>not–Q. 
 
I shall close with mentioning another issue about Stalnaker’s account. Stalnaker takes it 
to be a largely pragmatic matter how the total ordering is determined, i.e. what the closest 
antecedent worlds are. This allows Stalnaker to keep the account flexible in dealing with 
examples which seem highly context-dependent, but it gives rise to concerns about the role of 
counterfactuals in science that motivated authors like Goodman to be interested in 
counterfactuals in the first place, for instance their role in supporting laws, causality, and so on. 
For instance, one would not expect it to be a pragmatic matter whether laws hold. To ensure 
this, the similarity ordering must be subject to certain objective constraints. Stalnaker’s theory 
allows for such constraints but does not account for them. 
I conclude my brief survey of Stalnaker’s account. I shall now proceed to Lewis’s 
variation of it. 
 
6 Robert Stalnaker, ‘A Defense of Conditional Excluded Middle’, in Ifs: Conditionals, Belief, Decision, Chance, 
and Time, ed. by William L. Harper, Robert Stalnaker, Glenn Pearce (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1981), pp. 87–104; J. 
Robert G. Williams, ‘Defending Conditional Excluded Middle’, Noûs, 44 (2004), 650–668; Nathan Klinedienst, 
‘Quantified Conditionals and Conditional Excluded Middle’, Journal of Semantics, 28 (2011), 49–170. 
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1.2.2. Sobel and Similarity: Lewis 
 
Lewis’s (1973) account is so close to Stalnaker that their minimal divergence approach is 
usually known as the Lewis–Stalnaker semantics and competes with Kratzer’s for becoming 
largely standard in the philosophical debate.7 There are some subtle differences, though. Lewis 
weakens some of Stalnaker’s assumptions and advocates stronger assumptions where Stalnaker 
generously and non-committally invokes pragmatics. 
Lewis takes up a line of motivation which is already implicit in Stalnaker. In Stalnaker’s 
account, the counterfactual conditional is sandwiched between a logically stronger and a 
logically weaker expression: the strict conditional on the one and the material conditional on 
the other hand. Stalnaker does not exploit the motivational potential of sandwiching, though. 
Doing so becomes the thrust of Lewis’s approach to counterfactuals. Lewis carries sandwiching 
one step beyond Stalnaker.  
As distinguished from Stalnaker, Lewis starts with discussing the alternative of a strict 
conditional approach to counterfactuals. According to such an account, a counterfactual A>>C 
is true precisely if the material conditional A⸧C holds necessarily. The approach is most easily 
stated in terms of possible worlds. A counterfactual is true if all worlds in which A is true are 
worlds in which C is true. In short, all A–worlds are C–worlds. Lewis uses the logical properties 
identified by Stalnaker to argue against the strict conditional approach. The latter validates 
strengthening the antecedent and transitivity. Yet Lewis goes further. He develops a suggestive 
iterative strategy to plausibilize a closeness ordering of worlds à la Stalnaker. 
Consider the following example, which Lewis calls a ‘Sobel sequence’: 
 
(A13)  If the US had thrown their nuclear weapons into the sea, there would have been war. 
(A14) If the US and the other superpowers had thrown their nuclear weapons into the sea, there 
would have been peace. 
(A15) If the US and the other superpowers had thrown their nuclear weapons into the sea and 
thereby caused a breakdown of global fishery industries, there would have been war. 
… 
 
Another example from the literature is:8 
 
(A16) If Sophie had gone to the parade, she would have seen Pedro dance. 
(A17) If Sophie had gone to the parade and got stuck behind someone tall, she would not have 
seen Pedro dance. 
(A18) If Sophie had gone to the parade and got stuck behind someone tall and used stilts, she 
would have seen Pedro dance. 
… 
 
The general pattern: 
 
A1>>C 
A1&A2>>not–C 
A1&A2&A3>>C 
… 
Conjoining additional propositions A2, A3 …with an antecedent A1 is called antecedent 
strengthening. Two things seem to hold for such sequences. Firstly, under certain assumptions 
they can be prolonged indefinitely. Second, a great many sequences of this form may be true. 
This is evidence that the strict conditional approach can’t be right. 
 
7 Lewis, Counterfactuals. 
8 Anthony Gillies, ‘Counterfactual Scorekeeping’, Linguistics and Philosophy, 30 (2007), 329–360. 
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Lewis uses the intuition that such sequences can be prolonged indefinitely to argue for 
a minimal difference approach to conditionals. However the minimal difference account is 
spelled out, a world at which all the superpowers throw their weapons into the sea may differ 
more from the actual world than a world in which only the US throw their weapons into the sea, 
but not the other way round. For any world in which all the superpowers throw their weapons 
into the sea ipso facto is a world in which the US do. More generally, no world at which a 
strengthened antecedent A1&…An is true can diverge less from the actual world than the closest 
world at which an unstrengthened antecedent A1&…An-1 is true.   
These observations allow Lewis to state a neat proposal how Sobel sequences can be 
true. The closest A1–world is a C–world. The closest A1&A2 is less close than the closest A1–
world. Thus, nothing prevents it from being a not–C–world. The closest A1&A2&A3–world is 
less close than the closest A1&A2–worlds. Thus, nothing prevents it from being a C–world again 
and so on. Lewis does not claim that the minimal difference–approach is the only one that 
allows to account for true Sobel sequences, but the possibility of true Sobel sequences adds 
further constraints to a semantics of conditionals over and above sandwiching between the strict 
and the material conditional. We get arbitrarily many further sandwiching layers. Sandwiching 
thus lends further support to the minimal difference–account.  
I note, however, that the proposal depends on certain background assumptions. One 
assumption is that the semantics is static. Though counterfactuals are granted to be somewhat 
context-sensitive as it is a pragmatic matter how the ordering of worlds according to their 
closeness is determined, it is a background assumption that context is not so shifty that its 
shiftiness could account for the truth of Sobel sequences. Even if such background assumptions 
are granted, Lewis’s approach only provides limited support for the minimal difference 
approach as long as it has not been shown that there is no other truth-conditional account that 
posits truth–conditions in between the strict and the material conditional and yields true Sobel 
sequences.  
 
I shall now consider some points at which Lewis parts ways with Stalnaker. They can 
be divided into issues where Lewis is less committal than Stalnaker and issues where he incurs 
stronger commitments. The general motive of being less committal is that the account is in 
danger of being too restrictive and thus to provoke counterexamples. The general motive of 
being more committal is that the account at one crucial point does not seem to live up to the 
expectations concerning the role of counterfactuals in science that have been raised by 
Goodman and others. 
I begin with the points at which Lewis generalizes Stalnaker by loosening some of his 
more restrictive conditions: one is the so-called limit assumption: There is a closest antecedent 
world whenever a counterfactual is true. This assumption may be questioned. For it may be 
that, for any antecedent world, there are antecedent worlds closer to actuality. Take comparisons 
of length. A stick which is 99cm long differs less in length from a stick which is 1m long than 
a stick which is 98cm long. But a stick which is 99,9cm long comes even closer. It is outranked 
by a stick which is 99.99 cm long and so on. To appreciate the connection to counterfactuals, 
consider the following question: 
 
(A19) If that stick had not been 1m long, how long would it have been? 
 
Assume I say, guided by the idea of minimal difference in length: 99cm. This answer seems 
arbitrary, as there are smaller differences, and the same goes for any other answer. The 
persuasive power of the comparison is limited, though. There are doubts in how far we are 
guided by considerations of minimal divergence in length in judging (A19). Rather we are at a 
loss at answering the question. It is not clear how this result relates to the issue of minimally 
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diverging worlds, but obviously such comparisons are not guided by dimensions made salient 
in the way the example makes salient comparisons of length. 
A second assumption of Stalnaker’s which Lewis eschews is the so-called uniqueness 
assumption: the selection function that figures in the truth–condition of counterfactuals always 
selects one particular world, which is the closest one. Lewis criticizes that worlds may tie in for 
being closest. As an example, consider a fair coin. The coin is not tossed. But had it been tossed, 
would it fallen heads or tails? It seems that worlds at which it falls heads and worlds at which 
it falls tails tie in for closeness. Still, the following seems true (excluding worlds where the coin 
does strange things like landing on its margin): 
 
(A20) If the coin had been tossed, it would have fallen either heads or tails. 
 
If we adopt the uniqueness assumption and additionally assume that there is a tie between 
worlds at which the coin falls tails and worlds at which the coin falls tails, (A20) cannot be true. 
To avoid this result, we should drop the uniqueness assumption. 
If worlds can tie in for closeness, the question becomes salient what happens in cases in 
which the counterfactual is true in some but not all closest worlds. Take the coin example. None 
of the following seems true: 
 
(A21) If the coin had been tossed, it would have landed heads. 
(A22) If the coin had been tossed, it would not have landed heads. 
(A23) If the coin had been tossed, it would have landed tails. 
(A24) If the coin had been tossed, it would not have landed tails. 
 
As a consequence, it seems true that it is not the case that if the coin had been tossed, it would 
have landed heads and so on. This conflicts with the following principle as endorsed by 
Stalnaker: 
 
Not (A>>C) ⸧ (A>>not–C) 
 
Stalnaker maintains that counterfactuals are neither true nor false if there is no uniquely 
closest world. However, he proposes a supervaluationist view of such cases.9 There are several 
ways of precisifying a counterfactual which is neither true nor false. For instance, one 
precisification of the coin counterfactuals selects the closest world in which the coin falls heads, 
another precisification selects the closest world where the coin falls tails as the closest world 
where the coin is tossed. For all precisifications the following holds. Either the coin would have 
fallen heads, or it would have fallen tails. In other words, when C and not–C–worlds tie in for 
being the closest A–world, for any precisification conditional excluded middle holds: 
 
A>>C ˅ A>>not–C 
 
One may doubt this idea of precisification, though. There does not seem to be any room for 
being more precise in the coin example. We have two well-defined possibilities, and it seems 
arbitrary to privilege one. 
In other cases, though, there seems to be room for precisification. Consider the famous 
Caesar–counterfactuals: 
 
(A25) If Caesar had been in command in Korea, he would have used catapults. 
(A26) If Caesar had been in command in Korea, he would have used the atom bomb. 
 
9 Stalnaker, ‘Conditional Excluded Middle’, pp. 87–104. 
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Lewis says: 
 
‘Thus we account for such pairs of counterfactuals as Quine’s  
If Caesar had been in command [in Korea] he would have used the atom bomb. 
Versus 
If Caesar had been in command he would have used catapults. [… ]  
 
I could [… ] call on context rather to resolve part of the vagueness of comparative similarity in a way 
favourable to the truth of one counterfactual or the other. In one context, we may attach great importance to 
similarities and differences in respect of Caesar’s character and in respect of regularities concerning the 
knowledge of weapons common to commanders in Korea. In another context, we may attach less importance 
to these similarities and differences, and more importance to similarities and differences in respect of 
Caesar’s own knowledge of weapons. The first context resolves the vagueness of comparative similarity in 
such a way that some worlds with a modernized Caesar in command come out closer to our world than any 
with an unmodernized Caesar[… ] My intuition is to explain the influence of context entirely as the resolution 
influence.’(pp. 66–67) 
 
According to Lewis, sometimes counterfactuals in isolation are vague with regard to the 
relevant similarity ordering. Then context may fix the similarity ordering. In the case of the 
Caesar–counterfactuals, we are first at a loss which one of these counterfactuals to privilege, 
but it is easy to imagine a context in which we have cues. One may say: 
 
‘Caesar had only the limited knowledge of weaponry that was available to a Roman. He at most 
knew catapults. He would not have known what to do with modern weaponry. 
 
(A25) If Caesar had been in command in Korea, he would have used catapults.’ 
 
This seems somewhat plausible. 
 
Or one may say: 
 
‘Caesar was absolutely ruthless in choosing his means. He always used the most effective 
weapon to bring down his enemies. 
 
(A26) If Caesar had been in command in Korea, he would have used the atom bomb.’ 
 
Again this seems acceptable. 
The same goes for a famous example used by Lewis against Stalnaker (p. 82): 
 
(A27) If Bizet and Verdi had been compatriots, Bizet would have been Italian. 
(A28) If Bizet and Verdi had been compatriots, Verdi would have been French. 
 
Again we may be at a loss which one is true and which is false. But consider the following: 
 
‘How could Bizet have been Italian? Well, assume his ancestors had moved to Italy, and by a 
tremendous coincidence all the other circumstances that led to Bizet being begot and born 
remain untouched. Then Bizet would have been a compatriot of Verdi. In other worlds: 
 
(A27) If Bizet and Verdi had been compatriots, Bizet would have been Italian.’ 
 
An analogous story could be told for (A28). 
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An interesting variant of such ties between opposing pairs of counterfactuals is due to 
Goodman. Goodman deems the following two counterfactuals true:10 
 
(A29) If New York City were in Georgia, then New York City would be in the South. 
(A30) If Georgia included New York City, then Georgia would be in the North.  
 
However, the antecedents seem to be logically equivalent. Goodman surmises that word order 
here gives cues how to enrich the antecedent by ‘and the boundaries of Georgia were 
unchanged’ and ‘the boundaries of New York were unchanged’. In the Lewis–Stalnaker 
approach, one may say that the antecedent itself provides minimal pragmatic cues as to what 
the relevant similarity order looks like.  
A third point at which Lewis considers loosening Stalnaker’s conditions is the centering 
condition. For any world w, the world minimally differing from w is w itself. 
 
S3. If A is true at wa, f(A,wa)=wa 
 
Since Lewis feels less pressure to settle for uniquely closest worlds, he considers weakening 
this condition in admitting the possibility that there might be worlds other than w which are as 
close to w as w itself. This seems plausible given the view that the similarity ordering is 
pragmatically determined. Such a pragmatic view draws on the idea that some respects of 
similarity matter more for us than others given our current interests. If the difference between 
w and w* is not relevant to us in determining the similarity ordering, nothing prevents w* from 
counting as equally close to w as w itself for the purposes of conversation. 
As a consequence, Lewis offers two variants of the centering condition: 
 
Strong centering: For any w, there is no other world w* which is as close to w as w. 
Weak centering: For any w, w is among the worlds closest to w. 
 
Lewis’s amendments of Stalnaker’s restrictive conditions lead him to the following 
truth–condition for counterfactuals: 
 
Lewis’s Truth–Condition: 
A counterfactual A>>C is vacuously true precisely if there is no accessible A–world. 
A>>C is non-vacuously true at world w precisely if there is an A&C–world which differs 
less from w, on balance, than any A&not–C–world. 
 
Having discussed the points at which Lewis weakens Stalnaker’s assumptions, I now 
come to a respect in which Lewis incurs stronger commitments than Stalnaker. It is part and 
parcel to Stalnaker’s project to provide general semantic truth–conditions which capture the 
concept that guides us in using counterfactuals. He maintains that there is such a unique concept 
underlying all the vagaries of everyday usage. In order to bring out this concept, he aims at 
precisely locating the point where semantics ends and pragmatics begins. Pragmatics begins 
when we ask how the similarity ordering of worlds is determined over and above the formal 
requirements of the ordering.  
Stalnaker is mainly interested in the semantics and leaves the pragmatics open. 
However, this leads to problems for the ambitions many philosophers, including Stalnaker 
himself, harbour about counterfactuals. We have seen Goodman pointing out to the scientific 
relevance of counterfactuals for defining natural laws, theory confirmation, dispositions, and 
 
10 Goodman, p. 121. 
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causality. Stalnaker himself suggests to define laws by a counterfactual connection between 
predicates F and G:11 
 
For all x, if x were F, it would be G. 
 
Lewis in turn harbours great ambitions of defining causation by counterfactuals, starting 
with the intuitive:12 
 
A is a cause of B if, had A not happened, B would not have happened. 
 
Stalnaker’s view on the pragmatics of determining similarity harbours a problem for such 
ambitions. Scientifically minded philosophers like Quine distrusted counterfactuals due to the 
seeming arbitariness of their truth. If we can get almost any counterfactual true and false by 
conjuring up the right similarity ordering, as witnessed by extreme examples like the Caesar–
counterfactuals and the Verdi–Bizet cases, this dependence on pragmatic factors like our 
varying interests threatens to infect anything that is defined by means of counterfactuals.  
There are also principled doubts about our readiness to judge overall similarity. As 
Keynes noted, a 
 
‘[… ] book bound in blue morocco is more like a book bound in red morocco than if it were bound in blue 
calf; and a book bound in red calf is more like the book in red morocco than if it were in blue calf. But there 
may be no comparison between the degree of similarity which exists between books bound in red morocco 
and blue morocco, and that which exists between books bound in red morocco and red calf.’13 
 
Whenever A is more similar to B than to C in one respect and more similar to C than to B in 
another, incommensurable respect, we cannot rank B and C with regard to overall similarity. 
Assume that there are only two alternate ways of binding a book bound in red morocco: blue 
morocco, red calf. How are we to judge the following: 
 
(A31) If the book had not been bound in red morocco, it would have been bound in blue 
morocco  
 
versus  
 
(A32) If the book had not been bound in red morocco, it would have been bound in red calf. 
 
Again there are principled doubts that the issue is settled by intuitive similarity, but disregarding 
such doubts, there is also an issue which consequent describes an overly more similar 
antecedent situation. 
Even granting there is incommensurability, we might not feel overly concerned. There 
seem to be intuitive trade–offs. The rest is vagueness, one might say. Within limits, we just 
dissolve incommensurabilities by fiat. The brusqueness of such acts can be allayed by 
embedding them into suitable stories. Assume the book is in a library where books are only 
bound either in red or in blue morocco. In this case, of course the book would have been bound 
in blue morocco had it not been bound in red morocco. Or take a person’s weight and 
temperature. We are not in a position to say how much temperature outweighs a difference in 
weight. But there are constraints, for instance due to normalcy conditions. A body temperature 
of 39° C is counted as a remarkable deviation from a healthy person. So is a weight of 110 kg. 
 
11 Stalnaker, ‘A Theory of Conditionals’, p. 110. 
12 David Lewis, ‘Causation’, The Journal of Philosophy, 70 (1973), 556–567.  
13 John Maynard Keynes, A Treatise on Probability (London: Macmillan, 1921), p. 36. 
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So at first glance, probably a difference in weight between 80 and 85 kg is considered less 
important than a difference in temperature between 36° and 39° C. Furthermore, contexts 
contribute to resolving vagueness. In a debate on obesity, weight differences may count more 
heavily towards dissimilarity than differences in body temperature.  
Concerns remain. Firstly, in how far do these contextually bound prima facie similarities 
live up to our expectation that there are similarities ‘out there’ to track? Secondly, again the 
question of the grand story rises. Overall similarity cannot mean similarity of a whole to another 
with regard to particular features, for instance similarity of total worlds with regard to the 
number of atoms in them. Rather it must mean something like similarity all things considered. 
In how far does our limited perspective converge to a picture ‘all things considered’? Lewis 
tries to get rid of concerns about incommensurabilities by imposing strong restrictions on 
overall similarity. Some respects are more important than others, some do not count at all.14  
Concerns about the scientific function of counterfactuals are one factor that leads Lewis 
to taking a closer look at how the similarity ordering is determined. Another factor is the 
notorious future–similarity objection. The future similarity objection springs from a 
counterexample of Kit Fine’s to the Lewis–Stalnaker semantics. Consider: 
 
(A33) If Nixon had pressed the nuclear button, there would have been a nuclear holocaust. 
 
(A33) seems intuitively true. For it to be true, a world at which a nuclear holocaust ensues must 
be overall more similar to the actual world than a world at which the signal just fizzles out and 
history converges to the history of the actual world. But this seems unintuitive. Surely a world 
at which Earth is devastated by nuclear holocaust in the seventies is overall less similar than a 
world at which the signal fizzles out and everything returns to normal.  
To evade this objection, Lewis develops the following strategy: instead of looking for 
intuitive similarity, he makes overall similarity of worlds a technical notion. He uses intuitive 
counterfactuals like the Nixon example to reason back to what our criteria of similarity or 
minimal difference must be like to support them. However, he also takes guidance from relevant 
theoretical considerations, in particular concerning the distinction of determinism and 
indeterminism. As a working characterization of determinism, I propose the following: 
 
A world w is deterministic precisely if there cannot be a world w* such that  
(i) w* has the same fundamental laws of nature as w, 
(ii) w* perfectly matches w in particular matters of fact at some time t, 
(iii) w* does not perfectly match w in particular matters of fact at some other time t*. 
 
If two deterministic worlds match in laws and facts at some time, they cannot be different in 
facts at a different time.  
Lewis then goes on to develop overall criteria of similarity for deterministic worlds. 
Such worlds raise the following problem: if the antecedent A is not actually true, the closest A–
world must differ from the actual world @ at least in A. If that world shares the laws of the 
actual world, as a deterministic world it must differ from @ at all times throughout the history 
of the universe. Such a world does not seem very similar, even if we disregard intuitive 
judgements of similarity. In particular, it seems unmotivated to preserve the laws at all costs. 
Lewis’s alternative is that the closest A–world differs in laws. However, since laws are involved 
in explaining any particular fact, it would seem a weird coincidence either if we had large-scale 
match in fact but substantial mismatch in the laws. To deal with this problem, Lewis introduces 
 
14 ‘To what extent are the philosophical writings of Wittgenstein similar, overall, to those of Heidegger? I don’t 
know. But there is one aspect of comparison that does not enter into it at all, not even with negligible weight: the 
ratio of vowels to consonants.’(David Lewis, ‘Counterfactual dependence and time’s arrow’, in Philosophical 
Papers II (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 32–66 (pp. 41–42)). 
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his much-criticized idea of a ‘small miracle’. Though the label is neat, it is somewhat 
misleading. Lewis does not have in mind something that runs counter to the laws of nature, at 
least not to the laws of the antecedent world considered. He only claims that the laws of the 
closest A–world are minimally different from the actual laws in that they allow for the 
antecedent to become true. Lewis thinks of the difference as an exception clause for the specific 
highly localized circumstances that lead to A becoming true.15 To use an example of Lewis, 
think of some extra neurons firing unexplainably (given the actual laws) in Nixon’s  brain and 
making him press the nuclear button immediately afterwards. Lewis requires that small miracles 
are spatiotemporally closely confined, and they are rather simple. They do not consist of 
exceptional events of many different kinds. 
Using the notion of a miracle, Lewis has us consider several candidates for the closest 
world at which Nixon presses the button: 
 
(i) A world which perfectly matches the actual world in laws but differs from it in facts from 
the very beginning until the end of time. 
(ii) a world which perfectly matches the actual world in facts save for the antecedent A but has 
very different laws. 
(iii) a world which perfectly matches the actual world in facts until shortly before the 
antecedent, then diverges by a small miracle, and then reconverges by a small miracle such as 
to achieve perfect future match in facts.  
(iv) a world which perfectly matches the actual world in facts until shortly before the 
antecedent, then diverges by a small miracle, and then reconverges by a small miracle such as 
to achieve approximate future match in facts.  
(v) a world which perfectly matches the actual world in facts until shortly before the antecedent, 
then diverges by a small miracle without ever matching the actual world again. 
 
Of these worlds, (v) is Lewis’s candidate. It underpins (A33). As we have seen, a world which 
(i) shows mismatch in facts throughout history seems rather dissimilar from the actual world. 
A world with very different laws (ii) seems even more problematic, given the explanatory role 
of laws for particular matters of fact. A world that (iii) perfectly reconverges seems a promising 
candidate. However, Lewis insists that such a world is impossible. Reconvergence by a small 
miracle is not to be had. The reason is that any event leaves many future traces of different 
sorts. Here is Lewis’s description of these traces: 
 
‘[… ]Nixon’s deed has left its mark on the world[… ] There are his fingerprints on the button. Nixon is still 
trembling[… ] His gin bottle is depleted. The click on the button has been preserved on tape. Light waves 
flew out of the window, bearing the image of Nixon’s finger on the button, are still on their way into ou ter 
space. The wire is ever so slightly warmed where the signal current passed through it. And so on, and on, and 
on.’16 
 
In Lewis’s opinion, a complete cover–up action for these many and varied and spatiotemporally 
dispersed traces would take not a small but a big, widespread miracle.  
What remains is (iv) a world with approximate match. Such a world has some intuitive 
appeal. For instance, we might think of a small miracle that makes the signal of Nixon’s 
pressing fizzle out while leaving the other traces of the deed. Such a miracle could prevent the 
nuclear disaster. To get (A33) right, Lewis must insist that approximate match counts for 
nothing or almost nothing. The justification is his methodology to reason back from the 
intuitively true counterfactuals to the guiding criteria of similarity. 
This, then, gives us Lewis famous lexical ordering of four criteria of similarity: 
 
15 Lewis, ‘Counterfactual Dependence’, pp. 54–55. 
16 Lewis, ‘Counterfactual Dependence’, p. 45. 
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‘(1) It is of first importance to avoid big, widespread, diverse violations of law [big miracles].  
(2) It is of second importance to maximize the spatio-temporal region throughout which perfect match of 
particular fact prevails.  
(3) It is of third importance to avoid even small, localized simple violations of law [small miracles].  
(G9) It is of little or no importance to secure approximate similarity of particular fact, even in matters that 
concern us greatly.’17 
 
Our semantics for counterfactuals should not depend on the highly contestable 
hypothesis that the actual world is deterministic. What about indeterministic worlds? For this 
case, Lewis replaces the small miracles by a chance event and the big miracles by large-scale 
counter-entropic developments.  
This concludes my discussion of Lewis’s amendment of Stalnaker’s semantics. I shall 
now briefly look at Kratzer’s general theory of modal expressions. 
 
 
17 Lewis, ‘Counterfactual Dependence’, pp. 47–48. 
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1.2.3. Orthodoxy à la Kratzer 
 
I close the basic presentation of truth-conditional orthodoxy about counterfactuals by taking a 
quick look at Angelika Kratzer’s variant of the minimal difference semantics in terms of 
possible worlds.18 This variant has become increasingly influential both in the philosophical 
and in the linguistic debate. One reason is that the account is highly general. Kratzer starts from 
a principled analysis of modals like ‘could’, ‘might’, probably’. She covers different kinds of 
modality, epistemic (‘perhaps’), deontic (‘should’), circumstantial or metaphysical (‘sugar is 
solvable’).  
Kratzer distinguishes between a modal base and an ordering source. Both are provided 
by context or ‘conversational background’. The modal base consists of a set of propositions 
restricting the set of possible worlds to those at which these propositions are true. These are the 
accessible worlds. The ordering source determines an ordering of these worlds. It provides a set 
S of propositions. The ordering is determined by the following conditions: the ideal world i is 
one where all propositions in S are true. A world w* is at least as close to i as a world w** 
precisely if all propositions in S which are true in w** are true in w*. Kratzer then goes on the 
define the notion of necessity and graded notions of possibility, which can be used to define the 
modal auxiliaries in turn. For instance, ‘must’ is interpreted as quantifying over all possible 
worlds fixed by the modal base. ‘Must A’ is true precisely if all worlds in the modal base are 
A–worlds. 
As for a conditional ‘If A, C’, Kratzer characterizes it as implicitly modalized by a 
covert modal. Comparable to the role of ‘must A’, the antecedent A is added to the modal base. 
It acts as a restrictor on the accessible worlds. All accessible worlds must be A–worlds. These 
worlds are quantified over. The conditional is true precisely if the consequent C is true in all 
those worlds which come closest to the world at which the conditional is assessed according to 
the contextually relevant ordering source.  
Kratzer differentiates between several categories of conditionals. The strict conditional 
results if the modal base and the ordering source are empty in the sense of admitting all possible 
worlds as accessible. The material conditional results if the ordering source is empty and the 
modal base contains any proposition that is true at the world of assessment. The counterfactual 
results from an empty modal base and an ordering source which contains anything that is true 
at the world of assessment.  
Summarizing, Kratzer presents an elegant reformulation of the minimal difference 
account, which allows her a generalization to all modal expressions. This concludes my brief 
survey over the basics of the orthodox truth-conditional semantics of counterfactuals. In the 
second and much longer part of this book, I shall discuss several challenges which arise for the 
account. I shall mainly use the Lewisian version of the standard account as it is most widespread 
in the philosophical debates I aim at covering. As indicated at the beginning, my method shall 
be highly casuistic. I shall outline a general problem and then illustrate it by discussing selected 
positions on it in some detail.  
 
 
18 Kratzer, ‘Modality’. 
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2. Challenges to Orthodoxy 
2.1. Logics 
 
I shall start with logics. We have seen that for both Lewis and Stalnaker, the logical properties 
of counterfactuals play a key role in closing in on the right semantics for counterfactuals. They 
accept principles as valid and to be respected as far as there are no intuitive counterexamples. 
As far as there are counterexamples, Lewis and Stalnaker build their view such as to invalidate 
the corresponding principles. The alternative is that the principles are valid, but the apparent 
counterexamples can be explained away by a shift in the semantics of the terms used. I shall 
defend Lewisian orthodoxy against one exemplary way of pursuing this strategy. 
In the Stalnaker–Lewis semantics certain logical principles which hold for the material 
and the strict conditional become invalid: contraposition, strengthening the antecedent, 
transitivity viz. hypothetical syllogism (CSH). The move has been contested. Berit Brogaard 
and Joe Salerno aim at defending the validity of these inferences. Here are three examples of 
intuitively failing inferences (RWH): 
 
`(Reliable John) 
[B1] If John had made a mistake, it would not have been a big mistake.  
[B2] Therefore, if John had made a big mistake, he would not have made a mistake. 
 
(Wet Match) 
[A3] If this match had been struck, it would have lit.  
[B3] Therefore, if this match had been soaked in water overnight and struck, it would have lit. 
 
(Hoover) 
[B4] If J. Edgar Hoover had been a communist, he would have been a traitor.  
[B5] If he had been born a Russian, he would have been a communist.  
[B6] Therefore, if he had been born a Russian, he would have been a traitor.´19 
 
The standard account, say Brogaard and Salerno, consists of the following conditions: 
 
(TC) ‘a subjunctive of the form ‘If A had been the case, B would have been the case’ is true at a world w iff 
B is true in all the A–worlds closest (or most relevantly similar) to w.´  
(Vacuous Case) ` [… ]if there are no closest A–worlds, then vacuously all the closest A–worlds are B–worlds.’ 
(Context) ‘[… ]closeness is contextually determined, since which worlds are relevantly similar to a given 
world is a contextual matter.’ (p. 40) 
 
Based on these assumptions, Brogaard and Salerno outline a way of interpreting RWH 
that preserves their validity provided that context is held fixed. The key move is that Brogaard 
and Salerno only distinguish between possibilities which are closest and possibilities which are 
inaccessible. This does not follow from the way they describe the standard account. It is a 
substantial amendment. If we accept it, CSH become valid.  
Concerning (Reliable John), Brogaard and Salerno distinguish the following 
alternatives: for (B1) to be true, John’s making a big mistake cannot be among the closest 
worlds where John makes a mistake. Thus, it must be inaccessible. If context is held fixed, (B2) 
is vacuously true. The inference is sound. Or, if context is not preserved but changes so as to 
make worlds in which John makes a big mistake accessible, the inference fails merely due to 
context failure. Analogously for (Wet match). Concerning (Hoover), there are two cases. Either 
Hoover’s being Russian is considered an accessible and closest possible situation in which he 
is a communist. Then (B4) is wrong. Or it is and remains inaccessible. Hence the inference is 
valid. Brogaard and Salerno are committed to the following claim: whenever an instance of 
CSH fails, it fails due to context shift. 
 
19 Berit Brogaard and Joe Salerno, ‘Counterfactuals and Context’, Analysis, 68 (2008), 39–46 (p. 39). 
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Brogaard and Salerno direct their criticism against the usual treatment of CSH within 
the standard account. They refer to Lewis’s elaboration of possible–worlds semantics. Their 
objection is that RWH have not been shown to be invalid. For there is the understanding they 
outline. And given the standard account above, they are right. There are versions of that account 
that support their reasoning.  However, the Lewisian version as it is standard in most 
contemporary philosophy enshrines stronger commitments. And given these commitments, 
there are instances of CSH failure that are not due to context shift. 
It is crucial how ‘closest’ in TC is spelled out by Lewis. From the viewpoint of textbook 
Lewisianism, Brogaard and Salerno cannot rule out instances of CSH failing for the following 
reason: The antecedent possibility of the second premise, respectively, is accessible but not as 
close as the antecedent possibility of the first premise. 
In a Lewisian semantics, it is natural to distinguish two things:  
 
Similarity: An antecedent possibility may be closer than another one; nevertheless both are 
accessible.  
Accessibility: An antecedent is not counted among the accessible possibilities at all.20 
 
There is a further difference to textbook Lewisianism: according to Brogaard and Salerno, 
context decides which possibilities are accessible (p. 40). In Lewis’s favourite view, in contrast, 
we ‘…call on context … to resolve part of the vagueness of comparative similarity[…]’21 Lewis 
concludes: ‘My intuition is to explain the influence of context entirely as the resolution 
influence.’22 To Lewis, context only resolves the vagueness of comparative similarity. 
There might be possibilities which are accessible without being closest. But even given 
orthodoxy, why not adopt Brogaard’s and Salerno’s position? The (B2 / A3 / B5) antecedent 
possibilities are as similar as the (B1 / A3 / B4) ones or inaccessible? To see why not, take a 
really far-fetched, nomically impossible variant of (Wet Match): 
 
(Wet Match*) 
(A3) If this match had been struck, it would have lit.  
(B7) Therefore, if the match had been struck and there had been a widespread violation of 
natural laws guiding the behaviour of valence electrons, the match would have lit. 
 
To Brogaard and Salerno there are two alternatives.  
 
First alternative: The antecedent of (B7) is not considered a relevant possibility at all.  
Second alternative: Context shifts such as to make the (B7) antecedent possibility not only 
relevant but as close as the (A3) antecedent possibility. 
 
However, there are conversational situations in which both alternatives are excluded. Imagine 
two physicists discussing:  
 
Dialogue1 
Physicist I: ‘If this match had been struck, it would have lit.’ 
Physicist II: ‘But doesn’t it follow that if the match had been struck and there had been a 
widespread violation of natural laws guiding the behaviour of valence electrons, the match 
would have lit?’ 
 
20 Cf. David Lewis ‘Score–keeping in a language game’, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 8 (1979), 339–59 (p. 
43). 
21 Lewis, Counterfactuals, p. 66. 
22 Lewis, Counterfactuals, p. 67. 
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Physicist I: ‘No. I see the possibility of a wide-spread violation of natural laws. But it is too 
outlandish to draw this conclusion.’ 
 
In this situation, the antecedent of (B7) is acknowledged as an accessible possibility. It seems 
preposterous to assume that Physicist II relies on the contextual inaccessibility of a widespread 
violation of natural laws. It would be as preposterous to insist against Physicist I that in the 
course of the dialogue a gross context shift occurs, which makes the (A3) antecedent possibility 
as close as the (B7) antecedent possibility. 
Brogaard and Salerno might accommodate the Dialogue1 by distinguishing two senses 
of accessibility: 
 
Accessible1: A possibility is conceivable. 
Accessible2: A possibility is counted among the contextually relevant ones. 
 
Physicist I may grant that the (B7) antecedent possibility is conceivable but refuse to count it 
among relevant worlds. However, firstly Physicist I does not have to be understood in this way. 
Secondly, once one accepts a similarity–ordering which is more fine-grained than the 
distinction of being closest and being inaccessible, one simply cannot exclude an interpretation 
of (Wet Match*) according to which the (B7) antecedent is relevant but less similar than the 
(A3) antecedent possibility. Since orthodoxy conceptually makes room for the threefold 
distinction closest–less close albeit accessible–inaccessible, it seems arbitrary to preclude that 
there are contexts in which the second member of the distinction becomes relevant. 
In short, according to orthodoxy, there may well be everyday instances of (Wet Match*) 
of the following sort: 
(i) Both (A3, B7) antecedent possibilities are accessible. 
(ii) The (A3) antecedent possibility is closer, i.e. more similar than the (B7) antecedent 
possibility. 
(iii) No context shift. 
Still (Wet Match*) intuitively fails as an inference. So within an orthodox Lewisian framework, 
Brogaard’s and Salerno’s analysis is not successful. 
Coming to a different logical issue, Brogaard and Salerno also discuss a counterfactual 
version of McGee’s counterexample to modus ponens: 
 
(Reagan) 
[B8] `If a Republican were to win, then if Reagan were not to win, Anderson would win.  
[B9] A Republican will win. 
[B10] So if Reagan were not wo win, Anderson would win.´(p. 44) 
 
Brogaard and Salerno are bound to defend the validity of modus ponens. The orthodox view 
has no difficulties with doing so. One simplified orthodox treatment goes like this: For (B8) to 
be true, we must consider the world where Reagan does not win closest to the closest world 
where a Republican wins. The closest world in which a Republican wins is the actual one, as 
claimed by (B9). In order for (B10) to be true, the next world to the actual world where Reagan 
does not win must be a world where Anderson wins. Since according to (B8) & (B9), the closest 
world where Reagan does not win is a world where Anderson wins, (B10) is true provided (B8) 
and (B9) are. This reasoning generalizes to all cases in which the antecedent possibilities are 
accessible. The argument is valid as no context shift occurs and the similarity ordering is stable. 
When the possibility of a Republican winning is inaccessible, (B8) is vacuously true but (B9) 
cannot be true. When the possibility of Reagan not winning is inaccessible, (B8) and (B10) are 
vacuously true. Modus ponens is preserved.  
Now (B10) is intuitively false. So one better had not to accept (B8) and (B9). 
Fortunately, one is not obliged to hold (B8) true. In the actual world a Republican (Reagan) 
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wins. The next world to the actual world where Reagan does not win does not have to be a 
world where Anderson wins. Rather it might ‘mimic the outcome of the polls’. 
Contrary to this intuitive treatment, Brogaard and Salerno argue that the contextual 
condition held fixed for (B8) and (B9) is that a Republican wins:  
 
‘To evaluate the first premise we go to the nearest worlds in which a Republican wins. As Reagan was first 
in the polls and indeed won, the actual world is the only closest world in which a Republican wins. But the 
Reagan–loser worlds closest to the actual world are still worlds in which a Republican wins. That is because 
the context holds fixed that a Republican wins. And so, the Reagan–loser world closest to the actual world 
must be an Anderson–winner world. The first premise comes out true. Further, since a Republican actually 
won, the second premise is true as well.’(p. 44) 
 
According to Brogaard and Salerno, we hold fixed as part of the context that a Republican wins. 
Worlds where no Republican wins are inaccessible. If we hold context fixed in this way for 
(B8) and (B9), there is no reason why not to hold it fixed until (B10). Then (B10) has to come 
out true. We get the same result provided all antecedent possibilities of (B8)–(B10) are 
accessible and a world where Reagan does not win is inaccessible. In all these cases, we have 
to accept (Reagan). Accepting (Reagan) is a very counterintuitive result. To avoid it, Brogaard 
and Salerno add: 
 
‘However, if we allow the context to shift from a range of worlds in which a Republican won to a range of 
worlds in which the outcome of the election mimics the outcome of the polls, then the conclusion comes out 
false.’(pp. 44–45) 
 
Our intuitive rejection of (Reagan) is explained by a shift between (B9) and (B10). But why 
should there be such a shift? The dichotomy of being closest and being inaccessible does not 
leave much space for shifting manoeuvre. The only promising candidate is this: a world where 
Reagan does not win is promoted from being inaccessible to being accessible. The other way 
round (B10) would be vacuously true. But it seems ad hoc to insist that, when evaluating (B8), 
one finds the world where Reagan loses inaccessible, only to find it accessible when assessing 
(B10). I do not see how Brogaard and Salerno could make further room for ‘mimicking the 
outcome of the polls’. Lewisian orthodoxy can. This is a disastrous result for Brogaard and 
Salerno. 
Are there any reasons to quit the orthodox framework in favour of Brogaard’s and 
Salerno’s solution? It might be argued that it is better to have a unified account in which CSH 
come out valid. But Adams pairs like (A9)/(A10) and (A11)/(A12) show that there are good 
reasons to treat ordinary indicative conditionals, material conditionals, and counterfactuals 
differently. There is no reason to assume that they should be subject to the same logics. So 
being orthodox, we should not wonder if CSH come out valid at least for the material 
conditional but not for counterfactuals.  
Summarizing, I have defended the orthodox account against a revision which promises 
to preserve certain logical principles invalidated by the standard account. There is no sufficient 
reason to preserve these principles against our intuitions. 
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2.2. Challenging Truth–Conditions: Gibbard Cases 
 
I have presented a truth-conditional account of counterfactuals. The idea that counterfactuals 
have truth–conditions has come under pressure from several sides. I shall discuss one exemplary 
argument. The argument revolves around transferring a famous and beautiful counterexample 
to truth-conditional accounts of indicative conditionals to counterfactuals. Here is the 
counterexample:  
 
‘Sly Pete and Mr. Stone are playing poker on a Mississippi riverboat. It is now up to Pete to call or fold. My 
henchman Zack sees Stone’s hand, which is quite good, and signals its content to Pete. My henchman Jack 
sees both hands, and sees that Pete’s hand is rather low, so that Stone’s is the winning hand. At this point, the 
room is cleared. A few minutes later, Zack slips me a note which says ‘If Pete called, he won,’ and Jack slips 
me a note which says ‘If Pete called, he lost.’ I know that these notes both come from my trusted henchmen, 
but do not know which of them sent which note. I conclude that Pete folded.’23 
 
Consider the two conditionals 
 
(C1) If Pete called, he won 
(C2) If Pete called, he lost 
 
Both are uttered in the same context. Both Jack and Zack seem perfectly right to utter these 
conditionals from their point of view. Moreover, Gibbard observes that none of the speakers is 
‘mistaken about something germane‘.24 Yet the two conditionals seem mutually inconsistent: if 
Pete called, he lost entails it is not the case that, if Pete called, he won, and vice versa. Gibbard 
wonders how it can be that two speakers can utter mutually inconsistent conditionals without 
being mistaken. Moreover, the situation seems symmetrical. At least a symmetrical but less 
beautiful example can easily be forged. Here is one due to Bennett:25 
 
In a drainage system, there are three gates, top gate, left gate and right gate. Precisely if top gate 
and left gate are open, water will flow through left gate. Precisely if top gate and right gate are 
open, water will flow through right gate. If top gate is open, either left gate or right gate might 
be open, but not both. If top gate is closed, left gate and right gate might both be open. Righty 
knows additionally that right gate is open. She utters ‘If top gate was open, water flew through 
right gate only’. Lefty knows additionally that left gate is open. She utters: ‘If top gate was open, 
water flew through left gate only’. In fact top gate was closed. 
 
I will come to other symmetric examples in a moment.  
From his observations, Gibbard draws the lesson that indicative conditionals have no 
truth–conditions. To him, it cannot be that two speakers assert true but inconsistent sentences 
in the same context. It cannot be either that at least one of the two sentences is false as that 
would require at least one of the speakers to be mistaken about something germane. Moreover, 
as the symmetric cases show, both sentences would have to be true, or both would have to be 
false; it cannot be that one sentence is false and the other is true. 
I shall very briefly survey some potential reactions before proceeding to counterfactuals. 
One reaction that promises to preserve truth–conditions is an account of assertions of 
conditionals as conditional assertions only in a situation in which A is true. By a conditional 
‘if A, C‘ one asserts C in case A. If A is not true, one does not assert anything. Thus, since Jack 
and Zack did not assert anything, there are no assertions that could conflict. I shall discuss an 
 
23 Alan Gibbard, ‘Two recent theories of conditionals’, in Ifs: Conditionals, Belief, Decision, Chance, and Time, 
ed. by William L. Harper, Robert Stalnaker, Glenn Pearce (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1981), pp. 211–47 (p. 231). 
24 Gibbard, p. 231.  
25 Jonathan Bennett, A Philosophical Guide to Conditionals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 256. 
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account along these lines in section (2.3.1.2.). Here I only point to one problem: assume Jack 
says ‘it is not the case that if Pete called, he won‘. Jack seems to have asserted something true 
regardless of whether Pete did call or not. 
Another proposal would be to withdraw to conditions of assertion instead of truth–
conditions: we do not ask: when is a conditional true? We ask: when is it adequate to assert it? 
The proposal requies us to specify conditions of assertability. Such a view clashes with our 
disposition to call conditionals true and false, respectively. Perhaps such judgements should not 
be taken too seriously, but they show at least that some revision of our everyday ways of 
speaking may be unavoidable if truth–conditions are eschewed. 
My topic in this book are counterfactuals. Thus, instead of further pursuing ways to deal 
with Gibbard’s challenge for indicative conditionals, I shall proceed to discussing whether the 
challenge transmits to counterfactuals. Adam Morton and Dorothy Edgington disagree as to 
whether there are counterfactual Gibbard cases. I shall argue against Morton that there may be 
such cases, and against Edgington that the standard truth–conditional analysis of 
counterfactuals can account for them. The general lesson to be drawn is twofold: First, the 
Gibbard phenomenon should be kept free from theoretical bias. Second, if a truth-conditional 
analysis succeeds in counterfactual cases, it might as well succeed with regard to indicative 
Gibbard conditionals. 
Trying to get Gibbard’s Riverboat example in focus, Jonathan Bennett complains that 
‘[… ]the pure signal of [Gibbard’s] argument has sometimes been invaded by noise coming over 
the wall from the subjunctive [‘would’] domain.’26 I shall present an argument to the contrary. 
Proper attention to counterfactual Gibbard cases helps to purify the signal from theoretical bias. 
The case of counterfactual Gibbard conditionals should be reopened; notwithstanding the 
intense debate between Adam Morton and Dorothy Edgington, the crucial issue remains 
unsettled. 
Edgington argues that in some cases, we can proceed from indicative Gibbard 
conditionals to corresponding counterfactuals. Here is Morton summarizing the example: 
 
‘There is a disease D, vaccines A and B, and a side–effect S. Neither A nor B alone completely prevents D. If 
you’ve had A and you go on to get D you get S; but if you’ve had B and you go on to get D you don’t get S. 
If you’ve had both A and B you don’t get D and so don’t get S. There are two observers X and Y and a patient, 
Jones. X knows hat Jones has had A and thus is justified in believing that if Jones gets D he will get S. Y 
knows that Jones has had B and thus is justified in believing that if Jones gets D he will not get S. Each of 
their beliefs is justified by what they know. They contradict one another, but learning the whole truth will 
not show that one is right, since the whole truth includes the fact that Jones has had both A and B and thus 
will not get D[…] Edgington goes on to consider a dead–Jones case. Suppose Jones is run over by a bus 
before there is any chance of his getting D. Then, she argues, X can say if Jones had got D he would have got 
S and Y can say if Jones had got D he would not have got S. As a result, ‘at that time the Gibbard phenomenon 
applies each has adequate reason for his opinion, and the world rules out there being an objectively correct 
opinion, for it rules out Jones’ getting the disease’.’27 
 
Edgington builds Gibbard counterfactuals which correspond to indicative Gibbard 
conditionals: 
 
(C3) If Jones gets D he will get S. 
(C4) If Jones gets D he will not get S. 
(C5) If Jones had got D he would have got S. 
(C6) If Jones had got D, he would not have got S.  
 
 
26 Bennett, Conditionals, p. 83. 
27 Adam Morton, ‘Can Edgington Gibbard Counterfactuals?’, Mind, 106 (1997), 100–105 (pp. 101–102), quoting 
Dorothy Edgington, ‘On conditionals’, Mind, 104 (1995), 235–330 (p. 319). 
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Edgington accepts, Morton rejects that there are Gibbard counterfactuals. Morton’s argument 
builds on the Lewisian standard analysis of counterfactuals. Bennett agrees with Morton, using 
a similar argument.28 Edgington replies to Morton by arguing against the standard Lewisian 
analysis of counterfactuals.29 Yet a dialectically much stronger point can be made (and then 
turned against both Morton/Bennett and Edgington): even if the standard analysis is accepted, 
Morton cannot establish that Edgington is wrong; there might be Gibbard counterfactuals. To 
make this point, I shall develop my own argument against Morton.  
Morton summarizes what he takes to be necessary and sufficient conditions for 
indicative Gibbard conditionals: 
 
‘The facts are symmetrical between them, in that there are equally good reasons for thinking that one is true 
as that the other is. So one is true iff the other is. Call this Symmetry. But they contradict one another: if 
getting S is a consequence for Jones of getting D then escaping S is not a consequence. Call this 
Contradiction. So the one is true iff the other is not. But these two biconditionals are contradictory. (Note 
that they can be contradictory even if the sentences they discuss have no truth–value.) So we had better not 
give any truth–values.’30 
 
In order to be Gibbard cases, Edgington’s counterfactuals must conform to Symmetry and 
Contradiction, says Morton: 
 
‘Symmetry and Contradiction can be produced for the counterfactuals without specifying anything that makes 
them cease to hold for the indicatives. Thus Edgington has to make two claims about the dead Jones case. 
First, that the case can be spelled out so that there are no further facts which favour one counterfactual over 
its contrary which do not also favour one of the indicatives in the live Jones case over its contrary[…] And 
second that in the situation thus spelled out either of the two counterfactuals is true iff the other is false.’31 
 
In Morton’s view, the acceptance of Gibbard counterfactuals that correspond to 
indicative Gibbard conditionals depends on two claims: 
 
Counterfactual Symmetry: there are no further facts which favour one counterfactual over its 
contrary which do not also favour one of the corresponding indicatives over its contrary. 
Contradiction: one of the two counterfactuals is true iff the other is false. 
 
As we will see, however, the acceptance of Gibbard counterfactuals does not commit one to 
any of these claims.  
Morton uses Counterfactual Symmetry and Contradiction in arguing as follows: 
purported Gibbard counterfactuals either fail to satisfy Symmetry or Contradiction.  
Consider the first alternative: Gibbard counterfactuals fail to satisfy Counterfactual 
Symmetry. Morton’s argument is that there normally are facts which break the symmetry. They 
are relevant to making one counterfactual false and the other true without doing the same for 
the indicative counterparts. There are different ways of further fleshing out the situation 
depicted by Edgington. For instance, it might be that Jones almost missed his appointment to 
get A, but only extraordinary circumstances could have prevented him from getting B.32 
According to Morton, such circumstances make worlds in which Jones failed to get A closer 
than worlds in which Jones failed to get B. If Jones had got D, that would be because he had 
not got A. Yet he would still have got B before. Thus (C5) if Jones had got D, he would have 
got S. The additional assumptions act as tie–breakers in the case of counterfactuals but not in 
 
28 Bennett, Conditionals, p. 242. 
29 Dorothy Edgington, ‘Truth, Objectivity, Counterfactuals and Gibbard’, Mind, 106 (1997), 107–116 (pp. 112–
113). Cf. the critical review of Edgington’s argument in Bennett, Conditionals, pp. 255–256. 
30 Morton, ‘Gibbard’, p. 101. 
31 Morton, ‘Gibbard’, p. 102. 
32 Morton, ‘Gibbard’, p. 102. 
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the case of the corresponding indicative conditionals. Then the former violate Symmetry while 
the latter do not. Counterfactual Symmetry does not hold. Thus, the additional facts which hold 
in the scenario disqualify purported counterfactual Gibbard cases. 
The second alternative is that Contradiction fails: Morton acknowledges that 
Edgington’s example can be fleshed out such as to yield perfectly symmetrical counterfactuals. 
For instance, Jones might have been administered both A and B before his birth.33 While in 
asymmetric cases, Morton takes it for granted that only one counterfactual is true and the other 
is false, in symmetric cases, he does not take this for granted. In these cases, Contradiction 
becomes crucial. According to Morton, the symmetric cases miss this second condition of 
Gibbard cases. From ‘it is not the case that if Jones had got D, he would have got S’, it does not 
follow that ‘if Jones had got D, he would not have got S’. It may simply be that both are false. 
Coming to my criticism, I shall first address Contradiction. I doubt that Contradiction 
is a necessary condition for Gibbard cases. We have seen Morton noting: ‘…if getting S is a 
consequence for Jones of getting D then escaping S is not a consequence. Call this 
Contradiction. So the one is true iff the other is not.’ Contradiction as Morton has it implies 
that one of the conditionals is true iff the other is not (not (A→C)↔(A→not–C)). As Morton 
acknowledges, what we need for Gibbard cases is the following: ‘if getting S is a consequence 
for Jones of getting D then escaping S is not a consequence’. But to satisfy this requirement, 
we do not need Contradiction. We need only that the two conditionals cannot both be true; one 
is true only if the other is not: 
 
Weak Contradiction: Not both ‘If D, S’ and ‘if D, not S’ 
 
This is exactly the principle employed by Bennett. He calls it  
 
‘Conditional Non–Contradiction: not((A→C)(A→not C))’34 
 
And it is plausible that counterfactuals meet this requirement!35 Gibbard cases only have to 
satisfy the weaker principle.36 Thus, violating Contradiction does not disqualify a pair of 
counterfactuals from forming a Gibbard case. 
Having discussed Contradiction, I shall now discuss Counterfactual Symmetry. 
Counterfactual Symmetry is not sufficient to bring home Morton’s point as it does not bear on 
perfectly symmetric cases. Still it is worth discussing. By Morton’s lights there is a key 
difference to indicative Gibbard conditionals. Fleshing out the story will very often lead to one 
of the counterfactuals being true, the other false. We have to ask which is the slightest departure 
from actuality that leads to Jones getting the disease. Morton’s examples of fleshing out the 
story make one candidate vivid: Jones has only got one of the vaccines. He almost has missed 
getting A. So we might reckon a situation in which he has not got A closer than a situation in 
which he has not got B. Given some auxiliary assumptions, Y’s counterfactual is true but X’s 
is not. In a genuine Gibbard situation, Morton argues, there is no comparable way of fleshing 
out the story such that one of the indicative conditionals comes true but the other does not. 
Thus, Morton gives reasons to assume that we often have Gibbard lookalikes in which both 
opponents are equally entitled to their conditionals but these conditionals are false. The 
counterfactuals violate Symmetry. 
 
33 Morton, ‘Gibbard’, p. 103  
34 Bennett, Conditionals, p. 84. 
35 Thus, Edgington’s and Morton’s discussion whether conditional excluded middle holds seems beside the point 
(Edgington, ‘Truth’, p. 114). 
36 But what if someone insists on the stronger principle? I reply with a question: Why does one need the stronger 
principle in contrast to the weaker one, why is it essential to the Gibbard phenomenon? 
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In reply, in order to hear the pure voice of the Gibbard phenomenon, we should get rid 
of theoretical noise. Adopt for a moment a stance of theoretical innocence: The standard 
analysis of counterfactuals has not yet been established. Considering the symmetric dead Jones 
scenario, would anyone unaffected by theory surmise where to look for the additional facts that 
make X’s and Y’s counterfactuals false? I imagine that she would be in the very same position 
we are when considering the case of Jones being alive: Untainted by theory, what we know is 
that X’s and Y’s epistemic standing is symmetric. Both protagonists are epistemically 
blameless; they are not mistaken about anything germane. And we know that they are ignorant 
about some matter that is relevant to their conditionals: Jones has got both vaccines. There 
might be further matters which are relevant. It is open what consequence for the truth–value of 
the conditionals should be drawn. Weak Contradiction indicates that they cannot both be true. 
In the case of indicative conditionals, it is a mystery how one or both could be false, and which 
fact could make them false.37 Yet the only difference to the case of counterfactuals is that a 
well-established standard analysis provides an answer how the counterfactuals can be false. 
Without the standard analysis, no one would have thought of this answer. We do not (yet) have 
an equally well-established answer for indicative conditionals. But nothing precludes that such 
an answer might be established, and that it tells us where to look for the facts that make 
indicative Gibbard conditionals false. 
One might feel hesitant to endorse this diagnosis as long as no indication has been given 
where to look for additional facts that could make indicative Gibbard conditionals true or false. 
Thus, I mention some examples of a truth-conditional analysis: one is the classical horseshoe 
analysis of the indicative conditional.38 Considered as material conditionals, both X’s and Y’s 
verdicts come true simply in virtue of their antecedents being false. X and Y are ignorant but 
not mistaken about this fact. As in the counterfactual case, there is an unknown additional fact 
that decides the truth–value of the conditionals. There might be other candidates for such facts. 
I do not want to advocate the horseshoe analysis; after all, it violates Weak Contradiction.  
An alternative example is Stalnaker’s view: the upshot is that the truth–value of the 
indicative Gibbard cases is evaluated in the same way as the truth–value of the counterfactual 
ones: We ask which world is more similar, needs a smaller departure from the actual world, a 
D&S–world or a D&not–S–world.39 Under symmetry all conditionals are indeterminate as the 
selection function does not select a unique closest world.40 Still conditionals have truth–
conditions. This completes the parallel between indicative and counterfactual conditionals. In 
both cases, there is an intuitive puzzle how to decide between conflicting conditionals; in both 
cases, one person may be perfectly entitled to endorse one of the conflicting conditionals, while 
another person may be perfectly entitled to endorse the other. The only difference is that in the 
 
37 DeRose alleges that in the Riverboat example, the only fact eligible for making one conditional false is Pete 
having the lower hand (Keith DeRose, ‘The Conditionals of Deliberation’, Mind, 119 (2010), 1–42 (p. 24)). He 
rules out this candidate, though, as one may hold onto the conditional (C1) upon learning that Pete probably has 
the lower hand. I cannot do justice to this argument here but only outline a strategy to begin with. As a first step, 
offer an explanation why one may falsely deem Pete’s losing hand a fact that makes the conditional false: normally, 
learning about Pete’s hand leads to retracting the conditional; yet this is not due to the latter’s falsity but rather 
because it has become pointless, the antecedent situation being too improbable; in contrast, one may also choose 
to give it a point (‘To be sure, given the distribution of cards, it is improbable that Pete will win; yet he will never 
call unless he has the winning hand; so if he calls, he will win.’). In a second step, the analogy with counterfactuals 
is exploited to show that the facts making a conditional false might be far from obvious; instead of a simple, well–
confined matter of fact (Pete’s losing hand), we might have to explore a complicated configuration of facts playing 
some complex semantical role (forming the world closest to actuality or the like). By the way, the very asymmetry 
exploited in DeRose’s argument (one conditional being less well founded) sheds doubt on the Riverboat example 
as a paragon of the Gibbard intuition, in contrast to Edgington’s more symmetric one (cf. William G. Lycan, Real 
Conditionals (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005), p. 169). 
38 Cf. Lycan, Real Conditionals, p. 171, on Lewis’s view.  
39 Cf. Lycan, Real Conditionals, pp. 171–172. 
40 Cf. Bennett, Conditionals, p. 183. 
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counterfactual case, there is a well-established truth-conditional analysis, in the indicative case, 
there is none. 
While these considerations may be sufficient to shed doubts on Morton’s argument, the 
main intuitive difference remains: at least one in a pair of purported Gibbard counterfactuals is 
false. In contrast, Gibbard says on the indicative conditionals: 
 
‘[…]one sincerely asserts something false only when one is mistaken about something germane. […] Neither 
[of the protagonists] has any relevant false beliefs, and indeed both may well suspect the whole relevant 
truth.’41 
 
The requirement that both opponents may suspect the whole relevant truth must not be read too 
strongly. If X and Y had reasons to suspect that Jones has had both A and B, their entitlement 
to their conditionals would be in danger. If Zack and Jack suspected that Sly Pete knew his 
opponent’s hand and had the losing hand himself, they would refrain from asserting their 
conditionals. Jack might uphold his conditional if pressed, but there would be no point in 
asserting it. Thus, what remains is the requirement that the protagonists not be mistaken about 
relevant facts.  
Bennett adds the requirement that both opponents are fully entitled to their conditionals: 
‘I stress fully entitled; these acceptances are intellectually perfect.’42 This requirement must not 
be read too strongly either. ‘Intellectually perfect’ cannot mean that the positions of X and Y 
could not be epistemically superior with respect to assessing their conditionals, be they 
indicative or subjunctive. Surely it would in a way be better if they knew that Jones has had A 
and B. But this does not impair their entitlement. What remains is the requirement that both 
speakers must be entitled to their conditionals. 
In sum, we have two requirements for Gibbard cases: none of the two speakers must be 
mistaken about anything relevant to the truth of their utterances. Both must be justified in their 
utterances. 
Given these requirements, the question becomes: are X and Y mistaken about anything 
germane in uttering their counterfactuals, or is there anything that impairs their justification? 
We may first ask: do they have any relevant false beliefs? Of course, in the Lewisian standard 
analysis, at least one of the counterfactuals is false. So at least one of X and Y has relevant false 
beliefs, namely the counterfactuals themselves. Yet since it is open whether indicative Gibbard 
conditionals are false just as their counterfactual versions, it would beg the question to use the 
falsity of the counterfactuals as a reason against their being Gibbard cases. Bennett emphasizes: 
‘Gibbard must mean that one sincerely asserts something false only if one is mistaken about 
some relevant nonconditional matter of fact.’43 X and Y do not seem mistaken about some 
relevant non-conditional matter of fact.  
Morton insists that there are further facts which may decide the truth–value of the 
counterfactuals but do not bear on the truth–value of the indicatives. Perhaps X and Y are 
mistaken about them, or their ignorance undercuts their justification. To assess this hypothesis, 
we may ask: should X and Y scrutinize these facts before endorsing their counterfactuals? The 
answer is no. Morton fails to explain an important finding of Edgington’s: in her example, X’s 
and Y’s transition from the indicative to the subjunctive conditionals seems perfectly smooth. 
There is no additional condition for this transition besides Jones being run over by a bus; nor is 
there anything patently irrational or illegitimate about it.  
We can account for the smooth transition within the standard Lewisian analysis of 
counterfactuals. According to Lewis’s standard criteria, some minimal divergence from 
 
41 Gibbard, ‘Two Theories of Conditionals’, p. 231. 
42 Bennett, Conditionals, p. 83. 
43 Bennett, Conditionals, p. 84. 
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actuality brings about Jones getting D; under determinism, it amounts to a small miracle.44 From 
our better-informed perspective it seems difficult to say whether Jones would have got S had 
he got D. Any small divergence that brings about Jones getting D must interfere with A and B 
having their normal effect. We cannot tell in how far this leads to Jones getting S or not. 
However, the smooth transition in Edgington’s example indicates that in contrast to us, X and 
Y do not have to bother. Why not? None has reason to assume that Jones has got both vaccines. 
In order to account for the smooth transition, we must regard X and Y as perfectly vindicated 
in neglecting this possibility, just as they justifiably neglect it when endorsing the indicative 
conditionals.  
It is important to appreciate Edgington’s choice of example. She has Jones run over by 
a bus in order to make getting D a suitable counterfactual scenario. X and Y know that John 
has been run over by a bus. Jones having had both vaccines would also be sufficient for ensuring 
D to be contrary–to–fact. Yet if X and Y knew that Jones has had both vaccines, their reasons 
to accept their counterfactuals would not be sufficient, just as they would not be sufficient to 
accept the indicative variants. The smooth transition to the counterfactuals can be explained as 
follows: to get a justified take on the counterfactual case, X and Y only need to consider the 
minimal departure from actuality undoing John’s having run over by a bus and making him 
contract D. Since they have no reason to suspect that John has got both drugs, they do not have 
to take into account a departure that undoes this fact. 
In sum, even granted that one of two Gibbard counterfactuals has to be false, nothing 
we are told about indicative Gibbard cases excludes that the same goes for them. As a 
consequence, assuming X’s and Y’s counterfactuals are false, they testify against Gibbard’s 
claim that ‘one sincerely asserts something false only when one is mistaken about something 
germane’. To be mistaken about something germane would require to be mistaken about some 
fact which one should know or suspect before incurring a commitment to a conditional. X and 
Y do not seem mistaken in this way, and still one of the counterfactuals they accept may be 
false. The same criticism applies to Bennett’s claim (‘→’ stands for the indicative conditional): 
 
‘[… ]we saw how one person can be perfectly entitled to accept A→C and to accept A→not C; but this cannot 
happen with A>>C  and A>>¬C. [… ]Never can both be true or fully acceptable, as conflicting indicatives in 
a Gibbardian stand–off can be.’45 
 
Indeed, it might be impossible for both counterfactuals to be true; but each might nevertheless 
be endorsed in isolation with perfect entitlement, be fully acceptable, just as the conflicting 
indicatives. This counts against the alleged difference between the indicative conditionals and 
the counterfactuals: not being mistaken about something germane and being fully entitled is 
compatible with indicative Gibbard conditionals being false, just as at least one of the 
corresponding counterfactuals is.  
I ponder a potential reply: perhaps the crucial issue is not what X and Y should know 
but simply what they do not know. The question becomes: Is it irreconcilable with the Gibbard 
phenomenon that some protagonist in a Gibbard case is ignorant about non-conditional facts 
bearing on her conditional? The answer must be no. For any indicative Gibbard cases, there are 
relevant facts which the protagonists do not know. If they were to take into account these facts, 
they would not utter their conditionals.  
Taking stock, the Gibbard intuition should be kept free from theoretical presuppositions. 
And it should be ensured that the relevant symmetries of epistemic position obtain. Instead of 
Morton’s Symmetry and Contradiction, Gibbard cases are subject to the following 
requirements: 
 
 
44 Lewis, ‘Counterfactual Dependence’, pp. 47–48, 59. 
45 Bennett, Conditionals, p. 242, notation adapted. 
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Epistemic Symmetry:  
X and Y are in a symmetric evidential situation such that no one is mistaken about anything 
germane. 
X is entitled to accept a conditional ‘if A, C’ (respectively the corresponding counterfactual, if 
applicable). 
Y is equally well entitled to accept a conditional ‘if A, not–C’ (respectively the corresponding 
counterfactual, if applicable). 
 
Weak Contradiction:  
‘If A, C’ and ‘if A, not–C’ cannot both be true; the corresponding counterfactuals cannot be 
either. 
 
If Gibbard scenarios are understood in this way, they are reconcilable with a truth-
conditional analysis of counterfactuals. This gives rise to an important dialectical point: As far 
as Gibbard cases are concerned, a truth-conditional analysis of indicative conditionals may fare 
as badly or as well as the truth-conditional analysis of counterfactuals.  
In my view, considering counterfactuals may be the best way to argue for Epistemic 
Symmetry and Weak Contradiction as requirements for genuine Gibbard cases. Since there is a 
well-established truth-conditional analysis, it becomes obvious that both protagonists can be 
perfectly justified to endorse their conditionals although they are false. Where there is no such 
analysis, this tends to be obscured. So contrary to Bennett’s complaint, the news coming over 
the wall from the subjunctive domain help to overcome a theory–bias which distorts the Gibbard 
intuition. It is ironic that Edgington’s discovery of Gibbard counterfactuals can be turned 
against the lesson ‘no truth–conditions’ she herself draws from Gibbard’s examples.  
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2.3. Probabilities 
2.3.1. Proposals in the Literature 
2.3.1.1. Schulz’s Arbitrariness Account 
 
One big issue for the theory of counterfactuals is the role of probability. I shall discuss a range 
of accounts which approach this topic. One subcase of probabilistic counterfactuals are 
counterfactuals about lotteries. Lotteries pose great challenges to epistemology. Yet intuitions 
on lottery counterfactuals are also notoriously puzzling. In particular, they seem in tension with 
the standard account of counterfactuals.  
I shall start with discussing an approach recently developed by Moritz Schulz.46 To 
dissolve problems with lottery counterfactuals, Schulz comes up with a new semantics for 
counterfactuals. The new semantics dissolves the tension discerned in the standard account and 
nevertheless preserves many of the attractive features of the latter. 
In discussing Schulz’s approach, I first briefly summarize the problem and the solution 
à la Schulz. Second, I discuss some uncertainties about Schulz’s presentation of the problem 
and propose an amendment. Instead of a principle based on the theoretical notion of subjunctive 
credence, one should rather use more basic linguistic evidence. Third, I present counterevidence 
to Schulz’s solution: it does not square well with the embedding behaviour of counterfactuals. 
Embedding evidence is contestable. Yet the evidence I provide just testifies to an independently 
motivated aspect of counterfactual reasoning: it tracks a natural distinction between what does 
and what does not follow from the antecedent plus background facts.  
Schulz addresses a problem of lottery counterfactuals. In the simplified standard 
account, a counterfactual is true iff all relevant antecedent worlds are consequent worlds. 
Relevance in turn is usually spelled out in terms of closeness or similarity to an evaluation 
world. Take a fair lottery with a great many tickets. Anna does not buy a ticket. What about the 
following counterfactual? 
 
(D1) #If Anna had bought a lottery ticket, she would have lost. 
 
It seems somewhat inappropriate to utter (D1). Perhaps (D1) can be felicitously uttered when 
one wants to stress how unreasonable it would have been for Anna to buy a ticket. But in many 
contexts, (D1) seems infelicitous. In the standard (Lewis–Stalnaker) account of counterfactuals, 
this is explained as follows. (D1) is obviously not true, and so one had better not assert it. For 
(D1) to be true, all the contextually relevant worlds where Anna buys a ticket have to be worlds 
where she loses. Contextual relevance is standardly spelled out in terms of closeness or 
similarity to the world from which the conditional is evaluated (usually the actual one). The 
relevant worlds are usually partitioned as follows (though this does not directly follow from the 
standard account): Anna has precisely one particular ticket t and ticket 1 wins, Anna has ticket 
t and ticket 2 wins... Hence besides all the relevant worlds where she loses there is one relevant 
world where she wins. (D1) is not true.  
To bring out the puzzle, Schulz asks what degree of credence one should place in (D1). 
He contends that credence should abide by an intuitive constraint. Provided there is no 
inadmissible evidence, your rational credence Cr(...) in a counterfactual P >> Q should equal 
the objective probability Ch(...) of the consequent given the antecedent (measured by the 
proportion of Q–worlds among the relevant P–worlds): 
 
(Credence) Cr(P>>Q|Ch(Q|P)=x)=x.  
 
 
46 Moritz Schulz, ‘Counterfactuals and Arbitrariness’, Mind, 123 (2014), 1021–1055. 
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Applying this constraint yields high credence in (D1). The chance of Anna’s ticket losing given 
she buys one is high. Yet applying the standard account, one knows that (D1) is false. How can 
one place high credence in what one knows for certain to be false, given the standard account? 
Schulz’s solution is to introduce a new truth–condition for counterfactuals: 
 
A counterfactual P>>Q is true iff Q at some P–world which is arbitrarily selected from the 
relevant, e.g. most similar P–worlds.  
 
One gets precisely the desired epistemic profile: (D1) is true provided the arbitrarily 
selected world where Anna buys a ticket is one where she loses. The ratio of losing and winning 
worlds which are available for the arbitrary selection precisely corresponds to the objective 
probability of losing as contrasted to winning in the lottery. Since the probability of Anna losing 
is very high, so should one’s credence in (D1) be. However, one cannot know (D1) to be true, 
just as Anna cannot know in advance that her ticket will lose when she buys it. Hence it seems 
epistemically irresponsible to assert (D1). As a result, we get an explanation why it seems 
inappropriate to utter (D1).  
 
The evidence revisited  
 
While I agree that there is a puzzle around, I feel uncertain about the manner it is presented. In 
particular, I doubt that (Credence) is intuitive upon closer inspection. (Credence) is motivated 
by a parallel to Lewis’s  
 
(Principal Principle): Cr(P|Ch(P|E)=x)=x. 
 
Your credence in P should equal the chance of P given your total evidence E, provided the latter 
is admissible. It is notoriously difficult to characterize admissibility, but, as a first stab, your 
total evidence should only inform you about the chance of P, not independently about whether 
P is the case. (Credence) is not as immediately compelling as (Principal Principle).  
The problem of this parallel can be illustrated by an example where probabilities are 
more volatile than in the lottery case: 
 
(D2) There has been a storm in the North Sea on May 15.  
 
Assume you have good reasons to think that, as distinguished from a lottery, the probability of 
a storm in the North Sea constantly changes throughout history until May 15. Moreover, all 
your evidence with respect to (D2) tells you that, on May 9, the chance of a storm was 30%. 
Then your credence in (D2) should be 0.3. Now assume you get additional information that 
there has been no storm. This is clearly relevant evidence which should change your credence 
in (D2) to close to 0. Conditional credence behaves similarly. Consider the conditional 
probability of a storm in the North Sea on May 15 given there was a storm in the Irish Sea ten 
hours before. Assume all you know is that it tends to be very volatile, but on May 9, it was 
60%. Then your credence in a storm in the North Sea on May 15 conditional on a storm in the 
Irish sea ten hours before should be 0.6. Now additionally assume that, May 15 having passed, 
you know that there was no storm either in the North Sea or in the Irish Sea. Then your 
conditional credence will presumably be undefined. 
Consider  
 
(D3) There would have been a storm in the North Sea on May 15 if there had been a storm in 
the Irish Sea ten hours before. 
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What does (Credence) tell you? Your only relevant information is that at some time the 
conditional probability of there being a storm in the North Sea given a storm in the Irish sea 
was 0.6. According to (Credence), your credence in (D3) should be 0.6. But once you know 
that there has been no storm, it is not obvious that your credence should be guided by the 
probability on May 9 just because you happen to know it. The motive for doubt is that the 
conditional probability is so volatile. In the lottery cases, this problem of (Credence) does not 
become manifest as probabilities are not volatile. 
There are several ways to defend (Credence) against these concerns. One may deny that 
the conditional probability on May 9 is the probability that figures in (Credence). But then the 
latter probability becomes mysterious. One may deny that (Credence) is applicable when you 
know there has been no storm either in the North Sea or the Irish Sea. For the present conditional 
probability of a storm is undefined. But then the question becomes why the same does not hold 
for (D1) as you know that the antecedent is contrary–to–fact. Another way to defend (Credence) 
would be to exploit the admissibility constraint from (Principal Principle). Perhaps evidence 
that the conditional probability is volatile is inadmissible. But firstly, I feel uneasy about 
(Credence) even when you know the conditional probability at some point long before 
antecedent time but are completely in the dark as to whether this probability is stable. Secondly, 
we lack an explanation why the admissibility constraint behaves so differently in the case of 
counterfactuals and actual events. 
I do not want to deny that something like (Credence) may be true, nor that it yields the 
intuitive results for (D1). I just want to highlight disanalogies between (Credence) and 
(Principal Principle). These disanalogies are significant. (Principal Principle) guides reasoning 
where one only knows the chances of an event and not whether it actually will occur or has 
occurred. In contrast, counterfactual reasoning (at least of the ‘had’–’would’–sort) is mostly 
used to reason about events one knows not to have occurred. These disanalogies should prevent 
one from simply adopting (Credence) as a general principle.47  
Instead of (Credence), I suggest to make do with linguistic intuitions, which have a less 
problematic standing. The following seems intuitively acceptable: 
 
(D4) If Anna had bought a lottery ticket, she would probably have lost. 
 
But at least judging from its surface form, in asserting (D4), one seems to claim that (D1) is 
probably true. So one seems to accept that something one knows to be false is probably true. 
The result is very close to Schulz’s original puzzle, but rests only on elementary linguistic data. 
One gets an expression which captures some of the ideas behind (Credence) if one inserts one 
particular probability. Assume there are 10,000 tickets in the lottery. Then intuitively, 
 
(D5) If Anna had bought a ticket, it is 99.99 percent probable that she would have lost. 
 
Instead of putting the evidence in terms of credence 0.9999 in (D1), one may put it in terms of 
our willingness to accept (D5).  
Even stronger evidence in favour of Schulz’s account can be derived from the more 
cautious 
 
(D6) If Anny had bought a lottery ticket, she would perhaps have lost. 
 
Taken at face value, the epistemic modal adverb ‘perhaps’ here seems to be used to express the 
epistemic possibility that (D1) is true. This epistemic possibility is ruled out by the standard 
 
47 Sarah Moss, ‘Subjunctive Credences and Semantic Humility’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 87 
(2013), 251–78, avoids this problem by exclusively focusing on future–directed subjunctive conditionals. 
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account (what we know about the lottery situation) but ensured by Schulz’s account. Unless 
there is a convincing rival explanation, (D4) and (D6) strongly support Schulz’s account.  
I have argued that the linguistic intuitions mentioned have a less problematic standing 
than (Credence). However, I admit that they come with uncertainties of their own that would 
be avoided by basing the argument on (Credence). For instance, one may doubt that, in 
accepting (D4), one accepts that (D1) is probable. The same for (D6). Indeed I will come up 
with a somewhat diverging reading.  Still it seems to me that (Credence) is not compelling 
enough as a general principle to bear the weight of Schulz’s argument. 
 
Counterevidence to Schulz’s account 
 
I shall now discuss some range of data which seem to speak against Schulz’s account. Schulz’s 
solution owes its special charm to the combination of definite truth or falsity with 
unknowability: a lottery counterfactual like (D1) is definitely true/false albeit principally 
unknowable. Now we can usually play through the truth of some statement hypothetically even 
when we are not in a position to know it. In this vein, we may try to hypothetically consider 
what follows from the truth of (D1). Hypothetical reasoning of this sort is expressed by 
‘assume’, ‘suppose’, ‘under the hypothesis’ and the like. Unfortunately, these expressions 
interact in a very intricate way with conditionals; we get enmeshed in the notorious embedding 
problem. I am well aware that using evidence from embedding, of which we already have seen 
an example in Brogaard and Salerno’s discussion of (Reagan), is deeply problematic. I do not 
want to incur a commitment to the general possibility of embedding, or one particular analysis 
of embedded conditionals. But I do not think either that embedding intuitions can be simply 
dismissed.  
I shall present some particular examples where I have rather clear intuitions. These 
intuitions are in tension with Schulz’s account. Someone who wants to defend the latter faces 
the challenge to explain their precise profile. Simply pointing to other problems with embedding 
is not sufficient as an explanation. Moreover, I shall argue that the best explanation invokes 
some independently motivated picture of the role of counterfactual reasoning. So even if one is 
reluctant about embedding, this picture motivates general doubts about Schulz’s solution. 
There is a further reason why one should not easily dismiss the embedding evidence I 
am going to present. Implicit embedding is almost ubiquitous in philosophical reasoning. I 
implicitly used it in presenting (D1) embedded in a hypothetical lottery scenario where some 
fictional person Anna does not buy a ticket. The cases to come are different only in that they 
focus on the embedding. 
I observe that it often seems quite natural to embed certain counterfactuals into 
hypothetical or suppositional reasoning. Especially amenable to such an embedding are 
counterfactuals which may well be true for all we know, even given Schulz’s account. I shall 
consider two embedding examples. Both elicit significantly different intuitions, contrary to 
what one should expect given Schulz’s account. The first example is a dispute between Galilei 
and an Aristotelean physicist. Both disagree about free fall in a vacuum. Galilei may say: 
 
‘Consider two bodies of different mass in a vacuum and without any disturbing influence. 
Perhaps they would fall at the same speed, perhaps they would fall at different speeds. Assume 
the following: 
 
(D7) If two bodies of different mass had been dropped, they would have fallen at different 
speeds.  
 
Given this assumption, the Aristotelean theory may be right. Given the opposite assumption, it 
is false.’ 
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The ruminations of my imagined Galilei seem perfectly in order. He considers two different 
hypotheses viz. epistemic possibilities of what happens in all relevant antecedent situations.  
I shall now compare the Galilei case to a lottery case. I take it for granted that, in a 
double slit experiment, it is perfectly indeterminate whether an electron passes through one slit 
A or the other slit B. Nothing hinges on this particular example. If there are perfectly 
indeterministic processes (which should not be precluded for semantic reasons), any of them 
would do as an example. Consider two physicists faced with a concrete double slit experiment. 
One of them says: 
 
‘Consider the experimental setting within a longer time period t. As you can see, no electron 
has passed. But what if things had been otherwise? Note that I do not want you to consider what 
would have happened if an electron had passed through slit A. I want you to consider just what 
would have happened if an electron had passed through one of the two slits.48 Assume the 
following:  
 
(D8) #If an electron had passed through one of the two slits within t, it would have passed 
through A.’ 
 
I take it that (D8) is odd in the context of hypothetical reasoning. One is tempted to reply: ‘I 
cannot assume this! It is indeterminate which slit the electron would have passed!’  
 
Here is the most plausible explanation: one can only assume (‘assume the following’) 
what one takes to be a genuine epistemic possibility. In an appropriate context, we are willing 
to consider very far-fetched possibilities. Yet we cannot make room for the assumption that 
(D8) is true. This is evidence that, under the common assumption that the path of the electron 
is genuinely indeterminate, there is no epistemic possibility that (D8) is true. But in Schulz’s 
theory, there is a salient epistemic possibility that (D8) is true. One of the worlds to be arbitrarily 
selected is a world where the electron passes through A. So the best explanation of why (D8) is 
odd conflicts with Schulz’s theory.49 
One may object that the uneasiness about (D8) is not semantic but rather pragmatic in 
nature: for an epistemic possibility to be taken seriously as a hypothesis, what is taken to be 
epistemically possible should not be unknowable for principled reasons. Since one can never 
know (D8), (D1), and the like for principled reasons, it does not make sense to consider them 
as hypotheses. But it may be interesting to consider epistemic possibilities even if what is 
possible is unknowable in principle. A more serious ad hoc–concern is why the physicist would 
want to consider (D8).50 Perhaps she uses intuitive counterfactuals to assess some Everettian 
many worlds–approach to quantum physics. 
 
48 There is a temptation to resolve embedded conditionals by non–literal interpretations. In problematic cases, the 
request to assume that P had been the case if Q would have been may be taken non–literally as a request to reason 
what would have been the case if P and Q had been the case. Where there is such a danger, it seems natural to 
explicitly rule out the non–literal interpretation. 
49 What if the assumption is interpreted as a metaphysical possibility? Then we get a nested counterfactual like  
 
(B8) If a Republican were to win, then if Reagan were not to win, Anderson would win.  
 
In Schulz’s account, such an interpretation again would face difficulties explaining the difference between (D7) 
and (D8). In the standard account, we get an explanation: there might be a closest metaphysically possible world 
where (D8) is true, but that world would be one with very different natural laws and therefore irrelevant to the 
double slit experiment. 
50 Why did I use the physicist instead of a lottery case? In the latter, it will be very difficult to preclude the reading 
‘If she had bought a ticket and lost…’ from influencing intuitions due to its pragmatic significance. 
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One may deny that Schulz is committed to the truth and falsity of (D8). Yet there seems 
to be such a commitment provided the relevant antecedent worlds are divided up in worlds in 
which the electron goes through slit A and worlds in which it goes through slit B. One may 
deny that they are divided in this way, but this seems unmotivated unless one brings up physical 
reasons for dividing up the relevant worlds differently, which rather invalidate the concrete 
example than the overall objection. 
I shall not further discuss concerns about the embedding evidence, arguing instead that 
the difference between the Galilei and the double slit case sits well with some platitudes about 
the role of counterfactuals: in a counterfactual, one makes a supposition that one normally takes 
to be contrary–to–fact as the antecedent sentence is not true. Then one considers what follows 
from this supposition together with certain background facts (those ‘cotenable’ with the 
antecedent). The standard analysis is one way of spelling out what the background facts are. In 
the Galilei case, it follows from the antecedent etc. whether the two bodies would or would not 
fall at the same speed. In the double slit case, it does not follow whether the electron passes one 
slit or the other. For (D8) to be true, this would have to follow.51 Counterfactual reasoning 
tracks a joint-carving distinction which is deeply rooted in our world view, the distinction 
between outcomes which follow and outcomes which do not follow from the antecedent. 
Schulz’s solution blurs this distinction. The arbitrary selection process fixes an outcome where 
the antecedent plus background facts does not fix it. 
In using the notion of counterfactual entailment (what ‘follows’ from the antecedent), I 
am well aware that this notion is problematic, in particular when we are in an indeterministic 
setting. The problems are not fully dissolved by the standard account. But the standard truth–
condition that all relevant antecedent worlds have to be consequent worlds comes reasonably 
close to a notion of entailment that is characterised by validity in all possible worlds. My 
alternative to Schulz’s account to come will weaken this condition for some counterfactuals 
(those read non-maximally). But it preserves the idea of entailment. The idea is that 
counterfactual entailment (all relevant antecedent worlds are consequent worlds) is 
approximated (the exceptions among the antecedent worlds do not matter).  
Before coming to my own proposal, I shall discuss a further solution to the problems 
with lottery conditionals. 
 
 
51 The relevant notion of entailment should allow for indeterminism. Perhaps it can be spelled out in probabilistic 
terms. 
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2.3.1.2. Barnett’s Suppositional Account 
 
I shall now turn to a second proposal that promises to account for probabilistic counterfactuals.  
In a series of articles, David Barnett has developed a highly original general theory of 
conditionals.52 The grand aim is to reconcile two main rivals: a suppositional and a truth-
conditional view53. When he extends his approach to counterfactuals, Barnett boldly combines 
a probability-based view, which characterizes counterfactual reasoning by the probabilistic 
relationship between the antecedent and the consequent, with a truth-conditional view.54 He 
aims at integrating as well the insights of a Lewis–Stalnakerian nearness analysis as the virtues 
of the traditional metalinguistic approach according to which the truth of a counterfactual 
depends on the antecedent entailing the consequent given certain further assumptions. In sum, 
if Barnett is successful, he overcomes the main boundaries by which the philosophical debate 
has been marked so far. While I confine my critical discussion to counterfactuals, I shall give 
some hints how they might spell trouble for his suppositional view in general.  
I shall focus on Barnett’s 2010 paper. Barnett’s method is uncommon. He introduces a 
semantics for an artificial expression ‘zif’. After stipulating ‘zif’, he forwards a challenge: 
‘Anyone who rejects that zif would have been if faces the obvious challenge: to find a relevant 
difference between our entrenched practices with ‘if’ and our inchoate practices with ‘zif’ .’ 
Since ‘zif’ is alleged to be ‘if’, I will translate Barnett’s ‘zif’ claims to ‘if’–claims where 
appropriate. Barnett stipulates some rules of ‘zif’. Barnett calls the consequent what is stated 
by a conditional statement and the antecedent what is supposed by the conditional statement: 
 
‘Zif Probability A zif–statement is n% probable iff what is stated by the statement is made n% probable by 
what is supposed by it. 
[… ]   
Zif Truth A zif–statement is true iff what is supposed by the statement entails what is stated by it. 
Zif Falsity A zif–statement is false iff what is supposed by the statement is inconsistent with what is stated 
by it.’(p. 279) 
 
These conditions solve the problem with lottery counterfactuals. We reject that 
 
(D1) If Anna had bought a lottery ticket, she would have lost. 
 
For (D1) is not true and we should not accept or assert what is not true. 
Yet we accept 
 
(D4) If Anna had bought a lottery ticket, she would probably have lost. 
 
This seems perfectly vindicated by Barnett’s conditions. ‘Probably’ may simply indicate that 
some threshold of probability is met. It may be further specified: 
 
(D5) If Anna hat bought a lottery ticket, it is 99.99 percent probable that she would have lost. 
 
However, this utility in solving the lottery issue is outweighed by the problems of the 
theory. I shall start with one problem. Take an everyday counterfactual which under certain 
circumstances seems perfectly true: 
 
(D9) If I had got up 5 minutes earlier, I would have caught the train 
 
52 David Barnett, ‘Zif is If’, Mind, 115 (2006), 519–565; David Barnett, ‘The Myth of the Categorical 
Counterfactual’, Philosophical Studies, 144 (2009), 281–96. 
53 Barnett, ‘Zif is If’, p. 521. 
54 David Barnett, ‘Zif Would Have Been If: A Suppositional View of Counterfactuals’, Noûs, 44 (2010), 269–304. 
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(D9) seems true given I missed the train only by less than five minutes. Yet of course, my 
getting up 5 minutes earlier does not entail my catching the train. Thus, our explanation for why  
(D1) is unacceptable overgeneralizes to (D9). Thus, Barnett’s theory can be expected to be 
highly counterintuitive from the outset, and indeed it turns out to unduly tax credulity. 
I shall critically assess Barnett’s theory in more detail, arguing for the following claims: 
 
Barnett fails to provide an adequate closeness constraint (as in the standard account) for 
everyday counterfactuals, and it fails to do without such a constraint. 
Since Barnett’s view does not fare better with his own prime example than the standard possible 
worlds approach, he does nothing to rule out the latter. 
His further linguistic evidence does not withstand critical scrutiny. 
It is completely open how to modify Barnett’s overall suppositional approach to indicatives  
such as to integrate his view of counterfactuals. 
 
Barnett fails to provide an adequate closeness constraint (as in the standard account) for 
everyday counterfactuals. 
 
I shall illustrate that, as contrasted to the standard account, Barnett fails to subject 
counterfactuals to an appropriate closeness constraint. I shall show where this failure leads to 
difficulties for the account: to begin with, consider the role of probabilities. Most everyday 
counterfactuals are not true but only probable according to Barnett’s criteria. One important 
question is what probabilities are in counterfactual contexts. We have seen that Schulz’s parallel 
between the Principal Principle, which deals with probabilities, and his principle Credence was 
problematic as it was difficult to reconcile with the volatility of probabilities. Barnett presents 
his own take on probabilities in the context of counterfactuals. In order to account for 
suppositional probability ascriptions, Barnett introduces Conditional Counterfactual 
Probabilities:  
 
‘CCP’s appear to measure the stability of features and connections in the world. Suppose for illustration that 
a large number of children have been surveyed and that 95% of them like candy. The question arises whether 
this statistic reflects a relatively stable connection between being a child and liking candy, or whether it is 
purely accidental.  
[… ]   
The relatively stable connections give way to ones that are more stable, more general, and more basic, until 
ultimately we reach the brute stabilities, including the fundamental laws of nature.’ (p. 278) 
 
I find Barnett’s conception of probability in terms of stability difficult to understand. 
The more stable a connection between A and B is, the more probable A given be seems to be. 
This view leads to a dilemma. The first alternative is that stability is something along the 
following lines: a feature or connection is the more probable the higher the proportion of worlds 
at which it holds.55 This is an insufficient basis for assessing probabilities of counterfactual 
suppositions. Consider: 
 
(D9) If I had got up 5 minutes earlier, I would have caught the train 
 
Assume that my probability of reaching the train on the counterfactual supposition that I get up 
5 minutes earlier is high. But it does not entirely owe this to the stability of features in the world; 
the accidental fact how far from the station I actually am plays a crucial role. Even very stable 
relationships may fail to hold in arbitrarily many metaphysically possible situations. What is 
 
55 Cf. Edgington, ‘On Conditionals’, p. 308. 
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responsible for the probability of a counterfactual is not their stability tout court but their 
stability relative to sufficiently close situations. 
Thus, the second alternative is to impose some nearness constraint on probability. 
Probabilities are assessed given things are as they actually are as far as compatible with the 
antecedent. But in contrast to the standard analysis of counterfactuals, closeness or preservation 
of actual facts is not built into ‘zif’ by default. Nor is it implicit in Barnett’s notion of 
probability. Thus, Barnett’s semantics is fatally incomplete. If we supplement it, we get 
something akin to the standard account, which Barnett wanted to overcome. 
A second point where the failure of providing a closeness constraint leads to implausible 
results can be illustrated by a flash drama of Barnett’s, which he uses precisely as a test for 
whether the semantics of counterfactuals is subject to such a constraint: 
 
Dialogue2 
‘Smith: [D10] Zif she hadn’t stepped on that mine, she would have made it across. 
Jones: I doubt it. For suppose that she hadn’t stepped on that mine. We must ask ourselves: what is the mostly 
likely way for this to have come about? Perhaps the initial conditions of the universe had been different; in 
which case it is highly unlikely that she, or this minefield, would ever have existed[… ] 
Smith: You are extremely uncharitable. Was it not obvious from our context that what I meant was that, 
[D11] zif she hadn’t stepped on that mine and things had been as similar as possible to actual, up to that 
point, she would have made it across? 
Jones: Well, in that case, she probably would have made it across. From now on, please say exactly what you 
mean.’(p. 285) 
 
According to Barnett, this dialogue shows that Smith made an implicit closeness supposition 
over and above the explicit supposition. Since he did not made this supposition explicit, he can 
be chastized for talking loosely by Jones. To Barnett, this shows that a closeness constraint is 
not built into the semantics of counterfactuals. 
However, replacing ‘zif’ by ‘if’, I find Jones’ reaction not merely uncharitable but very 
odd. The possibility of the initial conditions of the universe being different seems simply 
irrelevant.  In order to evaluate Smith’s statement, we have to consider the actual situation 
modulo the soldier not stepping on a mine (however this is to be cashed out). Jones’ move 
bringing into play weird antecedent situations is only saved from outright infelicity by our 
willingness to accommodate even very outlandish possibilities once they are brought up. Jones 
insistence that one should say exactly what one means leaves us clueless how to abide. The 
dialogue counts against Barnett’s analysis of ‘if’ rather than supporting it. This again is 
evidence that Barnett would have to add a default closeness constraint to accommodate 
intuitions and to get a neat conception of probability for counterfactuals. 
Here is another point at which the lack of an adequate closeness constraint proves fatal: 
Barnett suggests that instead of an implicit closeness supposition, some zif–statements may be 
subject to a subjunctive free–will supposition 
 
‘zif the soldier had freely chosen to step just to the left of where she actually freely chose to step, the events 
leading up to this choice would probably have been just as they actually were, for there is no reason to think 
they would have been different, and there is some reason to think they would have been the same.’(p. 287)56 
 
Yet Barnett here misses ‘zif’ and tacitly replaces it by ‘if’. Without a closeness constraint that 
privileges the way things are, nothing ensures that things ‘would probably have been just as 
they actually were’.57 Barnett’s probabilities are based on empirically encountered regularities. 
Yet individual matters of fact are not fully fixed by regularities. For instance, regularities do 
not fix whether a coin that was actually tossed fell heads or tails. Whether such a process is 
 
56 Cf. Igal Kvart, ‘Counterfactuals’, Erkenntnis, 36 (1992), 139–179 (p. 141). 
57 Cf. David Lewis, ‘Humean Supervenience Debugged’, Mind, 103 (1994), 473–490 (p. 480). 
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deterministic or indeterministic, we have to add particular matters of fact which are not 
explicitly mentioned. The closeness constraint guides us in telling which particular matters of 
fact to add. 
Barnett provides eight clues where an alien linguist examining the use of ‘zif’ can see that the 
standard account of counterfactuals does not apply, neither to ‘zif’ nor to ‘if’. I shall critically 
discuss these purported clues.  
Clue #1 is Barnett’s argument against building a closeness constraint into the meaning of the 
counterfactual: 
 
‘the outsider might investigate whether explicitly adding a nearness–condition to the antecedent of a zif–
statement has any effect on our evaluation of the statement. On the nearest–world hypothesis, it should not. 
[… ] 
[D12] Zif hamsters had wings, everything else would be as similar as possible to actual. 
[D13] Zif hamsters had wings and everything else were as similar as possible to actual, everything else would 
be as similar as possible to actual.’(p. 288) 
 
(D13) is necessary, (D12) is not, says Barnett. To Barnett, this is not reconcilable with (D12) 
being subject to an implicit semantic closeness constraint. If there were such a constraint, (D12) 
should also be necessary.  
In order for Barnett’s argument to succeed, the standard nearness truth–condition for 
counterfactuals would have to be: 
 
For a world of evaluation w, a counterfactual A >> C is true iff C at some A–world which is 
closer to actuality (our world) than any A–world such that not–C. 
 
But in fact, the standard truth–condition is this: 
 
For a world of evaluation w, a counterfactual A >> C is true iff C at some A–world which is 
closer to w than any A–world such that not–C. 
 
Here is the rub: to check whether, for any possible world w, (D12) is true, we have to 
consider the closest world w* to w at which hamsters have wings and everything else is as 
similar as possible wo w, not to actuality as in (D13). No wonder that (D13) is necessary, while 
this is not guaranteed for (D12). 
 I note that it might be metaphysically impossible that hamsters have wings, but this 
does not change the result. Assume it is impossible. Then, in the standard account, (D12) is 
simply necessarily true as far as a world at which hamsters have wings is inaccessible from any 
possible world.  
 
Ad clue #2: One of the alleged virtues of Barnett’s approach is that it accounts for 
counterpossibles, counterfactuals with impossible antecedents such as: 
 
‘[D14] Zif the truths of fundamental physics were discoverable by a priori conceptual analysis, particle 
accelerators would be superfluous. 
 
[… ]we judge some zif–statements to be about impossible scenarios, and our confidence in such statements 
is sometimes low and sometimes high. This does not comport with the hypothesis that zif–statements with 
impossible antecedents are vacuously true (or vacuously false).’(p. 289) 
 
Yet Barnett does not say how conditional counterfactual probabilities may apply to 
impossible situations. What we would need is a detailed account in how far the supposed 
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impossible circumstances interfere with stable features of the world and in how far they do not, 
as it is given e.g. by Nolan’s closeness account of impossible worlds.58  
Without any hint as to how to deal with probabilities in this case, what remains in 
Barnett’s account is that counterfactuals with metaphysically impossible antecedents are true 
iff the antecedent logically entails the consequent; and they are false iff the antecedent is 
inconsistent with the antecedent. Nothing in between. We are left without any clue how to deal 
with (D14). No advantage compared to the standard account according to which all 
counterfactuals with impossible antecedents are vacuously true. 
 
Since Barnett’s view does not fare better with his prime example than the standard possible 
worlds approach, he does nothing to rule out the latter. 
 
Barnett’s Clues #3–6 are derived from four principles that Barnett takes to hold for 
categorical statements and but not for ‘zif’: 
 
‘Clue #3: However confident one is that S, one should be at least as confident that there is an answer to the 
question of whether S. 
Clue # 4: On the supposition that there is no answer to the question of whether a is F, one should have zero 
confidence that a might be F. 
Clue #5: However confident one is that S, one should be equally confident that it is true that S. 
Clue #6: Intuitively, it cannot be objectively incorrect to assign probability 1 to a categorical statement and 
objectively incorrect to assign probability 0 to the statement.’(pp. 290–292) 
 
There are some doubts about these purported platitudes. For instance, the plausibility of Clue#4 
depends on what is meant by ‘there being an answer’. It the phrase is supposed to mean that 
there is a fact of the matter, Clue #4 sounds somewhat plausible. Less so for any meaning which 
includes somehow our capacity of giving an answer. Even in the first reading, it is not a matter 
of course that one ought to have zero confidence rather than refraining from forming any 
credential attitude. As for Clue #6, it is not clear how to deal for instance with statements about 
chancy future developments. Such statements may have an objective probability in between 1 
and 0.59   
Even granting the platitudes, the question becomes why they should fail for 
counterfactuals. Barnett’s argument entirely rests on applying the analysis of ‘zif’ to one 
example, not on any further piece of independent evidence: 
 
(D15) If there were a Goldilocks girl, she would like candy.  
 
To Barnett, (D15) clearly shows that the four principles do not hold for ‘if’: (D15) is neither 
true nor false; the antecedent does neither entail nor contradict the consequent. Thus, there is 
no answer to the question whether (D15) is true. The girl might like candy and she might not 
like candy. Yet assessing the relevant probabilities gives rise to a high confidence that the girl 
would like candy.  
Now there is no reason within the standard analysis why #3–#6 should not hold for 
counterfactuals. As a consequence, Barnett’s argument depends on his analysis of (D15) being 
superior to the standard analysis. Let us compare Barnett’s results to the standard analysis. It 
does not sound that implausible that (D15) is neither true nor false. How can the standard 
 
58 Cf. Daniel Nolan, ‘Impossible Worlds: A Modest Approach’, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 38 (1997), 
535–572. 
59 Ad Clue #6: Take objective chances. We are going to throw a coin. It seems objectively correct to assign a 
credence of 0,5 to the statement that it will fall heads. It is objectively as incorrect to assign probability 1 as 
probability 0. One may deny that ‘the coin will fall heads’ is a categorical statement, but some authors would in 
general assign a statement on a chance device like a fair coin ‘the coin falls heads’ a chance of 0.5. 
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analysis accommodate that? Lewis might have pointed out that (D15) is vague. Contrary to the 
first appearance, it is very different from everyday counterfactuals. In contrast to ‘If I had got 
up earlier today…’ which solidly hooks into a concrete actual situation, (D15) does not give us 
enough to envisage a concrete scenario. For instance, when and where does Goldilocks live? In 
Lewis’s default nearness analysis, a small miracle or inconspicuous divergence from actual 
facts would have to bring about the antecedent. But where is this divergence to be located? 
What does it look like? 
Here is Lewis on vagueness: 
 
‘Thus we account for such pairs of counterfactuals as Quine’s  
 
If Caesar had been in command [in Korea] he would have used the atom bomb. 
Versus 
If Caesar had been in command he would have used catapults. [… ]  
 
I could [… ] call on context rather to resolve part of the vagueness of comparative similarity in a way 
favourable to the truth of one counterfactual or the other.’60 
 
In the same vein, (D15) may call for further ways of cashing out the story. In some of them it 
comes out true, in some it comes out false. Of course, there are also problems with (D15) being 
a fictional character, which I disregard here. 
Besides vagueness, there are further alternatives for interpreting (D15) within the 
standard account: We may reckon a world where a Goldilocks girl likes candy more similar 
than a world where she does not. For instance, we may say that the latter world instantiates less 
high probability properties; after all, girls usually like candy.61 Then (D15) comes true.  
An alternative way of dealing with (D15) would be to insist that worlds where the girl 
likes candy and worlds where she does not are equally close. Then the Goldilock case resembles 
chancy situations the paradigm of which is the throwing of a dice. In the Lewisian standard 
analysis, both ‘If a dice had been thrown, it would have landed six’ and ‘If a dice had been 
thrown, it would have not landed six’ are false. Analogously, both ‘would like candy’ and 
‘would not like candy’ turn out false. In contrast, if we accept Stalnaker’s uniqueness 
assumption that there is precisely one closest world to be selected by the selection function, 
(D15) becomes neither true nor false, just as Barnett has it. In sum, there is plenty of room for 
reconciling the standard account with any intuitions one might have. 
Still, we might feel inclined to ascribe a high probability to a Goldilocks girl liking 
candy. This is reflected in our accepting as true  
 
(D16) If there were a Goldilocks girl, she would probably like candy 
 
and  
 
(D17) If there were a Goldilocks girl, she might/might not like candy 
 
Here we indeed have our original problem with lottery counterfactuals. Assume that (D15) 
comes out false or indeterminate in the standard analysis. For instance, let there be many 
candidates for closest worlds where Goldilocks likes candy and some worlds where she does 
not. Still (D16) seems plausible. However, we should not accept Barnett’s account only because 
it allows to deal with such lottery cases. After all, we have seen, and we will see that there are 
 
60 Lewis, Counterfactuals, pp. 66–67. 
61 J. Robert G. Williams, ‘Chances, Counterfactuals, and Similarity’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 
78 (2008), 385–420. 
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alternatives. Barnett’s proposal must be judged by its other merits or demerits compared to 
those of its rivals. 
 
Barnett’s further linguistic evidence does not withstand critical scrutiny. 
 
I shall come to Barnett’s further evidence. Consider  
 
Clue #7 
‘[… ]there is no need to qualify the proposition that Jones is the murderer –by, say, ‘probably’, ‘definitely’, 
or ‘possibly’ in order for a categorical statement of it to be significant. By contrast, subjunctive contents 
stated relative to subjunctive suppositions do require qualification for their statements to be significant.’(p. 
295) 
 
Barnett’s idea must be the following: given the semantics of ‘zif’, either a counterfactual is 
definitely true in virtue of entailment, or it is only probably true. 
I disagree with Barnett’s claim. A normal categorical statement like  
 
(D18) Jones is the murderer  
 
does not need qualification. A counterfactual 
 
(D19) The glass would have shattered if dropped  
 
does not either. We usually utter statements of both kinds without qualifying them. Yet in both 
cases, we tend to be in a quandary when pressed. Someone might respond: ‘Definitely, 
probably, or possibly?’ Normally, on the one hand we will feel committed by our previous 
utterance to accept one of the options; but on the other hand, we will often hesitate. ‘Definitely’ 
might sound too strong, ‘probably’ too weak. This, I guess, is due to a certain vagueness and 
intransparency of the threshold of certainty or vindication at stake in our attitudes such as belief 
or explicit acceptance and the threshold required by the qualification. At least there is no 
indication that counterfactuals are more in need of qualification than categorical statements. 
The claim is obviously an artefact of zif–semantics. 
There is a further problem: according to Barnett ‘definitely’ requires entailment. Thus, 
were ‘zif’ if, the following should be infelicitous:  
 
Dialogue3 
Al: ‘(D9) Had I got up five minutes earlier, I should definitely have reached the train.’ 
Bo: ‘Definitely? After all, five minutes is not much, and the way is far.’ 
Al (who happens to be a sprinting champion): ‘Definitely!’ 
 
(D9) obviously does not meet the requirement of entailment. Still this dialogue sounds perfectly 
in order. In contrast, what would definitely sound odd is the ziffy: 
 
Bo: #’Come on, what about a sudden volcano eruption or a break in natural laws? You should 
mind your words. Just add ‘probably’ (and a nearness constraint) instead of this conceited 
‘definitely’!’ 
 
Furthermore, even when we hesitate to call a chancy counterfactual definitely true, we 
might not hesitate to call it true when qualified:     
 
Dialogue4 
Ed: ‘(D19) The glass would have shattered if dropped.’ 
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Ella: ‘Is that so?’ 
Ed: ‘Well, that much is true:  
(a) it would probably have shattered if dropped / (b) (D20) if the glass had been dropped, there 
would definitely have been a high chance of its breaking when dropped.’ 
 
Although Barnett might be able to accommodate (a), he seems unable to accommodate (b). 
Again the antecedent of (D20) does not entail the consequent. 
Compare the evidential impact of these simple examples to Barnett’s: 
 
Dialogue5 
‘Ella: Suppose the glass had fallen! 
Ed: It definitely would have shattered. 
Ella: Well, I hate to be a stickler, but I don’t think it’s right to say that it definitely would have shattered. For, 
as unlikely as it sounds, a perfect gust of wind could have brought the glass to a gentle landing. [… ] just think 
of a couple of the ways that the glass could have fallen. It could have fallen due to a subtle difference in the 
initial conditions of the universe, say, one that led to your reactions being a bit slower than they actually 
were. This difference could also have led to the existence of a perfect gust of wind. Another way that the 
glass could have fallen is for there to have been a subtle difference in the laws of nature, say, one that led to 
the glass’s accelerating slightly faster than it actually did.’(p. 280) 
 
I think our intuitive grip on such an example is loose. Again the most plausible diagnosis is that 
we are willing to consider even far-fetched possibilities once they are brought up. This does not 
mean that they are relevant from the outset. Note that by Barnett’s lights, Ella could as well 
appeal to a huge difference in laws of nature. According to the Lewisian standard analysis, such 
circumstances are too far-fetched to count as closest antecedent worlds. The Lewisian standard 
closeness conditions eschew them as well as a subtle difference in the initial conditions of the 
universe and Ella’s subtle difference in the laws of nature as far as the latter has no role in 
bringing about the antecedent as distinguished from Lewis’s default small miracle. Yet Lewis’s 
standard analysis cannot make as short work with certain very improbable chance processes, 
such as perhaps the sudden gust of wind. They are candidates for closest antecedent worlds. 
There is a huge debate on the issue.62 Here I think the standard analysis is perfectly in tune with 
our intuitions. We tend to neglect certain chance processes.63 But when we are pressed, we are 
in a quandary as to how to deal with them.  
I doubt that there is a more eligible way to handle Barnett’s extremely artificial dialogue 
than by dismissing some circumstances and feeling in a quandary when others are raised to 
salience. If I feel any intuitive pull, then it is to accept Ed’s initial statement as perfectly in 
order. This is what Barnett denies and what is accounted for by the standard analysis. The 
quandary created by the dialogue only testifies to our willingness to accommodate far-fetched 
possibilities, not to their playing a role for the truth of counterfactuals in normal contexts. One 
proposal for how to account for accommodation is that raising far-fetched possibilities is 
incompatible with the normal contexts under which counterfactuals are assessed. Just as there 
are counterfactuals like the Caesar examples which cannot be assessed outside of a strong 
context, there may be contexts which interfere with our confident assessment of counterfactuals. 
Bringing up far-fetched possibilities may create such contexts. 
Clue #8 provides further linguistic evidence. ‘When’ and ‘where’ denote times and 
places. For a counterfactual to denote anything, it would have to denote a situation. Yet it does 
not denote anything, says Barnett. To mark the difference, Barnett notes there are six places 
where ‘probable’ can be inserted into a counterfactual: 
 
(D21a) It is probable that hamsters would fly, zif they had wings 
 
62 Cf. Williams, ‘Chances’. 
63 Alan Hajek, ‘Most Counterfactuals are False’, unpublished Manuscript. 
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(D21b) It is probable, zif hamsters had wings, that they would fly 
(D21c) Zif hamsters had wings, it is probable that they would fly 
(D21d) Zif hamsters had wings, that they would fly is probable 
(D21e) That hamsters would fly, zif they had wings, is probable 
(D21f) That hamsters would fly is probable, zif they had wings.(p. 297) 
 
In contrast, there are only four places where ‘probable’ can be inserted into ‘when’ or ‘where’–
statements: 
 
(D22a) It is probable that I will live where Sharon lives 
(D22b) It is probable, where Sharon lives, that I will live 
(D22c) Where Sharon lives, it is probable that I will live 
(D22d) That I will live where Sharon lives is probable. 
 
The remaining two combinations are awkward, to say the least: 
 
(D22e) Where Sharon lives, that I will live is probable 
(D22f) That I will live is probable, where Sharon lives. (p. 298) 
 
Coming to my criticism, it is not obvious that the purported differences have anything 
to do with the issue of denotation. I do not deem them very significant anyway. Note that for 
instance the German equivalent of (21a), Es ist wahrscheinlich, dass Hamster flögen, wenn sie 
Flügel hätten, allows 5 variants at best (no equivalent to 21d). Moreover, we may try the 
following instead of (D22e) and (D22f): 
 
(D22e´) Where Sharon lives, there that I will live is probable / at that place that I will live is 
probable. 
(D22f´) There/at that place that I will live is probable, where Sharon lives. 
 
This is not elegant, but can one be sufficiently confident that it is infelicitous to build a 
deep distinction between ‘if’ on the one and ‘where’ and ‘when’ on the other hand on this 
verdict? At least concerning (D22e´) I have got mixed reactions from native speakers. 
Barnett gives further purported evidence that ‘if’–sentences do not denote a situation: 
‘…whereas “the time when Sharon leaves” and “the place where Sharon lives” are grammatical, 
“the hypothetical situation zif Sharon had left” is not.’(p. 298)64 Again it is not obvious that this 
observation has anything to do with the issue of denotation. ‘When’ and ‘where’ can be used in 
direct questions, ‘if’ can only be used in indirect questions like: ‘I ask you if…’. According to 
the only available account of the relationship between such questions and conditionals, ‘if’ 
highlights a positive answer to an indirect question.65 This observation can be accommodated 
by a denotational view of conditionals: the positive answer to an inexplicit indirect if–question 
determines the situation of which the consequent is to hold for a counterfactual to be true. 
 
It is completely open how to modify Barnett’s overall suppositional approach to indicatives  
such as to integrate his view of counterfactuals.66 
 
Even granting that Barnett’s account is adequate for counterfactuals, we may ask how it fits 
into his general picture of supposition. According to Barnett, ‘zif’ is generally to be used to 
make a suppositional statement. Then so it should be used for counterfactuals. As we have seen, 
 
64 Cf. Barnett, ‘Zif is If’, pp. 528–529. 
65 William S. Starr, ‘What If?’, Philosophers’ Imprint, 14 (2014). 
66 Cf. Barnett, ‘Zif is If’. 
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Barnett denies that ‘zif’ denotes a situation; yet he accepts that there is denotation in play: 
‘conditional denotation’. An antecedent situation is denoted provided there is one.67 If A is 
false, nothing is denoted: 
 
‘Joe says, [D23] ‘Zif the Pope visited yesterday, then we will have a good year’. The outsider responds, 
‘What do you mean then we will have a good year? There is no then, because there was no visit by the Pope’. 
To which Joe responds: ‘Surely you must recognize the possibility that you are wrong—that the Pope did in 
fact visit yesterday. Suppose this is so. Then we will have a good year. When I say ‘then’, I only aim to be 
talking about a situation in which the Pope visited yesterday conditional on there being such a situation. No 
Pope, no aim.’’68 
 
According to Barnett, ‘then’ in (D23) denotes something conditionally. Yet putting into 
abeyance my above criticism of Clue #8, I do not see any reason why the linguistic evidence 
for Clue #8 does not apply as well to indicative suppositions.69 According to Barnett, these 
suppositions do denote something (albeit conditionally). This is incompatible with the lesson 
Barnett draws from his Clue #8. Thus, either the evidence for the claim that counterfactuals do 
not denote or the suppositional account has to go. 
How can Barnett’s template for indicatives be transferred to counterfactual situations? 
Consider 
 
(D24) If the pope had visited yesterday, then we would have a good year. 
 
Straightforward application of the template for indicatives gives: When the antecedent is false, 
there is nothing to be denoted by ‘then’. ‘No pope, no aim’; nothing to be aimed at; still there 
is ‘an absent attempt at reference rather than a failed attempt.’70 How are we to understand an 
act which amounts to nothing but an absent attempt at denoting whatever ‘then’ is to denote? 
What does it mean to aim at something when it is at the same time conveyed that there is nothing 
to be aimed at? The only way of making sense of such an act is to make the absent attempt 
parasitic on the success case: A obtains; at least it is somehow open whether A obtains. As Joe 
responds: ‘You must somehow recognize the possibility that you are wrong.’ Thus, the problem 
of accounting for suppositional statements when A is false becomes more grievous in the 
counterfactual case. It would seem odd to say that for any genuine counterfactual (with actually 
false antecedent), ‘then’ fails to denote; there is nothing but an absent attempt at reference. 
There is nothing for ‘then’ in (D23) to stand for. 
I shall consider a further argument of Barnett’s in favour of his suppositional account of 
indicative conditionals. The opponent of a suppositional account is faced with the following 
problem: she is committed to making sense of the question what the truth–value of ‘zif A, C’ is 
under the supposition  
 
‘[… ]that it is false that A. This amounts to a request to evaluate whether C while supposing not just that A 
but also that it is not the case that A. And this is a request that we cannot satisfy. Hence our response: ‘We 
are at a loss as to how to respond, for we are unable to evaluate the statement under the supposition that it is 
false that A’.’71  
 
 
67 Cf. Edgington, ‘Conditionals’. 
68 Barnett, ‘Zif is If’, p. 529. 
69 Consider the indicative: (D21a) It is probable that hamsters fly, zif they have wings… There is no ‘situation zif 
Sharon has left’. 
70 Barnett, ‘Zif is If’, pp. 529–530. Edgington has it that, when A is false, nothing is asserted (Edgington, 
‘Conditionals’, p. 289). In contrast, Barnett insists: ‘[… ]one who asserts that, zif A, C, asserts something –namely, 
that C– regardless of whether A.’(p. 543) Regardless of whether A, C is asserted under the supposition that A. 
71 Barnett, ‘Zif is If’, p. 536. 
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The proponent of a suppositional account avoids this problem: under the supposition that it is 
false that A, her suppositional statement ‘zif A, C’ is null and void.  
Before coming to the point of interest, I shall make a quick a comment on this argument: 
I do not think that the opponent of the suppositional account really has a problem here. For 
instance, in Stalnaker’s view, the presupposition of the indicative conditional is that the 
antecedent situation is an open possibility. One may retort to Barnett that the supposition that 
it is false that A is incompatible with the antecedent being an open possibility.  
However, I did not bring up Barnett’s argument to rebut it. Rather my aim is to use it in 
a criticism of his suppositional account of counterfactuals: applying Barnett’s own way of 
putting supposition, supposing A while presupposing that it is not the case that A seems 
precisely to be what the suppositional template demands when we evaluate a counterfactual. 
What remains is that nothing seems ever to be stated by a genuine counterfactual, not even C 
under the supposition that A. So for any counterfactual, we ‘are unable to evaluate the statement 
under the (pre)supposition that it is false that A’.  
A similar problem: ‘When we believe under a supposition, we aim at the truth, but we 
are only committed to this goal on the condition that the supposition obtains.’72 If this move 
were transferred to counterfactuals, it would seem that one incurs no commitment at all by 
them. So it remains open how to accommodate counterfactual suppositions within Barnett’s 
overall approach. 
There are further difficulties of transferring the suppositional view of indicatives to 
counterfactuals. A ‘zif’–statement ‘zif A, C’ is true iff C is true on the supposition that A. 
Provided we take this as a model for counterfactuals as well, C would be true on the supposition 
that A iff A entails C; then the probability of C being true on the supposition that A is 1. ‘Zif 
A, C’ is n% probable iff: C being true on the supposition that A is n% probable.73 But for the 
counterfactual, the condition of C being true on the supposition that A is that A entails C. If A 
does not entail C, the probability that it does entail C is 0. So how can the probability of ‘zif A 
were the case, C would be’, i.e. of C being true on the supposition that A ever be different from 
0 or 1?74 
Negation causes trouble, too: ‘A statement that it is not the case that, zif A, C is a 
statement of a unique thing—that it is not the case that C—within the scope of the supposition 
that A.’75 If we apply this to counterfactuals, from our accepting ‘It is not the case that if the 
coin is/were thrown, it will/would fall heads’ it seems to follow that if the coin is/were thrown, 
it will/would not be the case that it falls heads. So it will/would not fall heads. But we deny that 
if the coin is/were thrown, it will/would not fall heads.  
In sum, while Barnett’s approach provides a solution to the problem of probabilistic 
counterfactuals, his overall theory is highly implausible. 
 
72 Barnett, ‘Zif is If’, p. 542. 
73 ‘How likely is it to be true that, zif this fair coin is flipped, it will land heads?’ To which we respond: ‘Fifty 
percent’(Barnett, ‘Zif is If’, p. 540) 
74 For a parallel cf. DeRose, ‘Conditionals’, pp. 12–13. 
75 Barnett, ‘Zif is If’, p. 546. 
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2.3.2. A New Proposal: Non–Maximality 
 
Lottery counterfactuals are notoriously puzzling. They seem in tension with the standard 
account of counterfactuals. Firstly, some counterfactuals which are not true according to the 
standard account become true when ‘probably’ is inserted. Secondly, we assign high credence 
to lottery counterfactuals which are clearly false according to the standard account. So far there 
is no universally accepted solution to the problem.  
I have criticized the extant proposals of Schulz and Barnett. I present a new approach, 
which does with a minuscule amendment to the standard account. Just as descriptions, 
conditionals are homogeneous and non-maximal. Homogeneity: some conditionals are neither 
true nor false if not all relevant (closest) antecedent worlds are consequent worlds. Non–
maximality: in certain contexts, not all relevant antecedent worlds have to be consequent worlds 
for the utterance of a conditional to say something true. Lottery contexts exclude the non-
maximal reading, but they are compatible with explicitly weighing the proportion of consequent 
worlds among the relevant antecedent worlds. This is what happens in the problematic 
counterfactuals. 
 
The puzzle of lottery counterfactuals 
 
The interaction between conditionals and probability is difficult to understand. We have seen 
that the following is infelicitous: 
 
(D1) #If Anna had bought a lottery ticket, she would have lost. 
 
Yet in contrast to (D1), (D4) seems perfectly acceptable in many contexts: 
 
(D4) If Anna had bought a lottery ticket, she would probably have lost. 
 
‘Probably’ may be further specified.  
 
(D5) If Anna hat bought a lottery ticket, it is 99.99 percent probable that she would have lost. 
 
For now I focus on (D4). It is not so easy to understand how (D4) can be acceptable. 
The interaction between ‘probably’ and ‘would’ is intricate. Here are two possibilities to 
understand (D4): in one alternative, (D4) simply says that (D1) is probably true. Yet judging 
from the standard account, we can know for sure that (D1) is not true. In a second alternative, 
(D4) says that, in all relevant worlds where Anna has bought a ticket and the draw has taken 
place, the probability of her having lost is high. Yet in most relevant worlds, the probability of 
her having lost after the lottery draw is 100%, whereas in some, it is 0%.76 There are further 
alternatives how to read (D4) which come closer to the intuitive result, e.g. the probability of 
Anna’s ticket losing given she buys (precisely) one at some suitably chosen points in time prior 
to the draw. The relevant probability may be probability at the evaluation world (the actual one) 
or probability at the individual relevant antecedent worlds. Alternatively, we may count the 
proportion of worlds where Anna loses among the relevant worlds where she buys a ticket. The 
latter alternatives come close to the intuitive results, but they need motivation. The account to 
come provides one. 
 
A new proposal: non–maximalility 
conditionals display homogeneity 
 
76 I assume that the past is no longer chancy. 
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My alternative proposal elaborates on the hypothesis that conditionals resemble descriptions in 
displaying homogeneity and non–maximality. To introduce the hypothesis, I start with evidence 
about ‘would’ conditionals. There is some reason to think that stressing ‘would’ or inserting 
‘definitely’ makes a difference to how we understand conditionals. Sarah Moss has observed 
that the following sounds marked:77 
 
(D25) #It is not the case that Anna would have lost if she had bought a ticket. 
 
But it seems perfectly all right to say 
 
(D26) It is not the case that Anna would/would definitely have lost if she had bought a ticket. 
 
The difference calls for an explanation. Here is a tempting suggestion: ‘would’ conditionals 
stress that one has to take into consideration all relevant antecedent worlds. They ALL have to 
be consequent worlds. Yet it is not clear from the outset how to integrate this idea into the 
standard account. According to the latter, any normal ‘would’ conditional has one take into 
account all relevant antecedent worlds. The difference in felicity between (D25) and (D26) 
remains mysterious. 
At first glance, Schulz’s arbitrariness account can make room for a more significant 
difference, as the following proposal shows: ‘would’ tells one to consider all relevant worlds 
and not only an arbitrarily selected one. But this change in the semantics seems somewhat 
arbitrary. The point of arbitrary selection is that we perform a test on all relevant antecedent 
worlds. One is randomly selected as representative. Why add an extra device which requires to 
consider any particular relevant antecedent world? The only explanation I can imagine is that 
‘would’ conditionals correct shortcomings of the arbitrarily selected world as a representative 
of the relevant worlds. But then there should also be advantages to compensate the 
shortcomings of arbitrary selection compared to taking into account all relevant worlds, 
pragmatic or epistemic or whatever. The proponent of the arbitrariness account may be 
challenged to say more about these advantages. Again I cannot rule out that this challenge can 
be met. But I do not think it has so far been met. 
In an alternative understanding, ‘would’ conditionals are strict conditionals: all 
antecedent worlds in a contextually provided modal horizon have to be consequent worlds, not 
only the closest ones. If this alternative is to explain the difference, the unstressed ‘would’ 
conditional had better not be a strict conditional.78 This option results in a surprisingly deep 
semantic difference between ‘would’ and ‘would’.  
A radically different approach to ‘definitely’/’would’ is to treat them as epistemic 
modals, expressing certainty as in: 
 
Dialogue6: 
Al: ‘Berlin is bigger than Madrid.’ 
Bo: ‘Definitely?’ 
Al: ‘Definitely.’ 
 
But (D26) cannot be interpreted as expressing a lack of certainty concerning (D1). For instance, 
had Al been uncertain in Dialogue6, he could not have expressed his uncertainty by: 
 
… 
Bo: ‘Definitely?’ 
 
77 Moss, p. 2. 
78 Cf. Gillies, ‘Counterfactual Scorekeeping’. 
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Al: ‘No. ?It is not the case that Berlin is definitely bigger than Madrid’. 
 
I shall explore an alternative explanation of the difference between (D25) and (D26) 
which I find more appealing than the ones mentioned so far. But I have to add further evidence 
first. There is a close similarity between the findings on counterfactuals and the behaviour of 
indicative conditionals and future-directed declarative sentences. Just like (D1), the following 
often seems inappropriate to sincerely assert: 
 
(D27) #If Anna buys a lottery ticket, she will lose. 
 
After Anna has bought a ticket 
(D28) #Anna’s ticket will lose. 
 
Just as (D26), the denial of the above sentences sounds odd: 
 
(D29) #It is not the case that, if Anna buys a lottery ticket, she will lose. 
(D30) #It is not the case that Anna’s ticket will lose. 
 
But the stressed versions seem much better: 
 
(D31) It is not the case that, if Anna buys a lottery ticket, she WILL/will definitely/must lose. 
(D32)  It is not the case that Anna’s ticket WILL/will definitely/must lose. 
 
To explain these data, I shall draw on the suggestion that indicative conditionals display 
semantic homogeneity. To get a grip on this notion, consider a case where homogeneity is 
uncontentious: 
 
Dialogue4 
Talking about books in a library (half of the books are in Dutch) 
Al: (D33) #The books are in Dutch. 
Bo: (D34) #It is not the case that the books are in Dutch.  
Alternatively Bo: (D35) Not all the books are in Dutch. 
 
We feel that Al’s utterance of (D33) is weird, but we hesitate to call it false. This can be 
explained as follows: it is commonly accepted that an incomplete description like (D33) tends 
to be read as homogeneous.79 An incomplete description ‘the F are G’, read as homogeneous, 
is true precisely if all F which are contextually maximally salient are G. It is false precisely if 
no maximally salient F is G. When only some of the maximally salient F are G, the description 
is neither true nor false. In contrast, a universally quantified sentence ‘all F are G’ is to be read 
non-homogeneously; it is true precisely if all F are G (perhaps in some contextually restricted 
domain) and false otherwise.  
Given close connections between descriptions and conditionals, it is tempting to assume 
that conditionals also display homogeneity.80 The difference between (D25) and (D26) and the 
difference between (D33)  and (D35)  can then be explained as follows: a conditional in a 
context displays homogeneity provided the following holds: it is true precisely if all relevant 
 
79 Manuel Križ, and Emanuel Chemla, ‘Two Methods to Find Truth–Value Gaps and their Application to the 
Projection Problem of Homogeneity’, Natural Language Semantics, 23 (2015), 205–248; Manuel Križ, 
‘Homogeneity, Non–Maximality, and all’, The Journal of Semantics, 33 (2016), 493–539. 
80 On general connections between descriptions and conditionals Maria Bittner, ‘Topical Referents for Individuals 
and Possibilities’, SALT, 11 (2001), pp, 36–55; Philippe Schlenker, ‘Conditionals as Definite Descriptions’, 
Research on Language and Computation, 2 (2004), 417–462. 
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antecedent possibilities are consequent possibilities, false precisely if none of them are, 
otherwise gappy. Homogeneity is ruled out by ‘would’ counterfactuals and musty indicatives. 
They are false unless all relevant antecedent worlds are consequent worlds. To derive an 
explanation of the intuitive differences, I need a further substantial assumption: we are hesitant 
to accept an outer negation as true if the negated sentence is not false: ‘Intuitively, a sentence 
[it is not the case that S] will be true exactly when S is false.’81 It is not fully clear whether the 
assumption generalises, but at least for descriptions (‘it is not the case that the books are in 
Dutch’) and conditionals, it seems fairly plausible. (D25), (D33) , (D34) are cases where the 
negated sentence is neither true nor false, and thus we are hesitant to accept the outer negation. 
In contrast, (D26), (D35) are acceptable because the negated sentences are clearly false. 
(D28) can be treated in the same way. We read it as dealing with an open future. Anna 
might lose and Anna might win. I remain neutral in what sense the future is open, epistemically 
or metaphysically. In uttering (D28), one presupposes that Anna has a ticket. The utterance is 
true precisely if all relevant future situations are situations where Anna loses, false if none of 
them are, otherwise neither true nor false. Again the musty version (‘Anna must lose/will 
definitely lose’) removes homogeneity: all future situations have to be situations where Anna 
loses. 
 
Conditionals display non–maximality 
non–maximality in descriptions 
 
Homogeneity is closely associated with a closely related phenomenon: non–maximality. 
Normally an incomplete description is taken to select precisely the contextually most salient 
individuals satisfying the descriptive condition expressed in the subject noun phrase. However, 
often descriptions tolerate exceptions among the contextually maximally salient individuals:82 
 
All the professors except Smith smiled and then left, leaving Smith behind.  
(D36) The professors smiled. 
(D37) ?The professors smiled and then (all) left the room. 
 
One may try to explain the felicity of (D36) by domain restriction, i.e. some domain of 
quantification being restricted to the smiling professors. As a consequence, the utterance of 
(D37) should also be felicitous. ‘Then (all) left the room’ would quantify over the restricted 
domain. To account for the difference between (D36) and (D37), ‘the professors’ in (D36) must 
not be read as all the professors in a contextually restricted domain, excluding Smith, but as 
allowing for exceptions from a set of contextually most salient professors (including Smith).83 
Here is a first take on the example: on the one hand, the maximal reading stands out as 
a point of departure. The maximal reading selects precisely the contextually most salient 
individuals. There are means of enforcing a corresponding universal quantification over a 
contextually restricted domain (all). On the other hand, examples like (D36) provide evidence 
that many contexts do not only privilege a certain maximal set of most salient individuals which 
satisfy some description. These contexts also fix a range of tolerable departures from the 
maximal set. Within that range, it does not matter whether all individuals in the maximal set 
 
81 Gennaro Chierchia and Sally McConnell–Ginet, Meaning and Grammar. An Introduction to Semantics 
(Cambridge/Mass.: MIT Press, 1999), p. 76. 
82 Example from Križ, ‘Homogeneity’, p. 498. 
83 I have encountered the tendency to draw a parallel to generics. The parallel is limited: firstly, definite 
descriptions are not the standard way of expressing generic statements. Secondly, the general criteria for generics 
(cf. Sarah–Jane Leslie, ‘Generics. Cognition and Acquisition’, The Philosophical Review, 117 (2008), 1–47) seem 
replaced by something more context–sensitive in the case of non–maximal descriptions. Conditionals seem more 
amenable to a generic or habitual reading (‘If it rains, the streets are wet’), but it remains to be seen in how far 
non-maximality accounts for this reading. 
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satisfy the condition imposed by the predicate, or whether there are some exceptions. In the 
example of the smiling professors, (D36) is acceptable if it only matters that almost all 
maximally salient professors smiled, i.e. Smith not smiling is a tolerable exception. Context 
determines how many of the professors have to smile for (D36) to be acceptable.  
There are competing analyses of non-maximal descriptions. The most advanced 
proposal by Križ bases non–maximality as a pragmatic phenomenon on homogeneity as a 
semantic phenomenon:84 in order to be assertable in a situation, a sentence S has to address a 
contextual issue. The issue comes with a contextually relevant partition of possible worlds that 
are of current interest. A necessary condition for S to address the issue is that no cell in the 
partition at issue contain both a world where S is true and a world where S is false. But there 
may well be a cell in the partition which contains worlds where S is true and worlds where S is 
not true. A homogeneous description ‘the F are G’ is true precisely if all F are G, false precisely 
if no F is G. Otherwise it is neither true nor false. When a homogeneous description is 
felicitously uttered, the final non-maximal meaning is computed as follows: the utterance 
presupposes that there is a unique cell in the partition at issue which contains some possible 
world where the description is true (all F are G) and no possible world where the description is 
false (no F is G). The actual world is claimed to fall into this unique cell. If it does, the utterance 
is true. The tolerable exceptions are determined indirectly: worlds with a tolerable number of 
exceptions (F that are not G) are lumped together in one cell with worlds where all F are G 
without exception. Worlds with too many exceptions are lumped together with worlds where 
the description is false. 
I add two important qualifications: firstly, once an exception has been mentioned, it 
cannot be neglected. In the example of the smiling professors, asserting (D36) is inappropriate 
once Professor Smith has been mentioned: 
 
Dialogue7 
Al: ‘Smith didn’t smile.’ 
Bo: (D36) ?’But the professors smiled.’ 
 
Secondly, we know from epistemology that lottery contexts do not tolerate exceptions. 
Anna cannot know that her ticket will lose, however minuscule the probability is that it won’t. 
Any particular outcome counts. For this reason, often lottery contexts are not hospitable to 
reading descriptions non-maximally. For instance, normally it seems irresponsible to say about 
a fair lottery:  
 
(D38) #The tickets will lose.85 
 
There are lottery contexts, broadly conceived, where a non-maximal reading seems in order. In 
these contexts we do not attend to the chanciness of the outcome. The more we focus on a 
lottery aspect, the greater the difficulty will be to enforce a non-maximal reading. 
 
Non–maximality in conditionals 
 
I shall now consider the proposal that counterfactuals also display homogeneity and non–
maximality.86 As we have seen, homogeneity is the semantic phenomenon that there is a third 
 
84 See also Križ’s, ‘Homogeneity’, criticism of Sophia Malamud, ‘The Meaning of Plural Definites: A Decision–
Theoretic Approach’, Semantics&Pragmatics, 5 (2012), 1–58.  
85 (D38) seems odd regardless of whether ‘the tickets’ refers to all tickets in the lottery or to some salient subset. 
86 Discussing homogeneity about conditionals enmeshes us in the debate on conditional excluded middle (CEM). 
While I grant that the issue is not yet settled, I note that none of the alternative accounts of lottery conditionals 
discussed so far supports CEM. 
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option between truth and falsity: sometimes it is indeterminate whether a conditional is true or 
false. Non–maximality is the pragmatic phenomenon that, for a conditional to say something 
true in a context, not all but only sufficiently many relevant antecedent worlds have to be 
consequent worlds. I follow Križ in assuming that homogeneity and non–maximality are closely 
related. Non–maximality can only arise where there is a space of indeterminacy which could 
be filled. A conditional that is neither true nor false can nevertheless be used for truly uttering 
that a significant proportion of relevant antecedent worlds are consequent worlds.  
Before coming back to the lottery cases, I shall take a look at some related puzzles which 
can be neatly dissolved by invoking non–maximality. This provides further evidence for the 
non-maximal reading of conditionals, including counterfactuals. In particular, I shall consider 
the interaction of ordinary ‘would’ and ‘might’ conditionals. Let there be a delicate china plate. 
We are inclined to assent to  
 
(D39) If the plate had been dropped, it would have shattered. 
 
Yet applying lessons from quantum physics, we are also inclined to accept: 
 
(D40) If the plate had been dropped, it might have flown off sideways. 
 
It has been noted, however, that (D39) and (D40) cannot be freely combined. The sequence 
(D39) to (D40) seems all right: 
 
(D39) If the plate had been dropped, it would have shattered;  
but (D40) (if the plate had been dropped,) it might have flown off sideways. 
 
Yet the reverse sequence feels odd:87 
 
(D40) If the plate had been dropped, it might have flown off sideways;  
but (D39) #(if the plate had been dropped,) it would have shattered.88 
 
The asymmetry between (D39)–(D40) and (D40)–(D39) is difficult to explain if one 
endorses the duality of ‘would’ and ‘might’: a ‘would’ conditional is true precisely if the 
corresponding ‘might not’ counterfactual is false. Schulz’s arbitrariness account can explain 
the asymmetry as follows: the duality of ‘would’ and ‘might’ is rejected. For a ‘might’–
conditional to be true, just one relevant antecedent world has to be a consequent world. The 
sequence (D39)–(D40) can be consistently uttered. (D39) is very probably true. In any normal 
context, this provides sufficient ground to utter (D39). But (D40) is true as well, as there is a 
relevant antecedent world where the plate flies off sideways. The infelicity of the reverse 
sequence (D40)–(D39) can be pragmatically explained by findings from epistemology. Raising 
a relevant alternative where a belief is false changes the stakes for the belief to count as known, 
and thereby also raises the stakes for asserting it. Uttering a ‘might not’–counterfactual (or 
something that entails it, like (D40)) raises the possibility that the corresponding ‘would’ 
counterfactual is false, namely if the arbitarily selected antecedent–world is a world where the 
consequent is false.  
 
87 Keith DeRose, ‘Can It Be That It Would Have Been Even Though It Might Not Have Been?’, Philosophical 
Perspectives, 33 (1999), 385–413. 
88 Perhaps the latter sequence can be uttered with a ‘would’ conditional. This seems surprising given the idea that 
the ‘would’ conditional enforces homogeneity and thus rules out non–maximality. But I guess that the effect is an 
indirect one: by ruling out homogeneity, one makes clear that one excludes the situations where the plate flies off 
sideways as irrelevant. 
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A rival explanation of the asymmetry is that the set of relevant antecedent worlds which 
have to be consequent worlds underlies contextual shifts. There are several possibilities how 
this shift works. One alternative is to claim that a ‘might’–conditional tends to enlarge the range 
of accessible worlds as long as the latter does not include an antecedent–cum–consequent 
world. This claim can be implemented within a strict conditional approach to subjunctive 
conditionals.  
My preferred alternative invokes non–maximality: a ‘would’ conditional sometimes 
leaves room for inexplicit exceptions among the relevant antecedent worlds (i.e. for worlds 
where the plate is dropped and flies off). Yet once an exception has been explicitly mentioned 
(by uttering the ‘might’–conditional), it has to be taken into account.  
To get a better feeling for the linguistic data, it may help to consider combinations of 
stressed ‘would’ and ‘might’ conditionals. Take  
  
Dialogue8 
Al: (D39) ‘If the plate had been dropped, it would have shattered.’ 
Bo: ‘But would it definitely have shattered?’ 
Al: ‘No. I admit that,  
(D40) if the plate had been dropped, it might have flown off sideways. 
Hence 
(D41) it is not the case that, if the plate had been dropped, it would / would definitely have 
shattered.’ 
 
I note that a perfectly analogous dialogue could be run with indicative conditionals. 
One challenge to the strict conditional theory is to account for Bo’s question. If (D39) 
is read as a strict conditional, what could the horizon of assessing Bo’s ‘definitely’ be? If it is 
the same one as in (D39), the question has already been answered by Al’s (D39). If the horizon 
is enlarged, why so, and how far is it enlarged? Here is how non–maximality explains the 
results: (D39), read as homogeneous, is indeterminate because not all relevant antecedent 
worlds are consequent worlds. Still it is used by Al to convey that a contextually significant 
proportion of relevant antecedent worlds are consequent worlds (where the plate shatters). In 
contrast, once the exceptions (where the plate flies off) are made explicit as in (D40), 
homogeneity is precluded. The non-homogeneous ‘would’ conditional negated in (D41) 
accordingly takes into account the exceptions, therefore it is false and thus to be negated. 
I shall present a further piece of evidence. We use counterfactuals far more generously 
than one would expect from the standard account. One may dismiss these ways of using 
counterfactuals as loose and non-literal and hence irrelevant to a systematic account of 
counterfactuals. Having encountered a widespread tendency to do so, I do not want my case to 
depend on them. Still they might appear in a new light when taking into account non–
maximality: 
 
Teacher, having experienced that pupils sometimes start quarrelling when he leaves them 
alone, being asked whether to join for a coffee pause: 
‘I can’t. 
(D42) The children would quarrel if I left them alone.’ 
  
If (D42) is read literally, it provides evidence for a demanding non-maximal reading.89 Only a 
certain proportion of relevant worlds where the children are left alone have to be worlds where 
 
89 When I introduced this example in an earlier version of this chapter, one referee wrote that (D42) is just false. 
Surprisingly, the referee did not express doubts that one might utter (D42) in the scenario considered. So the 
question is: given (D42) does not sound hyperbolic, metaphorical or otherwise non–literal (‘the children would 
kill each other!’), how can we account for the teacher’s use of (D42)? 
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they quarrel to influence the teacher’s decision. Otherwise it would seem irresponsible for the 
teacher to utter (D42) literally. If one harbours doubt about the example, one might also ask 
oneself whether it is really so different from the (D39). Moreover, one should not forget that 
non–maximality arguably is a pragmatic phenomenon. We do not have to grant that (D42) is 
true independently of pragmatics, just that it is used to say something true. 
I shall refrain from assembling further evidence for non–maximality and close this 
section with sketching an analysis of non-maximal conditionals. I have briefly summarized the 
most advanced proposal to base non–maximality in descriptions on homogeneity by Križ. I 
shall now provide an informal sketch what the analogue for conditionals might look like, though 
there may be other ways to flesh out my overall proposal. In Križ’s account, the issue addressed 
comes with a partition of possible worlds. As for counterfactuals, we must be wary of confusing 
this partition with the possible worlds relevant to evaluating a counterfactual. I suggest a slight 
amendment of Križ’s model. Normally, the issue is to find out how things are. Thus the relevant 
partition does not divide metaphysical but epistemic alternatives. Often the former can replace 
the latter, but here is a case where they cannot: assume the issue is whether a description ‘the 
actual samples from the mine are gold’ is true or not. Given the rigidifying ‘actual’, there are 
no metaphysical possibilities covering the two alternatives. There either is no metaphysically 
possible world where the actual samples are gold, or there is no metaphysically possible world 
where they are not. But there is an epistemic possibility that the actual samples are gold, and 
there is an epistemic possibility that they are not. Hence the relevant partition should be one of 
epistemic possibilities. In the same vein, the partition at issue when judging counterfactuals and 
claims to metaphysical modality is one of epistemic alternatives. But since we are to settle 
explicitly modal questions, the epistemic alternatives to be partitioned concern what the 
relevant metaphysical possibilities are. To put it otherwise: the worlds relevant to evaluating a 
counterfactual are metaphysically possible worlds (m–worlds), as it is usually assumed. But in 
order to figure out what the relevant worlds among the metaphysically possible worlds are, we 
have to consider several epistemic possibilities (e–possibilities) what the evaluation world viz. 
the actual world is like.  
With this amendment in place, Križ’s model can be transferred to counterfactuals: when 
a counterfactual is felicitously uttered, the contextual issue must come with a partition of e–
possibilities where no cell contains both an e–possibility where all relevant antecedent m–
worlds are consequent worlds and an e–possibility where none of them are. For the 
counterfactual to be used to assert something true, there must be a unique cell in the partition 
which contains only e–possibilities where sufficiently many relevant antecedent m–worlds are 
consequent worlds. I refrain from imposing the condition that there must be an e–possibility 
that all relevant antecedent m–worlds are consequent worlds. I do not see why we need this 
condition in the case of descriptions, and it will lead to unnecessary qualms in the counterfactual 
case: often we may well be in a position to rule out as an e–possibility that all relevant 
antecedent m–worlds are consequent worlds. The option of non–maximality would be of very 
limited avail if we could not use a counterfactual in that case. In sum, in certain contexts, a 
counterfactual can be used to say something true precisely if there is a unique cell in the 
contextual partition of epistemic possibilities which contains only epistemic possibilities where 
sufficiently many contextually relevant antecedent m–worlds are consequent worlds 
(sufficiently many being measured by some contextual threshold).  
There are three things which are settled by context in this model: firstly, context 
determines the partition of salient epistemic possibilities (i.e. possibilities what the actual world 
is like). Secondly, context determines the relevant antecedent m–worlds for each of these e–
possibilities. Applying the standard account of counterfactuals, these may be the antecedent m–
worlds closest to the world from which the counterfactual is evaluated. Thirdly, context 
determines the threshold of how many relevant antecedent m–worlds have to be consequent 
worlds for the counterfactual considered to say something true. 
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I shall ponder in how far the proposal can be transferred to indicative conditionals. There 
are two difficulties. The first is that the debate on indicative conditionals does not converge 
towards a standard analysis. There are many competing approaches around. Just to give an 
example how the account might be transferred to indicatives, I shall settle for one exemplary 
proposal which is especially amenable to my treatment, but which I cannot properly defend 
here. The indicative conditional is interpreted by a necessity operator scoped over a material 
conditional.90 In my version, the necessity operator is context-sensitive and ranges over 
epistemic possibilities. This proposal is attractive because it preserves on the one hand the 
connection to the material conditional; on the other hand it allows to add an additional aspect 
of contextual relevance, which may be used to avoid the unpleasant result that a conditional is 
true simply because its antecedent is false.  
The second difficulty with indicative conditionals is specific to my approach: while in 
the case of a counterfactual, the contextual partition of epistemic possibilities (i.e. epistemically 
possible scenarios) could be kept separate from the relevant antecedent possibilities, interpreted 
as metaphysical possibilities, in the case of an indicative, I see no way of keeping them apart. 
One may bite the bullet and propose the following simple condition: an indicative conditional 
can be used to assert something true precisely if sufficiently many contextually salient 
antecedent e–possibilities are consequent possibilities. Again the threshold what counts as 
‘sufficiently many’ is determined by context. 
 
Non–maximality and grading: might, probably, definitely 
 
I now come to a decisive step towards accounting for the lottery evidence. In the standard view, 
there is a fixed threshold which is either met or not: all relevant antecedent worlds have to be 
consequent worlds for a conditional to be true. The non-maximal reading at least sometimes 
requires a more differentiated take, making room for exceptions among the relevant antecedent 
worlds. Sometimes, for instance in assessing the plate counterfactual (D39), tolerable 
exceptions may simply not come into view. Yet at other times, for instance in the case of the 
smiling professors (D36), we may have to take what I call the grading perspective. In that case, 
grading involves three things: firstly to calculate the actual proportion of smiling professors 
among the most salient professors, secondly to figure out the contextual threshold for that 
proportion which allows (D36) to be truly uttered, thirdly to figure out whether the actual 
proportion meets the threshold.  
While the non–maximality reading relies on implicit grading, it would be useful to have 
expressions which make grading explicit. I suggest that ‘probably’, used in the consequent of a 
conditional, is one of these expressions. I support my point by locating ‘probably’ on a scale of 
related expressions. All these expressions can at least sometimes be read as epistemic modals.91 
This may even be their primary meaning. In the context of a subjunctive, their contribution is 
peculiar. At one end of the scale is ‘might’. ‘Might’, construed as the dual of ‘would’ 
(equivalent to ‘not would not’) displays a peculiar transition from an epistemic modal to some 
special use in counterfactuals: on the one hand, the expression is used as an epistemic modal to 
express claims to epistemic possibility. The basic idea is that, in uttering ‘it might be that P’, 
one conveys that there is an epistemic possibility that P. On the other hand, there is a genuine 
use in counterfactuals. ‘Might’ is plausibly construed as weakening ‘would’ as far as possible 
within the confines of semantic homogeneity, i.e. the range where a counterfactual is neither 
 
90 Cf. David Chalmers, ‘Frege’s Puzzle and the Objects of Credence’, Mind, 120 (2011), 587–635; Jonathan 
Ichikawa, ‘Quantifiers, Knowledge, and Counterfactuals’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 82 
(2011), 287–313; Daniel Rothschild, ‘Do Indicative Conditionals Express Propositions?’, Noûs, 47 (2013), 49–
68. 
91 Overview in Kai von Fintel and Anthony Gillies, ‘“Might” Made Right’, in Epistemic Modality, ed. by Andy 
Egan and Brian Weatherson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 108–130. 
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true nor false: there are some relevant antecedent worlds which are consequent worlds. At the 
other end of the scale there is ‘definitely’. ‘definitely’ also works as an epistemic modal. 
Roughly, ‘definitely P’ can be used to rule out the epistemic possibility of not–P. Again there 
is a genuine use in the context of a counterfactual: ‘definitely’ or ‘would’ make plain that all 
relevant antecedent worlds without exception are consequent worlds.  
I propose that ‘probably’ displays a perfectly analogous pattern. It has an epistemic 
meaning, but often its contribution to counterfactuals is peculiar. Endowed only with ‘would’ 
and ‘might’, we would lack a device which makes explicit that a significant proportion of 
relevant antecedent worlds are consequent worlds. We require more than just that some relevant 
antecedent world is a consequent world, but we do not require that all of them are. Instead, the 
requirement is that some contextual threshold below 100% is met. ‘Probably’ serves the task. 
We get an order of counterfactuals according to their increasing strength (the stronger ones 
entailing the weaker ones): 
 
(D43) If the plate had been dropped, it might have shattered.  
(D44) If the plate had been dropped, it would probably have shattered. 
(D45) If the plate had been dropped, it would/would definitely have shattered. 
 
In the reading I propose, (D40) conveys that some relevant world where the plate has been 
dropped is a world where it shatters, (D44) conveys that most of them are, (D45) that all of 
them are. Concerning the plate scenario, (D40) is true but too modest, (D44) is true and perfectly 
informative, (D45) false provided the plate might have flown off sideways. All expressions 
considered also have other readings where ‘might’ and co. more clearly function as epistemic 
modals. I note that, although ‘Would’/‘definitely’ as used in (D44) forms part of the grading 
scale, it at the same time works as a precisification of ‘would’ by removing homogeneity: the 
‘would’–counterfactual is true precisely if all relevant antecedent worlds are consequent worlds. 
This observation will become significant. 
 
Homogeneity, Non–Maximality and Lotteries 
Grading Lotteries 
 
In how far may the account developed in the last sections help us with lottery conditionals? I 
summarize the evidence to be explained. We reject 
 
(D1) #If Anna had bought a lottery ticket, she would have lost. 
 
We accept 
 
(D4) If Anna had bought a lottery ticket, she would probably have lost. 
(D5) If Anna hat bought a lottery ticket, it is 99.99 percent probable that she would have lost. 
 
I begin with the standard truth–condition for (D1): all closest worlds where Anna buys 
a ticket have to be worlds where she loses. This explains why we reject (D1). However, we also 
have seen that the negation of (D1) behaves strangely:  
 
(D25) ?It is not the case that Anna would have lost if she had bought a ticket. 
 
The ‘would’ version sounds better: 
 
(D26) It is not the case that Anna would/would definitely have lost if she had bought a ticket. 
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I have taken the general contrast between ‘would’ and ‘would’ as evidence for a 
homogeneous reading of counterfactuals. Where there is homogeneity, there might also be non–
maximality: not all relevant antecedent worlds have to be consequent worlds, but some 
contextual threshold has to be met. While the non-maximal reading is inexplicit, there are means 
of explicitly grading the proportion of consequent worlds among relevant antecedent worlds. 
In contrast to (D39), the lottery feature of counterfactual (D1) precludes a non-maximal reading 
of (D1), at least as long as the lottery aspect is salient. Since any single ticket counts, there just 
is no contextual cut–off which privileges some threshold of sufficiently many tickets below 
100% of the tickets. Still the asymmetry between (D25) and (D26) testifies to the presence of 
homogeneity. This can be explained as follows: in everyday counterfactuals like the plate 
counterfactual (D39) homogeneity and non–maximality prevail. Rarely will all relevant 
antecedent be consequent worlds. We expect non–maximality as the default case. This is why 
the denial of the ‘would’–version generally sounds better than the denial of the ‘would’–version, 
even in the lottery case. Hence (D25) sounds worse than (D26). Lottery contexts impose 
additional demands on everyday reasoning. Non–maximality is not simply absent. It is to be 
ruled out by certain regimentations: firstly, one cannot simply rely on a rough and ready practice 
of ignoring exceptions. Secondly, one cannot simply rely on an implicit threshold what counts 
as ‘close enough’ to 100%. However, what is not excluded is the differentiated grading 
perspective as far as it works as follows: the proportion of consequent worlds among relevant 
antecedent worlds is explicitly graded. I have suggested that there are several expressions which 
allow grading, one of them being ‘probably’. I have located ‘probably’ within a scale of related 
expressions. This scale can be applied to lottery counterfactuals: 
 
(D46) If Anna had bought a ticket, she might have lost.  
(D4) If Anna had bought a lottery ticket, she would probably have lost. 
(D47) If Anna had bought a ticket, she would / would definitely have lost. 
 
‘Probably’ here also relies on a contextual standard for what counts as sufficiently probable. 
But in contrast to the non-maximal reading of counterfactuals, it does so explicitly: (D4) is 
lexically different from (D1). We do not have a maximal and a non-maximal reading of the 
same sentence. 
I draw a parallel to a descriptive lottery case: The following is marked 
 
(D48) #The tickets will lose. 
 
There is no non-maximal reading of (D48). Yet the following is fine: 
 
(D49) Most of the tickets will lose. 
 
Just as ‘probably’, ‘most’ also invokes a contextual threshold, but again it does so explicitly, in 
contrast to a description read non-maximally. 
The results attained so far allow a more differentiated take on credences. I have rejected 
Schultz principle (Credence) and suggested that one should only settle for the linguistic 
evidence given by (D1) and (D4) I shall now present a more positive reaction to Schulz’s claim 
that one should place high credence in (D1). Consider the following dialogue: 
 
Dialogue9 
Al: ‘what is your credence that 
(D1) Anna would have lost if she had bought a ticket?’ 
Bo: (D4) ‘If Anna had bought a lottery ticket, she would probably have lost. 
But  
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(D26) it is not the case that Anna would definitely have lost if she had bought a ticket.’ 
 
Instead of (D4), Bo may also use the more specific  
 
(D5) If Anna had bought a lottery ticket, it is 99.99 percent probable that she would have lost. 
 
The intuition that we should assign high credence to (D1) can be accounted for by a full 
explanation of Dialogue9.  
Dialogue9 testifies to a certain vagueness in the request of telling what one’s credence 
in (D1) is. One natural reaction is to give a differentiated set of answers which cover salient 
specifications of the request. The salient specifications can be derived from the two tendencies 
in our evaluation of (D1). Firstly, the lottery context drives us towards reading (D1) like a 
‘would’ counterfactual. Thus, one option of settling the request is to specify it as: is the 
requirement that all relevant antecedent worlds are consequent worlds satisfied? We have seen 
that denying the corresponding ‘would’ counterfactual is preferred to denying (D1). In uttering 
(D26), Bo both clarifies the question (are ALL relevant antecedent worlds consequent worlds?) 
and answers it. However, uttering (D26) covers only one clarification. 
If Bo were only to utter (D26), her reaction would be somewhat uncooperative. Bo uses 
‘would’ to clarify the issue addressed. But there are other clarifications to heed. Bo’s utterance 
is naturally supplemented by a different way of precisifying the request for credences. The 
regimentation that comes with a lottery context excludes non–maximality but leaves the option 
of explicit grading. The proportion of consequent among relevant antecedent worlds is 
determined and ranked according to some scale, e.g. ‘might’, ‘probably’, and ‘definitely’. We 
have seen that all these expressions allow a transition from an epistemic modal to a peculiar use 
in grading the proportion of consequent among closest antecedent worlds. I propose that there 
is a similar transition for credences from the epistemic realm to the grading perspective, which 
requires to measure the proportion of consequent among closest antecedent worlds. This 
transition accommodates the natural tendency to read a request for credences as a request for 
counting by a suitably fine-grained measurement scale.  
‘What is your credence?’ is naturally understood as a request to count. ‘Credence’ is a 
mass term amenable to a ‘how much’ question: ‘what credence’ is naturally read as ‘how much 
credence’. There is a transition from such a ‘how much’ question to a ‘how many’ question by 
including a unit of measurement:92 how much credence, measured by the most salient 
measurement scale, i.e. how many percent credence do you assign to (D1)? We have got 
accustomed to this paraphrase, at least in a philosophical context. However, to provide an 
answer to the question thus reformulated, we have to come up with a suitable measurement 
scale. Even when we are somewhat clueless about the most salient scale, we are very willing to 
accommodate the request by looking for a scale in the neighbourhood. The scale made salient 
by the grading perspective is the proportion of consequent among the relevant antecedent 
worlds. 
Consider again the pair: 
 
(D4) If Anna had bought a lottery ticket, she would probably have lost. 
(D5) If Anna hat bought a lottery ticket, it is 99.99 percent probable that she would have lost. 
 
In Dialogue9, Bo asserts (D4) in order to convey that she has counted as requested and found 
that the proportion of consequent worlds among closest antecedent worlds is high according to 
some contextual standard.  
 
92 Karin Koslicki, ‘The Semantics of Mass–Predicates’, Noûs, 33 (1999), 46–91 (p. 75). 
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The intuition that we ought to assign high credence in (D1) is explained in the same way 
as Bo’s asserting (D4) in Dialogue9. In both cases, the grading perspective makes the proportion 
of consequent among closest antecedent worlds the most eligible scale of measurement. By 
using (D4), one expresses the same as when one says that one’s credence in (D1) should be 
high. I have noted that Bo may also use (D5) instead of (D4) in Dialogue9: 
 
(D5) If Anna had bought a lottery ticket, it is 99.99 percent probable that she would have lost. 
 
I propose that by asserting (D5) one expresses the same as when one says that one’s credence 
in (D1) is 99.99%: one has counted the consequent worlds among the relevant antecedent 
worlds as requested and found the proportion to be 99.99%. The explanation can be easily 
transferred to related intuitions about indicative conditionals. 
 
A Non–Standard Notion of Credence? 
There is one important doubt about my interpretation of credence. Credence is normally 
understood with regard to the standard case of belief in some candidate for actual truth. Rational 
credence in P should reflect in how far one’s evidence supports P. There is a close connection 
between credence tout court and credence given one’s evidence. Both in turn are closely related 
to conditional probability. There are principles which spell out the connection, most 
prominently Lewis’s (Principal Principle): roughly, one’s credence in P should equal the 
objective probability of P given one’s total evidence. It is a key requirement for any take on 
credences in counterfactuals that it be integrated into this overall picture. I note that eventually 
my proposal and the main other account to yield high credence in (D1), Schulz’s arbitrariness 
account, lead to the same result: we should count the proportion of consequent worlds among 
the relevant antecedent worlds. I arrive at this result not quite as straightforwardly as the 
arbitrariness account.  
In Schulz’s account, the link between the standard picture of credence and the 
arbitrariness semantics comes about in two steps: firstly, credence in a counterfactual should 
equal the objective probability that the counterfactual is true. This step is intuitively plausible, 
just as the Principal Principle is. Secondly, the objective probability of a counterfactual is 
determined by the proportion of consequent worlds among the relevant antecedent worlds. This 
move in turn is explained by the semantics: the probability that the arbitrarily selected relevant 
antecedent world is a consequent world equals the proportion of consequent worlds among the 
relevant antecedent worlds. It is an advantage of the arbitrariness account that it can preserve 
this close connection to the chance–credence link and that it does so well in motivating the 
interpretation of probability by the proportion of consequent among the closest antecedent 
worlds.  
While the high credence in (D1) as attained by counting consequent worlds among the 
relevant antecedent worlds is a straightforward consequence of the arbitrariness account (which 
is tailored to yield this result), I have to present the analogous move as a constructive proposal 
for how to deal with the request of telling one’s credence in (D1). This constructive proposal 
selects the most salient measurement scale, which is given by the grading perspective. The 
grading perspective leads to a peculiar interpretation of credences in counterfactuals. However, 
this interpretation is motivated by the parallel to the reinterpretation of other epistemic 
expressions, in particular epistemic modals. These expressions permit a non-epistemic reading 
in counterfactual contexts. They are used to make explicit the grading perspective: some, most, 
all relevant antecedent worlds are consequent worlds. As long as the non-epistemic reading of 
such modals is granted, it can motivate a perfectly analogous transition for credences. 
Summarizing, I have presented a relevant alternative to radically revisionary semantics. 
There is independent evidence that, just as descriptions, conditionals display homogeneity and 
non–maximality. These features can be used to explain the puzzles about lottery conditionals. 
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2.4 Problems with Similarity 
 
In the sections to come, I shall develop several problems with Lewis’s similarity ordering. The 
first of these problems concerns so-called Morgenbesser cases, the other problems concern the 
notorious future similarity objection. Morgenbesser cases allow me to apply results from the 
discussion of lottery cases to the discussion of similarity as they feature probabilistic outcomes 
such as coin tosses. 
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2.4.1. Morgenbesser Case 
 
Morgenbesser’s Coin is a notorious counterexample to the way Lewis supplements the standard 
semantics of counterfactuals by a similarity ordering. After taking issue with a recent attempt 
to dismiss the intuition, I discuss the two outstanding attempts at a solution in broadly Lewisian 
terms. Paul Noordhoff argues that facts which probabilistically depend on the antecedent should 
not count towards similarity. Jonathan Schaffer argues that facts which causally depend on 
whether the antecedent obtains or not should not count. I show that their discussion ends in a 
stalemate, thereby also fending off criticisms by Wong. None of them succeeds at refuting the 
other. Moreover, I present variants of the original Morgenbesser case which evade both 
solutions. 
I repeat the main ingredients of Lewis’s analysis: 
 
A counterfactual PQ is non-vacuously true iff some P&Q–world is more similar to the actual 
one than any P&not–Q–world. 
 
For simplicity, I will talk as if there were a set of closest P–worlds. For the deterministic case, 
Lewis presents a default similarity ordering of worlds: 
 
‘(1) It is of first importance to avoid big, widespread, diverse violations of law [big miracles]. 
(2) It is of second importance to maximize the spatio-temporal region throughout which perfect match of 
particular fact prevails. 
(3) It is of third importance to avoid even small, localized simple violations of law [small miracles]. 
(4) It is of little or no importance to secure approximate similarity of particular fact, even in matters that 
concern us greatly.’93 
 
Under indeterminism, it is of first importance to avoid amazing patterns of particular matters 
of fact (quasi–miracles). 
 
Enters Morgenbesser (I slightly vary Jonathan Schaffer’s presentation): 
 
Morgenbesser’s Coin  
A coin is tossed. At indeterministic w0, while the coin is in midair, Lucky bets heads. The coin 
lands tails, so Lucky loses. The following counterfactual seems intuitively true at w0:  
 
(E1) If Lucky had bet tails, he would have won. 
 
Lewis analysis entails that the relevant counterfactual is false: Lucky merely might have won. 
To see this, compare the (Lucky–bets–tails&coin–lands–tails)–world wT, with the (Lucky–
bets–tails&coin–lands–heads)–world wT. wT and wL will come out equidistant from w0. Each 
costs perfect match with actuality from Lucky’s bet on, and each buys an aspect of imperfect 
match – wT preserves the outcome of the flip (tails), while wH preserves the outcome of the bet 
(unlucky).94 
As Lewis’s argued in discussing the Nixon counterfactual (A33), it would take a 
widespread cover–up action to erase all traces the antecedent event has left. At least in the light 
cone of Lucky’s bet (in a relativistic world), there is no perfect match in particular matters of 
fact to be had. And since the outcome of the coin toss, albeit not influenced by the bet, lies 
within this region, the decision has to draw on imperfect match. But then a world wT which 
 
93 Lewis, Counterfactual Dependence, pp. 47–48. 
94 Jonathan Schaffer, ‘Counterfactuals, causal independence and conceptual circularity’, Analysis, 64 (2004), 299–
309 (p. 300). 
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preserves the outcome of the flip (tails) does not fare better than a world wL which preserves 
the outcome of the bet (Lucky loses). In sum, Lewis’s criteria of similarity cannot explain our 
intuition that Lucky would have won.  
 
Is the Example Coherent? 
 
Recently doubts have been voiced as to whether the Morgenbesser argument is coherent. Ian 
Phillips has argued that it presupposes indeterminism while the intuition depends on ‘closet 
determinism’: without determinism, one has no reason to accept Morgenbesser counterfactuals, 
says Phillips.95 In indeterministic worlds, nothing ensures that Lucky would have won.  
Phillips’ objection is that the Morgenbesser case is incoherent. The incoherence is due 
to combining the implicit presupposition of ‘closet determinism’ and the assumption of 
indeterminism. The latter assumption is required for Morgenbesser cases to pose a challenge 
for Lewis’s view. For under determinism it could be easily explained why we hold onto the 
outcome of the coin toss (tails). It is predetermined by the facts and laws at w0, which are 
preserved at wT but not wH. To be sure, there must be some changes in facts and laws compared 
to w0 to implement the antecedent. But intuitively they do not interfere with the way the coin 
toss comes about.  
This argument is not convincing, though. Arif Ahmed has retorted that the 
Morgenbesser intuition just depends on our tendency to hold fixed factors which do not causally 
depend on the antecedent in counterfactual reasoning.96 This explanation is intuitive without 
closet determinism. Morgenbesser intuitions are deeply entangled with the role of 
counterfactuals in everyday life. As psychological evidence shows, one core role of genuine 
counterfactuals is to evaluate past actions one could have taken such as to trigger regret or relief 
(‘If Lucky had only bet tails, he would have won’).97 It is part and parcel of this practice to 
mark the agent’s own contribution to the way things have gone. To do so, one must draw a line 
between facts to which the actions considered would have made a difference and other facts.  
In evaluating Lucky’s betting activity, we distinguish things to which his alternative 
options would have made a difference from things to which they would not have made a 
difference. Lucky’s betting behaviour had no influence on the coin toss. But keeping fixed the 
coin toss, his betting behaviour had an influence on the outcome of the bet. So he might regret 
not to have bet tails. Yet he cannot regret (at least strictly speaking) but only, say, lament that 
the coin fell tails. Counterfactuals are a tool of tracking this difference. This claim can be 
integrated into a more general view endorsed by many philosophers: in evaluating a 
counterfactual, we are interested in a scenario which ‘makes the antecedent true without 
gratuitous departure from actuality’.98 The Morgenbesser intuition draws on our intuitive ways 
of telling apart gratuitous from non-gratuitous departures. One challenge remains: ‘Ahmed 
must justify a closeness metric which delivers this result.’99 The Lewisian default ordering is 
the outstanding candidate for such a metric. 
Phillips himself would reject Ahmed’s intuitive rationale of counterfactual reasoning. 
He heralds a suppositional analysis of counterfactuals. Roughly, a counterfactual P>>Q is true 
or assertable iff the conditional probability of Q given P was sufficiently high at a suitable point 
 
95 Ian Phillips, ‘Morgenbesser cases and closet determinism’, Analysis, 67 (2007), 42–49.  
96 Arif Ahmed, ‘Out of the closet’, Analysis, 71 (2011), 77–85; Ian Phillips, ‘Stuck in the closet: a reply to Ahmed’, 
Analysis, 71 (2011), 86–91 (p. 87). 
97 James Olson and Neil Roese, ‘A critical overview’, in What might have been. The social psychology of 
counterfactual thinking, ed. by James Olson and Neil Roese (Mahwah: Lawrence Earlbaum Associates, 1995), pp. 
1–57. 
98 Lewis, Counterfactual Dependence, p. 41. 
99 Phillips, ‘Stuck in the Closet’, p. 88. 
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in time.100 Yet I think that even given Phillips’ own account, Morgenbesser intuitions can be 
upheld. 
To Phillips, the problem for Morgenbesser intuitions arises from their combining 
determinism and indeterminism. Determinism is needed to support Morgenbesser inuitions, 
indeterminism is needed for them to spell trouble for Lewis. However, the inconsistency does 
not arise if Morgenbesser intuitions are forwarded as a challenge to the suppositional account. 
Grant that they depend on assuming determinism. We do not need to asume indeterminism for 
them to pose a challenge to the suppositional semantics. The intuition is that, since the coin fell 
tails, Lucky would have won had he bet tails. Phillips’s suppositional semantics cannot 
accommodate this as the prior possibility of Lucky winning given he bets tails is not high 
enough to accept that he would have won. One might still object that Morgenbesser intuitions 
depend on determinism. But the suppositional account in turn should also apply to a 
deterministic world, especially if our everyday use of counterfactuals has been developed 
within a climate of closet determinism (as Phillips must assume). 
 
Having dissolved Phillips’s criticism, I shall now discuss several proposals to mend 
Lewis’s criteria of similarity such as to accommodate Morgenbesser intuitions. In confining my 
discussion to amendments of Lewis’s standard semantics, I shall not take into consideration 
solutions not based on a closeness semantics.101 
Paul Noordhoff has espoused the following solution: disregard match in facts which 
probabilistically depends on the antecedent. His solution can be inscribed as an amendment into 
Lewis’s metrics:  
 
(1)… 
(2´) It is of second importance to maximize the spatio-temporal region throughout which perfect 
match of particular facts prevails as far as these facts are probabilistically independent of the 
antecedent. 
(3)… 
(4´) It is of little or no importance to secure approximate similarity of particular facts as far as 
these facts are probabilistically independent of the antecedent. 
 
Noordhoff’s notion of probabilistic independence is the following: a fact F is probabilistically 
independent of the antecedent iff, for any time t, its probability is the same in the closest world 
where the antecedent obtains and the closest world where it does not. This criterion is not 
circular provided we can figure out what the probabilities of F are in the antecedent worlds at 
stake without already knowing whether F is probabilistically independent.  
The outcome of the toss is probabilistically independent of Lucky’s betting, says 
Noordhoff, and thus not probabilistically independent of the antecedent. Here is my 
interpretation: the closest world where Lucky does not bet tails is the actual one. Until the coin 
has fallen, P(tails) = P(heads) = 0.5; afterwards, P(tails) is = 1 and P(heads) = 0.102 The same 
goes for the closest world where Lucky bets tails. But, Noordhoff says, the same does not 
go for the outcome of the bet (Lucky wins). The outcome is not probabilistically independent 
of the antecedent, i.e. whether Lucky bets or not. Thus wT beats wH.  
 
100 Phillips, ‘Morgenbesser’, p. 43. 
101 E.g. Stephen Barker, ‘Counterfactuals, probabilistic counterfactuals and causation’, Mind, 108 (1999), 427–69; 
Eric Hiddleston, ‘A causal theory of counterfactuals’, Noûs, 39 (2005), 632–657. Yet see below my criticism of 
Barker’s intuitions. 
102 Paul Noordhoff, ‘Morgenbesser’s coin, counterfactuals and independence’, Analysis, 65 (2005), 261–263 (p. 
262), cf. Paul Noordhoff, ‘Prospects for a counterfactual theory of causation,’ in Cause and chance: causation in 
an indeterministic World, ed. by Paul Dowe and Paul Noordhoff. (London: Routledge, 2004), pp. 188–201 (p. 
193). 
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I shall consider two criticisms of Noordhoff’s approach. The first is due to Chiwook 
Won. Won has argued that approaches to counterfactuals in terms of probabilistic independence 
cannot deal with certain variants of Morgenbesser Cases. I summarize Won’s Morgenbesser 
cases, Paul Noordhoff's probabilistic independence solution, and Won's criticism. Then I show 
why the criticism fails. I close this part of my discussion with a real problem for Noordhoff. 
Morgenbesser cases are core examples which a semantics for counterfactuals must deal 
with. Just as I have done at the beginning, Won distinguishes approaches in terms of 
probabilistic (Noordhoff) and approaches in terms of causal independence (Schaffer). The idea 
of the former is to hold onto facts which are probabilistically independent of the antecedent, the 
idea of the latter is to hold onto facts which are causally independent. Won’s main claim is that 
approaches in terms of probabilistic independence fail. He focuses on Noordhoff’s exemplary 
account.  
Here is Won’s example:  
 
‘Susan offers Lucky a bet on an indeterministic coin toss. Lucky bets heads and Susan tosses the coin. But 
the coin lands tails. Now consider a counterfactual: 
[E2] If Lucky had tossed the coin, it would still have landed tails. 
Intuitively, this is false[…] 
[E3] If Lucky had bet tails, he would have won. 
Intuitively, this is true.’103 
 
Won uses a somewhat simplified version of Noordhoff's criterion of probabilistic 
independence: 
 
‘B is probabilistically independent of A just in case: 
[E4] If A were to occur, the chance of B’s occurring would be x. 
[E5]If A were not to occur, the chance of B’s occurring would be y. 
[…] x = y.’104 
 
The criterion underpins (E3), says Won, but only provided we subscribe to (strong) centering: 
the actual world where Lucky bets heads is closer than any other world where Lucky does not 
bet tails. In the closest worlds where Lucky does not bet tails (A does not occur), the actual one, 
the prior probability of the coin landing tails (the chance of B occurring) is 0.5. And the same 
goes for the closest worlds where Lucky bets tails (A does occur). The coin landing tails is 
probabilistically independent of Lucky betting tails. Thus, it is held fixed and (E3) comes true. 
But alas, says Won, centering cannot be upheld in Noordhoff's account. For otherwise (E2) 
would come true, counterintuitively. Given centering, the closest worlds where Lucky does not 
toss the coin are worlds where Susan tosses the coin. The probability of the coin falling tails is 
the same as in any relevant world where Lucky tosses it (0.5). The coin falling tails is 
probabilistically independent of the antecedent, and thus should be held onto. We have a 
dilemma: without centering, no (E3); with centering, (E2).105  
The argument fails for two independent reasons. Firstly, Noordhoff does not need 
centering to get (E3).106 Assume the closest world where Lucky does not bet tails is not the 
actual one but one, say, where Lucky does not bet at all. This assumption has no impact on the 
probabilistic independence of the tails outcome. At that world, too, the tails outcome is 
probabilistically independent of the antecedent: the fair coin is tossed and the probability of the 
 
103 Chinook Won, ‘Morgenbesser’s Coin, Counterfactuals, and Causal vs. Probabilistic Independence’, Erkenntnis, 
71 (2009), 345–354 (p. 346). 
104 Won, ‘Morgenbesser’s Coin’, p. 349. 
105 Won, ‘Morgenbesser’s Coin’, p. 351. 
106 And he seems committed to rejecting centering, judging from his reply to Schaffer (cf. Schaffer, 
‘Counterfactuals’, p. 307, Noordhoff, ‘Morgenbesser’s Coin’, p. 261)). 
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coin landing tails is 0.5.107 According to Noordhoff, we uphold that the coin falls tails in the 
closest worlds where Lucky bets tails, irrespectively of whether centering obtains. And that 
entails his winning in a world where he bets tails. Thus, we get (E3). 
Secondly, Won is wrong that centering would commit Noordhoff to (E2). Won just 
attends to the probability of the coin falling tails before the coin has fallen (= 0.5 at relevant 
worlds where the coin is tossed). But we must also attend to the probability after the coin has 
fallen (1 or 0). Single–case probabilities may vary in time. In assessing probabilities at different 
worlds according to Noordhoff's criterion, we must fix a set of points in time common to the 
different worlds where probabilities are evaluated. To achieve probabilistic independence à la 
Noordhoff, the probability in the different worlds must be the same for any time of evaluation. 
As for (E2), clearly in all relevant worlds, the probability of the fair coin falling tails is 0.5 
before the coin has fallen. But after the coin has fallen, this does not hold. In the closest worlds 
where Lucky does not toss the coin, i.e. the actual world where Susan does instead (by virtue 
of centering), the probability of tails becomes 1. But the same does not have to go for any closest 
world where Lucky tosses the coin. For any such world, surely the probability of tails becomes 
1 or 0. But since we cannot presuppose that the closest worlds where Lucky tosses the coin are 
worlds where the coin falls tails, there is no reason to deem a (Lucky tosses)–world where the 
probability of tails would be 1 (the coin fell tails) closer than a (Lucky tosses)–world where the 
probability of tails would be 0 (the coin did not fall tails). 
Thus, there is no reason for Noordhoff to accept 
 
(E6) If Lucky had tossed the coin, after the coin has fallen, the probability of tails would be 1. 
 
But (E6) would have to be true for the tails outcome to be probabilistically independent (à la 
Noordhoff) of the antecedent (Lucky tosses the coin). Condition P3 of probabilistic 
independence is not satisfied. There is no reason to hold onto the tails outcome, i.e. the 
consequent of (E2). Thus, Won is wrong that centering commits Noordhoff to (E2). 
The point can also be used to defend Noordhoff against a criticism of Schaffer. Schaffer 
notes in passing that the outcome of the bet (Lucky wins), too, is probabilistically independent 
of Lucky betting tails or not betting tails.108 In the closest world where Lucky bets tails, before 
the coin has fallen, P(winning) = 0.5. The same goes for the closest world where Lucky bets 
heads.  
Noordhoff tries to rebut Schaffer’s remark: there is not only the alternative of betting 
heads but also the alternative not to bet at all.109 Noordhoff seems to have in mind the following: 
Provided there is a relevant point in time t when the latter alternative has non–zero probability, 
the outcome of the bet probabilistically depends on whether Lucky bets tails or not. In a world 
where he bets tails, from his betting onwards the chance of winning is 0.5, in a world where he 
does not, it is smaller than 0.5. Noordhoff’s reply is mistaken. In adopting Lewis’s metrics for 
his test of probabilistic independence, he adopts centering: no world is closer to the actual world 
w0 than w0 itself. According to Noordhoff’s criterion, we must consider the world closest to w0 
where Lucky does not bet tails. And since Lucky actually does not bet tails but heads, the closest 
world to w0 is a world where Lucky bets heads, not a world where he does not bet at all. Thus 
the alternative of not betting at all is irrelevant. If there is a probability that Lucky does not bet 
at all, it is the same in the closest world where he bets tails and w0.  
Nevertheless Schaffer is mistaken, too (but for a different reason): the outcome of the 
bet (Lucky wins) does probabilistically depend on the antecedent (Lucky bets tails). Schaffer 
grants that the outcome of the coin toss (tails) is probabilistically independent of the antecedent. 
 
107 In a moment, we will see that this assumption of Won’s is too simplified. We must also attend to what happens 
after the coin has fallen. But the assumption works ad hominem Won. 
108 Schaffer, ‘Counterfactuals’, p. 307. 
109 Noordhoff, ‘Morgenbesser’s Coin’, p. 261. 
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For any time after this outcome is fixed, in the closest world where Lucky bets tails (wT), 
P(Lucky wins) = 1. In the closest world where he does not bet tails, the actual world in which 
he bets heads (w0), P(Lucky wins) = 0.  
While I think that Won’s and Schaffer’s objections fail, I close with a more grievous 
objection to Noordhoff's account: consider 
 
(E7) If Lucky had bet tails and the coin had been tossed, the coin would have fallen tails. 
 
Arguably this counterfactual is true if (E3) is.110 In Noordhoff's account, for us to hold onto the 
result of the coin toss (tails), it must be probabilistically independent of the antecedent: the 
probability of tails must be the same in the closest worlds where Lucky bets tails and the coin 
is tossed and in the closest worlds where it is not the case that Lucky bets tails and the coin is 
tossed, i.e. the actual one. After the toss, the probability is the same (= 1) just if we hold onto 
the result tails in the closest worlds where Lucky bets tails and the coin is tossed. But we hold 
onto the result tails just if it is probabilistically independent of the antecedent. Thus, the 
criterion is viciously circular.  
What if centering is given up? In that case, things get more complicated. Consider the 
closest worlds where the antecedent does not obtain: if they are worlds where Lucky does not 
bet tails and the coin is not tossed, the tails result is not probabilistically independent and (E7) 
comes out false. And if the closest worlds are worlds where Lucky bets tails but the coin is not 
tossed, again (E7) comes out false. If the closest worlds are worlds where Lucky does not bet 
tails but the coin is tossed (the actual one), the vicious circularity arises. If worlds of all three 
kinds are equally close, we cannot claim the tails result to be probabilistically independent. 
Again (E7) is wrong. Noordhoff could restrict the time of evaluation to points in time before 
the result of the toss is fixed. But then his theory would fall prey to Schaffer’s objection. 
To bring out a further problem, I vary an example of Stephen Barker’s:111  
 
Morgenbesser’s Coin II: 
Mandrake the Magician has placed magnets such as to influence the coin toss. When Lucky 
bets heads, there is a probability of 5% that Mandrake manipulates the outcome of the coin toss 
such that Lucky loses.112 Actually Lucky bet heads but Mandrake did not interfere.  
 
There was a point in time after Lucky’s bet when there was a chance of Mandrake interfering. 
We still accept that Lucky would have won if he had bet tails. But the outcome of the toss is no 
longer probabilistically independent of whether he bet tails or not (i.e. heads at w0). For in the 
latter but not in the former case there was a chance of Mandrake interfering. Thus, at some point 
in time, at w0 the chance of Lucky winning was 0.5 * 0.95, while at wT it was 0.5. In sum, while 
Noordhoff evades Schaffer’s objection, he cannot evade the other problems. 
Schaffer presents a different solution to Morgenbesser problems: in maximizing perfect 
match in facts, disregard match which causally depends on whether the antecedent obtains or 
not. The purported advantage of this solution is that it dissolves a great number of problem 
cases, including the Morgenbesser case. Lewis metrics is amended: 
 
 
110 Cf. Lee Walters, ‘Morgenbesser's Coin and Counterfactuals with True Components’, Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society, 99 (2009), 365–379 (p. 370). 
111 Barker, ‘Counterfactuals’, p. 431. 
112 Barker puts this example to a different use: in his version, when Lucky bets tails, there is a 5% chance of 
Mandrake interfering such as to change the outcome of the toss to heads. Barker thinks that if Lucky had bet tails, 
the probability of his winning would have been 95%. I do not share this intuition. Presumably the mere chance of 
Mandrake interfering is sufficient for us not to hold onto the outcome of the coin toss, even in cases where 
Mandrake does not interfere (cf. Kment’s discussion of Nixon’s Game below). So the probability of Lucky winning 
would have been 0,95 * 0,5. 
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‘(2c) It is of the second importance to maximize the region of perfect match, from those regions causally 
independent of whether or not the antecedent obtains. 
… 
(4c) It is of the fourth importance to maximize the spatiotemporal region of approximate match, from 
those regions causally independent of whether or not the antecedent obtains.’113 
 
The outcome of the bet causally depends on whether Lucky bets tails or not. The outcome of 
the coin toss does not. Thus, wT comes out closer than wH. Morgenbesser’s counterfactual is 
true.  
Schaffer’s solution has its own problems, though. Noordhoff disagrees with Schaffer’s 
analysis. I present a variant of his counterexample (which varies Tichy’s hat–example): 
 
Fred’s Hat: 
Fred has a reliable disposition to wear his hat. Sometimes weather conditions interfere with this 
disposition. There is a chance–device in his brain that makes him attend to the weather in 50% 
of the cases. Whenever he attends to the weather and the weather is fine, he takes off his hat. 
Actually he wears his hat and it is raining. We reject  
 
(E8) If it had not been raining, Fred would have worn his hat.114 
 
The rainy weather does not cause Fred to take off his hat. Moreover, consider the closest 
counterfactual situation where it is not raining and he still wears his hat: in this situation Fred 
wearing his hat does not seem to depend on the weather conditions either. He just does not 
attend to the weather. Moreover, this situation preserves more match in particular matters of 
fact than a situation where it is not raining and Fred does not wear his hat. According to 
Schaffer’s criterion, we should hold onto the fact that Fred wears his hat. Thus, we should 
accept (E8). 
Noordhoff surely is right that Schaffer’s notion of causal dependence needs 
interpretation. I propose to use the account of Boris Kment, which is very close in spirit to 
Schaffer but evades Noordhoff’s criticism. The upshot of Kment’s account is that match in 
particular facts should only count towards similarity of worlds as far as these facts have the 
same explanation.115 And as far as the relevant aspects of explanation in cases like 
Morgenbesser’s Coin boil down to causal explanation, we may take Schaffer and Kment as 
aiming at the same criterion: a fact is causally independent of whether the antecedent obtains 
or not precisely if it has the same explanation in the closest worlds where the antecedent obtains 
and in the actual world.116 
In how far does Kment help us to evade (Fred’s Hat)? Kment more extensively than 
Schaffer deals with the question how to confine explanatory history. He presents an argument 
for a very broad conception of relevant causal–explanatory factors:117 
 
Nixon’s Game 
Assume Nixon’s missile system is indeterministic. There is a chance that the signal fizzles out 
and there is a chance that a nuclear holocaust occurs. We reject 
 
(E9) If Nixon had pressed the button, the signal would have fizzled out. 
 
 
113 Schaffer, ‘Counterfactuals’, p. 305. 
114 Noordhoff, ‘Morgenbesser’s Coin’, p. 262. 
115 Cf. Boris Kment, ‘Counterfactuals and Explanation’, Mind, 115 (2006), 261–310 (p. 296). 
116 I disregard Kment’s preoccupation with counterlegals, which is not relevant to the case. 
117 Kment, p. 299. 
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There is a close parallel between (Nixon’s Game) and (Fred’s Hat). For (E9) to be false, 
worlds where Nixon presses and a nuclear holocaust occurs must be at least as close as worlds 
where he presses and the signal fizzles out. But in the closest worlds where the signal fizzles 
out, many actual matters of fact obtain unaltered which would be affected by the holocaust. At 
some point in time, there is an unrealized chance that Nixon’s pressing affects these facts.118 
Kment suggests that this unrealized chance amounts to a difference in the explanatory history 
of the facts which would be affected by a holocaust, compared to their actual explanatory 
history (without Nixon’s pressing, there is (almost) no chance of a holocaust). The same goes 
for (Fred’s Hat): for (E8) to be false, the closest worlds where it is not raining must not all be 
worlds where he wears his hat. So the closest worlds where it is not raining must split into 
worlds where Fred does not attend to the weather and wears his hat and worlds where Fred 
attends to the weather and does not wear his hat. In the former worlds, at some point in time 
there is an unrealized chance that the weather conditions catch Fred’s attention and he does not 
wear his hat. Given Kment’s broad reading of explanatory history, this unrealized chance 
amounts to a difference in the causal–explanatory history of Fred wearing his hat. Thus, Fred 
wearing his hat does not count towards similarity.  
In sum, the discussion between Schaffer and Noordhoff ends in a stalemate. None 
successfully rebuts the other. Yet Schaffer’s approach can be modified along the lines of Kment 
such as to evade Noordhoff’s counterexample. I see no parallel modification for Noordhoff’s 
account. 
This is not the end of the story yet. As I have presented a counterexample to Noordhoff’s 
approach, I will present two new counterexamples, which spell trouble for the Schaffer–Kment 
approach.119 It seems that some non-producing factors must not count towards relevant causal–
explanatory history. I vary an example owing to Schaffer and Kment:120  
 
The King’s Coin: 
The king tosses a coin. The evening before, the king’s enemy has placed a bomb under the 
king’s throne. The detonating mechanism is refined: there is a box. In the box, there is a clock 
which activates the bomb some time before the coin toss unless it is stopped. The box is causally 
isolated save for its connection to the bomb. The clock within the box is built such that two 
independent signals within the box, x and y, are each sufficient to stop it. Each signal can be 
activated or deactivated by a minuscule chance event. Signal x occurs but y does not. Later the 
box is cleanly disposed of.121 We accept, Kment and Schaffer say, 
 
(E10) If y instead of x had occurred, the outcome of the coin toss would have been the same. 
 
 
118 Cf. Kment, p. 300. 
119 Further criticism has been forwarded by Walters, ‘Morgenbesser’s Coin’. To evade Walters’s criticism, one 
might simply restrict the clause ‘from those regions...’ in Schaffer's amended similarity metrics to genuine 
contrary–to–fact antecedents (or to the contrary–to–fact part of such antecedents). As a consequence, facts which 
causally depend on the antecedent as far as it actually obtains do count towards similarity. 
120 Cf. Kment, p. 300. 
121 The box does not have to disappear without a trace. But differences within the box must not make a difference 
to subsequent history over and above activating or not activating the bomb. In devising the causally isolated box, 
I follow Wasserman (Ryan Wasserman, ‘The future similarity objection revisited’, Synthese, 150 (2006), 57–67 
(p. 59)). I need the box to achieve perfect future match of facts in accordance with Lewis’s criterion (2). We might 
doubt the nomic possibility of a causally isolated box and of cleanly destroying it. But firstly, the possibility of a 
causally or energetically isolated box is used in the philosophy of physics (cf. Laurence Sklar, ‘Causation in 
statistical mechanics’, in The Oxford handbook of causation, ed. by Helen Beebee, Christopher Hitchcock, Peter 
Menzies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 661–672 (p. 669)). Secondly, Wasserman himself concedes 
that his example is nomologically impossible; but he insists that this does not disqualify it as a counterexample to 
Lewis (Wasserman, p. 65). Schaffer rejects doubts that the example is too far–fetched to trigger reliable intuitions 
(Schaffer, ‘Counterfactuals’, p. 302). So he must accept the (King’s Coin) scenario. 
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Kment concludes that y instead of x occurring must not count towards a difference in the 
explanatory history of the coin toss. The problem is the following: relevant explanatory history 
would have to be tailored such as to reconcile the opposing demands imposed by (E9) and 
(E10). Yet it is doubtful that Kment can evade the problem by tailoring explanatory history. For 
(E10) to come true, the explanatory history of the coin toss must be the same no matter whether 
x or y occurs. Now consider 
 
(E11) If x had not occurred, the outcome of the coin toss would have been the same. 
 
(E11) seems intuitively wrong. However, Kment insists that y replacing x does not make a 
difference to the causal–explanatory history of the coin toss. Thus, one candidate outdoes all 
other worlds where x does not occur in terms of match in facts and needs nothing more than 
two minuscule chance events: y replaces x in the history of the coin toss.122 We gain perfect 
match with the complete future of the actual world, including the outcome of the coin toss. So 
according to both Lewis’s metrics and the Schaffer–Kment amendment, (E11) should come out 
true. The question is: why do we not imagine signal y to take over if x fails to occur? 
Consider Eric Hiddleston’s variant of the Mandrake case, originally directed against 
Lewis’s metrics:123 
 
Morgenbesser’s Coin III: 
Again Mandrake has placed magnets such as to influence the coin toss. When Lucky bets, there 
is a probability of 5% that Mandrake manipulates the outcome of the coin toss such that Lucky 
loses. Actually Lucky does not bet. The outcome is tails. We accept 
 
(E12) If Lucky had bet tails and Mandrake had not interfered, Lucky would have won. 
 
The problem this example poses to the Schaffer–Kment template is captured by Hiddleston’s 
gloss: Lucky’s not betting is an actual cause of the coin landing tails. (Lucky’s not betting is a 
cause of Mandrake’s not activating the magnet, and that is a cause of the coin landing tails.)124 
Kment’s broad conception of explanatory history underpins Hiddleston’s diagnosis: 
Lucky’s not betting actually forms part of the causal–explanatory history of Mandrake’s not 
intervening and thus of the coin landing tails. Since this part of the causal–explanatory history 
of the coin landing tails would have to be different in the counterfactual situation (Lucky’s 
betting would replace it), Schaffer and Kment provide no reason to hold onto the result tails 
and thus should reject (E12). 
In conclusion: Morgenbesser’s Coin can be given a twist that eludes all hitherto known 
Lewisian attempts at turning the game around. Does this show the principled limits of such 
accounts? I don’t think so. For instance, one might try to fix the Schaffer–Kment account by 
using a context-sensitive contrastivist notion of causation.125 Here I can only give a hint: causal 
dependence or relevance is determined with respect to a context-sensitive causal contrast. The 
causal contrast is sensitive to the minimal context created by the antecedent. The difference 
between (E10) and (E11) is explained by the difference between the causal contrasts invoked. 
As for (E10), signal x occurring is contrasted to signal y occurring instead. Intuitively, this is 
causally irrelevant to whether the coin toss is the same. Thus, we do hold onto the outcome of 
the coin toss. As for (E11), signal x occurring is contrasted to no signal occurring at all. 
Intuitively, this is causally relevant to whether the coin toss is the same. Thus, we do not hold 
 
122 The example can be varied such as to require only one chance event: Assume that among the different minuscule 
chance events that could undo x there is one which also triggers y. I think we still reject (E11). 
123 Cf. Hiddleston, ‘Counterfactuals’, p. 637. 
124 Adapted from Hiddleston, ‘Counterfactuals’, p. 637. 
125 Jonathan Schaffer, ‘Contrastive Causation’, The Philosophical Review, 114 (2005), 297–328. 
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onto the outcome of the coin toss. What concerns (E12), the causal contrast might be restricted 
to the contrary–to–fact part of the antecedent.126 Lucky betting tails may be contrasted to Lucky 
not betting at all. Again this does not make a difference to the outcome of the toss. Of course, 
a lot more would have to be said how the relevant causal contrast is confined.  
Pending such a more in-depth assessment, I still deem the Schaffer–Kment approach the 
most promising way of dealing with problems like Morgenbesser cases and the problems with 
convergence worlds to be discussed in the next section. 
 
 
126 This restriction might be explained as follows within the context of the example: the contrary–to–fact possibility 
of Mandrake interfering is explicitly raised. But then it is explicitly denied in the antecedent. Thus, neither the 
actual world nor the closest antecedent world is supposed to be one where Mandrake interferes. This might serve 
as a signal that no contrast between Mandrake interfering and Mandrake not interfering is intended. 
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2.4.2. World Convergence Made Easy: The Future Similarity Objection 
 
In the introductory part (1.), I presented Lewis’s default criteria of similarity, which I repeat 
here: 
 
‘(1) It is of first importance to avoid big, widespread, diverse violations of law [big miracles]. 
(2) It is of second importance to maximize the spatio–temporal region throughout which perfect match of 
particular fact prevails. 
(3) It is of third importance to avoid even small, localized simple violations of law [small miracles]. 
(4) It is of little or no importance to secure approximate similarity of particular fact, even in matters that 
concern us greatly.’127 
 
As we have seen, Lewis in ‘Counterfactual Dependence’ uses these default criteria to avoid 
Fine’s original future similarity objection. I shall now discuss several problems of this solution. 
I start with mentioning some puzzles and then discuss two exemplary ones in depth: Bennett 
and Elga worlds.  
Lewis distinguishes big miracles that must be avoided at all costs and small ones which 
are cheap: As long as the miracles remain small, maximizing perfect fit of particular matters of 
fact weighs more. ‘A big miracle consists of many little miracles together, preferably not all 
alike.’(p. 56) But how many?128 How varied? Miracles are individuated like events (p. 56). But 
can’t there be single events which take more of a miracle, perhaps a big one? Hence Bennett’s 
distressed question: ‘How much of a bump (or a click) is a fair trade for a twelve–hour 
shortening of the ramp [the smooth development towards the antecedent from the actual world 
modified by a small miracle]? As soon as the question is asked, one sees its absurdity. It has 
nothing to do with our actual uses of subjunctive conditionals.’129 But how can we avoid it 
given Lewis’s criteria? Bennett defends Lewis at this point:  
 
‘(2) No coherent account can be given of the nomological structure of a world that exactly matches  [the 
actual world] up to some time when it forks away through the occurrence of a small miracle. 
To regard 2 as [… ]counting much against it [assuming miracles] would be unduly optimistic about the 
conceptual aspects of the human condition.’130 
 
However, the general questions have quickly been condensed into more focused 
puzzles. I mention two of them by way of examples. The following is valid in Lewis’s logics: 
 
P>>R, not(P not–Q), hence (P&Q)>>R.  
 
We can develop the following counterexample:131 Let A be: The kitchen works, B: The rooms 
are cold; C: The stove is lighted, G: The gas is on. A, C, D, G are actually false. Rooms can be 
heated independently by electricity or a combination of gas and stove. Furthermore, the kitchen 
works as well with gas as independently with electricity. 
(i)A>> not–C 
(ii) not(A not(notB)) 
(iii) from (i): A>> not(CG) 
 
 
127 Lewis, ‘Counterfactual Dependence’, pp. 47-48. 
128 Assume I can reach an outcome by one small miracle, or two small miracles which together may add to a bigger 
one, or three… while each time gaining some amount of perfect match (the more small miracles required, the later 
they may take place). 
129 Bennett, Conditionals, p. 326. 
130 Bennett, Conditionals, p. 226. 
131 Bennett, Conditionals, pp. 333–334. 
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Hence (A&not–B)>> not(CG). But when we think over this conclusion, it seems absurd. 
 
In words: 
(i) If the kitchen had worked, the stove would not have been lighted.  
(ii) It is not the case that, if the kitchen had worked, it would not have been the case that the 
rooms would not have been cold. That is reconcilable with the rooms having been cold in some 
closest and not cold in other closest worlds. 
(iii) from (i): if the kitchen had worked, it would not have been the case that the stove was 
lighted and the gas was on. 
Hence if the kitchen had worked and the rooms had not been cold, it would not have 
been the case that the stove was lighted and the gas was on. 
 
Another counterexample: 
 
‘My coat was not stolen from the restaurant where I left it. There were two chances for theft, two times when 
relevant indeterminacies or small miracles could have done the trick. [… ] and the candidate for the later theft 
is a rogue who always sells his stuff to a pawnbroker named Fence. If the closest A–world involves the latest 
admissible fork, it follows from the above story that if my coat had been stolen from the restaurant, it would 
now be in Fence’s shop. That is not acceptable.’132 
 
Instead of discussing these counterexamples, I shall discuss two different ones, which 
have to do with the possibility of achieving perfect future match in facts by just a small miracle. 
The first is due to Adam Elga, the second is due to Jonathan Bennett. I shall assess exemplary 
ways of meeting these challenges and then compare them. 
 
 
132 Bennett, Conditionals, p. 220. 
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2.4.2.1 Elga Worlds 
 
In this chapter, I discuss Elga’s counterexample to Lewis’s default criteria of similarity for 
possible worlds: a largely counterentropic world may achieve perfect future match in facts at 
the cost of just a small miracle. I summarize Elga’s argument. Then I discuss several attempts 
at dissolving Elga’s challenge. I most extensively discuss a proposal by Jeffrey Dunn to write 
the preservation of special science laws into the similarity criteria. I argue that the Schaffer–
Kment proposal known from the chapter on Morgenbesser cases is superior in meeting Elga’s 
challenge. I add another facet of the challenge, the problem of amazingness. I argue that the 
most thorough way of solving that independent problem in terms of high–likelihood properties 
better accords with the Schaffer–Kment approach than Dunn’s. 
I sketch Elga’s counterexample to Lewis’s criteria of similarity. Lewis’s criteria were 
to ensure the asymmetry of counterfactual dependence: while it takes only a small miracle for 
an antecedent world to diverge in a very short time from the actual world towards the 
antecedent, it takes a big, widespread miracle for an antecedent world to perfectly reconverge 
such as to perfectly match the actual world in particular matters of fact.  
Elga considers 
 
‘At 8:00, Gretta cracked open an egg onto a hot frying pan. According to the analysis, are the following 
counterfactuals true?  
[E13] If Gretta hadn’t cracked the egg, then at 8:05 there wouldn’t have been a cooked egg on the pan.  
[E14] If Gretta hadn’t cracked the egg, then at 7:55 she wouldn’t have taken an egg out of her refrigerator.’133 
 
Consider two competitors for closest non-cracking worlds: Lewis’s favourite w2 perfectly 
matches the actual world w1 until shortly before 8:00. At that point, a small miracle occurs such 
as to prevent the egg from being cracked. Then w2 develops according to the laws such as to 
never again perfectly match the actual world. w3, in contrast, differs from the actual world 
before 8:00 such that the egg is not cracked (and not taken out of the refrigerator at 7:55) but 
some time after 8:00 converges to the actual world by dint of a small miracle. Lewis insists that 
the w3 – strategy is not feasible. For any normal event leaves many and varied traces. It would 
need many and varied unlawful events, a big miracle, to suppress these traces.134 So the 
asymmetry is this: certain divergence worlds are better candidates for closeness than any 
convergence worlds. 
Elga sets out to show that pace Lewis there are candidate worlds for w3 that need nothing 
but a small miracle.135 In deterministic statistical mechanics, a physical state can be completely 
described by the positions and momenta of particles. Starting from the egg in the pan at 8:05, 
Elga contrasts a normal future development to the thermodynamically atypical future 
development which reverses the actual forward-directed development of the egg between 8:00 
and 8:05; the egg uncooks and jumps back into the shell. The reversed development is extremely 
unstable. Its closest neighbours in phase space are states which differ from it just in a small 
local group of molecules. It needs only a tiny change at 8:05, a small miracle, to proceed to one 
of these developments. But this tiny difference very quickly spreads such as to give rise to a 
completely different, thermodynamically normal development. A tiny change leads to a 
completely different result. Now an analogous situation can be achieved by running the 
symmetrical laws backwards: it needs only a tiny variation immediately before 8:05 to switch 
from the normal past of the egg (cracking and cooking) to a completely different, 
thermodynamically reversed past development. Elga envisages a process of ‘reversed rotting’: 
a possible future development of the egg is reversed and projected into the past. A coniform 
 
133 Adam Elga, ‘Statistical Mechanics and the Asymmetry of Counterfactual Dependence’, Philosophy of Science, 
68 (2001), S313–S324 (p. S314). 
134 Lewis, ‘Counterfactual Dependence’, p. 47. 
135 Elga, ‘Statistical Mechanics’, p. S318. 
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‘infected region’ comprises this complete development from the distant past up to the point of 
convergence at 8:05. In the distant past, the infected region was huge. But due to its instability, 
it rapidly shrank and gave way to normal developments up to the small miracle immediately 
before 8:05.136 The egg has never been taken out of the refrigerator, never been cracked. 
Nevertheless, the thermodynamically reversed development eventually comes so close to the 
actual development as to achieve perfect match by a small miracle administered immediately 
before 8:05. Since this match is perfect, it comprises all the alleged traces of the cracking. 
As it seems, we cannot rule out that the Elga world is closer than all competing non-
cracking worlds. It perfectly abides by the actual fundamental laws of nature except for a small 
miracle, and it counters the perfect pre–antecedent match Lewis’s candidate worlds exhibit by 
perfect post–antecedent match. If w3 is closer than its competitors, Lewis’s criteria have the 
wrong counterfactuals come out true, for instance the intuitively false 
 
(E14) If Gretta hadn’t cracked the egg, then at 7:55 she wouldn’t have taken an egg out of her 
refrigerator. 
 
So Lewis’s similarity metrics grossly misses our common counterfactual verdicts. 
 
Elga undone? Dunn’s proposal 
 
I shall discuss in detail a proposal by Jeffrey Dunn how to mend Lewis’s criteria of similarity 
such as to demote Elga worlds from competing for closeness. While Lewis has in mind 
fundamental laws, Dunn also takes into account the laws of the special sciences, among them 
‘lawlike relations that are not entailed by the fundamental laws’.137 He gives them fourth 
importance, demoting Lewis’s fourth criterion to fifth importance:  
 
(4´) It is of the fourth importance to avoid violation of the special science laws.(p. 84) 
 
The Elga world is disqualified as a candidate for closeness due to its violating the laws of 
thermodynamics. Briefly, Dunn invokes the second law of classical thermodynamics: heat 
cannot spontaneously flow from a hotter location to a cooler location.138 Yet that is what Elga’s 
reverse process would amount to; the backwards rotting egg would have to absorb heat from its 
relatively cool surroundings in order to end in the pan at cooking temperature. Lewis’s 
candidate worlds abide by the second law of thermodynamics while the Elga world violates it. 
So the former are closer according to Dunn’s criteria. 
In my critical discussion of Dunn’s approach, I will proceed as follows: I will point out 
several intrinsic problems of Dunn’s amendment of Lewis. I will argue that Dunn’s strategy is 
not the best way of meeting Elga’s objection. Elga’s counterexample is only one instance of the 
notorious future similarity objection; other cases  completely evade Dunn’s strategy. Jonathan 
Schaffer and Boris Kment provide a strategy which is superior to Dunn’s; it applies to all 
counterexamples presently on offer. I present this strategy and its merits. Dunn ignores it, 
although it arguably is required even to evade intrinsic problems of his own approach. I close 
with concerns about the Schaffer–Kment strategy. 
 
Intrinsic problems of Dunn’s approach 
  
 
136 Elga, ‘Statistical Mechanics’, p. S323. 
137 Jeffrey Dunn, ‘Fried Eggs, Thermodynamics, and the Special Sciences’, The British Journal for the Philosophy 
of Science, 62 (2011), 71–98 (p. 73). 
138 For a more detailed modern formulation cf. Dunn, p. 82. 
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I begin with some methodological remarks. Facing doubts as to whether his default criteria of 
similarity fit our snap judgements, Lewis maintains that an account of similarity of worlds 
should be ultimately judged exclusively by intuitively compelling test counterfactuals.139 
Even if we accept that an account is ultimately to be judged only by sustaining intuitive 
counterfactuals, the very idea of a general similarity metrics as contrasted to a casuistry requires 
us to look for unifying traits counterfactual verdicts have in common. These traits can be used 
to explain our verdicts by general criteria these verdicts implicitly draw on. And they guide us 
in conjuring up test counterfactuals. In identifying such traits, feelings of simplicity and 
naturalness are likely to play a heuristic role.140 Nevertheless I will try to provide test 
counterfactuals as far as possible. There are other things which should play a role in evaluating 
an account, though. For instance, we will see that Dunn’s account clashes with Lewis’s basic 
assumption that the similarity relation is a total preorder (transitive and complete) on which his 
logics for counterfactuals rests. Even if that assumption itself should face the tribunal of our 
best intuitive verdicts about particular counterfactuals, its violation weighs heavily against an 
account of similarity. 
I concede a certain prima facie plausibility to Dunn’s approach; it pays due respect to 
irreducible laws of the special sciences.141 However, there are difficulties. The Elga world is 
described in terms of statistical mechanics. Dunn confesses his uncertainty how the latter relates 
to thermodynamics: 
 
‘An extremely tentative view about the relation between the two is that statistical mechanics is an attempt to 
explain how we get the special science laws of thermodynamics, given certain fundamental physical laws. It 
is important to note that I am attempting to construe classical thermodynamics as a special science, not 
statistical mechanics.’(p. 82) 
 
Dunn’s treatment raises a question: If certain laws of the special sciences can be reduced to 
more fundamental laws and facts such as those of statistical mechanics as used by Elga, what 
should the place of these laws in the similarity ordering be? 
One may deny that this is a problem, arguing as follows: assume a special science law 
is reducible to the fundamental laws in the sense of being entailed by them. By dint of the 
entailment, for the special science law to be violated, the fundamental laws must be violated as 
well but not vice versa. So in case of reducibility, Dunn’s criterion yields the following result: 
a world where the fundamental laws are violated but the special science laws are not is closer, 
other things being equal, than a world where the special science laws are also violated.  
To elaborate the problem, I begin with an example of Kment, concerning the 
counterfactual dependence of particular facts on fundamental laws: 
 
‘[E15] If (Law of Gravitation) had not been a law, then events would still have at least approximately 
conformed to it.  
 
No one I asked believed that this counterfactual was true[… ] 
 
 
139 Lewis, ‘Counterfactual Dependence’, p. 43. I am grateful to anonymous referees for insisting on this point. 
140 For instance, they may guide us in disregarding ‘gruesome’ similarities (Lewis, ‘Counterfactual Dependence’, 
p. 42). In a similar vein, Brian Weatherson, ‘What Good Are Counterexamples’, Philosophical Studies, 115 (2003), 
1–31, (p. 11), espouses a reflective equilibrium between linguistic intuitions and features like simplicity and 
naturalness, albeit without giving the former ultimate priority. 
141 Dunn hints at an independent motivation (Dunn, p. 81 ann. 9). Whether special science laws should form part 
of the default ordering of worlds is a matter of further debate: as noted by Dunn, which laws we tend to preserve 
is very context–sensitive; psychologists will rather tend to hold onto the laws of psychology than those of chemistry 
(cf. p. 95). Thus instead of building the special science laws into the default similarity ordering, one might rather 
claim them to override Lewis’s default criteria in the context of the respective sciences. 
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[E16] If the master law [comprising all fundamental laws] had not been a law, the history of the world would 
still have been very similar to what it was actually like.’142 
 
Kment suggests that the relationship between laws and particular matters of fact which makes 
us reject these conditionals is explanation. In the closest counterfactual situation where the 
actual explanans does not obtain, we do not hold onto the explanandum either. Without 
committing myself to this view, I maintain that there is a parallel counterfactual dependence of 
special science laws on laws they can be reduced to. 
Consider an outstanding candidate for reducing the laws of thermodynamics: the 
Albert–Loewer recipe, which comprises: 
 
‘(i) the Newtonian dynamical law: F = ma; (ii) the Past Hypothesis: the initial conditions are low entropy; 
and (iii) the Statistical Postulate: there is a probability distribution uniform on the standard measure over 
those regions of phase space compatible with our empirical information.’143 
 
Assume the laws of thermodynamics can be reduced à la Albert–Loewer. Then the following 
should be rejected: 
 
(E17) If the Past Hypothesis had not been true, still the laws of thermodynamics would not have 
been violated. 
 
Yet Dunn seems committed do (E17).  
I anticipate a reply: Dunn distinguishes between violating the laws of thermodynamics 
and these laws not obtaining (i.e. being laws) at all (pp. 94–95 footnote 33). In the latter case, 
they are not violated. Lewis insists that a fundamental law which has an exception does not 
obtain in the first place.144 We might expect any situation where the Past Hypothesis does not 
obtain to be a situation where the laws of thermodynamics do not obtain at all (and thus are not 
violated).  
I use the Elga world to conjure up a counterexample. By Dunn’s lights, the Elga violates 
the laws of thermodynamics. To be violated, these laws must obtain in principle. In Elga’s 
vision, the infected region grows the further back we go in time. So holding onto the Albert–
Loewer recipe, we may construe the Elga world as follows: the Past Hypothesis does not hold; 
in the infected region, initial conditions are not low entropy. However, in the regions 
surrounding the infected region, initial conditions are low entropy. And that is sufficient to 
ensure that the laws of thermodynamics obtain in principle. Of course, there is no reason to 
deem the Elga world the closest world where the Past Hypothesis does not hold. But some world 
like it is a good candidate. We cannot accept (E17) as long as we cannot decide between two 
candidates for the closest world where the Past Hypothesis does not obtain: a world where the 
laws of thermodynamics principally obtain but are violated as contrasted to a world where the 
laws of thermodynamics do not obtain. 
I anticipate a second reply: Dunn is critical of the Albert–Loewer recipe. He has a 
strategic motive for his criticism: if the Past Hypothesis is a fundamental law, the Elga world 
can be rejected for violating it. We do not need Dunn’s amendment. To counter this threat, 
 
142 Kment, pp. 280–281. 
143 Jonathan Schaffer, ‘Deterministic Chance’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 58 (2007) 113 –140 
(p. 122), cf. Dunn, p. 83. I surmise that things would be the same if thermodynamics were ultimately founded on 
other theories, say the GRW version of quantum mechanics (cf. Schaffer, p. 122 ann., Jill North, ‘What is the 
Problem about the Time–Asymmetry of Thermodynamics? – A Reply to Price’, The British Journal for the 
Philosophy of Science, 53 (2002), 121–136). Dunn notes that in case of a reduction, there might be no true 
counterfactuals except ones merely specifying probable consequences (Dunn, p. 84). But it should not come as a 
surprise if fundamental physics were to reveal many of our folk counterfactuals as mere approximations. 
144 Lewis, ‘Counterfactual Dependence’, p. 45. 
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Dunn voices doubts that the Past Hypothesis is a fundamental law. Fundamental laws à la Lewis 
are confined to perfectly natural properties; entropy is no such property. And fundamental laws 
are usually regarded as regularities; the Past Hypothesis is no regularity (cf. pp. 83–84). Be that 
as it may, I use the Albert–Loewer recipe only as an outstanding model of reduction. So if we 
do not principally eschew reduction of special science laws, there should be other reductive 
efforts which would serve the task.  
There are two further problems. Both are mentioned but not thoroughly solved by Dunn.  
We cannot exclude the Elga world as a candidate for being closest as long as it might 
exhibit more match in particular facts than the divergence world à la Lewis. This can happen 
when the world is finite and stretches further into the future than into the past, all relative to the 
time of convergence. As a remedy, Dunn gerrymanders a reading of the second criterion: ‘we 
do not quantitatively compare a region of past match with a region of future match.’(p. 86)  
There are two ways of cashing out Dunn’s reading; the first is: if, other things being 
equal, world wA exhibits more perfect match with actuality in pre–antecedent facts but wB 
exhibits more perfect match with actuality in post–antecedent facts, both are equally similar to 
actuality. The unfortunate consequence is this: for some wA and wB, there will be a world wC 
which fares even worse than wA in perfect post–antecedent match but equals wA in pre–
antecedent match (Assume a different small miracle leads to greater regions of post–antecedent 
mismatch than the small miracle by which wA departs from actuality). As a consequence, wC is 
as similar to actuality as wB but less similar than wA. This is irreconcilable with Lewis’s view 
that the relations of overall similarity among worlds form a total preorder, which is transitive 
and complete.145 Since wA and wB are equally similar and so are wB and wC, by transitivity wA 
and wC must be equally similar. But wC is less similar than wA. 
The second way of putting Dunn’s interpretation is that wA and wB are incommensurable 
with regard to overall similarity.146 This is not reconcilable with the completeness of the 
similarity ordering: if wA and wB at all qualify for overall similarity, either one is more similar 
or both are equally similar. Even if an account must ultimately be judged by its ability to deal 
with paradigm counterfactuals, the basic formal properties of the similarity ordering are crucial 
to Lewis’s standard analysis of counterfactuals. Dunn’s proposal conflicts with these properties. 
I come to what could be the most grievous difficulty as it is easily fleshed out in terms 
of individual paradigm counterfactuals. Particular matters of fact might interfere with laws of 
the special sciences: 
 
‘Grant that biology is a special science, and imagine that there was some critical event that occurred in the 
past, say a crucial step in the move toward DNA, in spacetime region R, that led biology on its current course. 
Let’s assume that had this particular critical event not occurred, then biology would have been very different. 
Now, consider the counterfactual:  
 
[E18] If lightning had struck in region R, then the laws of biology might have been very different.  
 
[E2] strikes us as true.’(p. 92) 
 
The problem (E18) poses is that in the standard Lewisian construal, it entails 
 
(E19) It is not the case that if lightning had struck in region R, then the laws of biology would 
have been the same. 
 
This contradicts Dunn’s (4´) as far as (4´) prescribes to hold onto the laws of biology. 
Dunn follows Lewis’s suggestion that ‘might’ can also be read as ‘it would be that: different 
laws are possible.’(p. 93) To judge this proposal, we have to distinguish two cases. In one case, 
 
145 Lewis, Counterfactuals, p. 14. 
146 cf. Morreau, ‘Trouble with Similarity’. 
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say where lightning directly strikes the critical event, the fundamental laws and the facts in the 
scenario entail different biological laws. Then, Dunn concedes, we accept (p. 94 ann.): 
 
(E20) If lightning had struck the critical event, then the biological laws would have been 
different. 
 
Then we must also accept that the laws might have been different, ‘might’ understood in the 
standard way.  
There is another, more problematic case: the fundamental laws and the facts modified 
by lightning do not ensure which biological laws will come to obtain. Worlds with our 
biological laws and worlds with different biological laws are equally close. One might worry 
how such a situation can be reconciled with determinism. In reply, first, the antecedent is vague. 
It could allow for different default resolutions. Second, even if the antecedent were perfectly 
precisified, nothing precludes that two different small miracles lead to antecedent worlds that 
are equally close, one with our biological laws, one with alien ones.147 In that situation, 
doctoring the ‘might’–conditional won’t help. For we pace Dunn reject that the laws would 
have been the same. This clashes with Dunn’s explicit commitment to: 
 
(E21) If lightning had struck in region R, then the laws of biology would have been just as they 
actually are (p. 92). 
 
Perhaps there is a way out: in light of Dunn’s comments in his footnote 33, it is not clear that 
his account really commits him to (E21).148 Footnote 33 presents a situation where the actual 
biological properties fail to be instantiated; as a consequence, the actual biological laws do not 
obtain (cf. pp. 94–95). Dunn insists that his criterion (4´) does not rule out such a world from 
being closest. Assume that for any lightning situation where the actual facts and the lightning 
together with the fundamental laws do not entail the actual biological laws, either the laws of 
biology obtain or they do not obtain at all. Then Dunn is not committed to (E21). 
This is literally right as far as (4´) demands that the laws of the special sciences should 
not be violated, not that they should obtain – but only given a specific reading of the criterion: 
a law which does not obtain because the properties to which it applies are not instantiated is not 
thereby violated. In order to sustain this reading, Dunn must distinguish situations where the 
laws are not violated because they do not obtain at all and situations where they are violated. 
Otherwise laws, at least those of the special sciences, could not be violated at all; all possible 
situations whatsoever would fare equal with respect to Dunn’s (4´). The Elga world could not 
be ruled out. 
Consequently we can further develop the second lightning case I have discussed into 
two subcases: in one counterfactual situation where lightning occurs, the laws and the facts 
together only ensure that one of two alternatives will come to pass: either the actual laws of 
biology obtain or they do not obtain at all because our biological properties are not instantiated. 
For that subcase, Dunn gets the right result: if the lightning situation had obtained, the actual 
laws would not have been violated but might not have obtained at all.  
Yet there is another subcase: in a different counterfactual situation where lightning 
occurs, the fundamental laws and the actual facts modified by lightning do not ensure that our 
biological laws will not be violated; for in that situation, our biological laws perfectly hold or 
they will be violated (Perhaps there is also the third alternative of the laws not obtaining at all). 
Dunn must falsely maintain that if this situation had come to obtain, the laws of biology would 
not have been violated. 
 
147 Dunn presents a structurally analogous case (p. 95). 
148 In considering this reading, I follow the advice of an anonymous referee. 
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To assess the possibility of this second subcase, I take a closer look at what it could 
mean to violate a law. By Lewis’s lights, fundamental deterministic laws do not allow for the 
distinction between a law being violated and not obtaining at all. What concerns laws of the 
special sciences, things are more intricate. These laws permit exceptions. To fit Dunn’s 
distinction of not obtaining at all and being violated, a violation must steer between an exception 
permitted by the laws and the laws not obtaining at all. For instance, Dunn must prevent Elga 
from retorting that in w3, the laws of thermodynamics are not violated because they do not 
obtain in the first place; so Dunn must insist that in the Elga world, the actual thermodynamic 
properties are instantiated in spite of the infected region violating the laws of thermodynamics.  
If he can do so concerning the Elga world, he cannot rule out that the lightning situation 
can be further developed along the following lines: let there be several regions R1,..Rn, each of 
which is sufficient to bring about our biological properties and the concomitant laws; but 
assume that had lightning struck region R1, that region might have been infected by biological 
systems behaving deviantly such as to violate the actual laws of biology;149 more precisely, the 
fundamental laws and the facts modified by lightning would not have ensured that R1 would 
not have been infected (In one closest lightning situation R1 would have been infected, in 
another, it would not have been). We should reject but Dunn must accept 
 
(E22) If lightning had occurred in region R1, the actual laws of biology would have gone 
unviolated.  
 
In sum, it does not help Dunn to introduce the case where laws are not violated because the 
respective properties are not instantiated at all. Note that my argument does not commit me to 
accepting the distinction of laws being violated or not obtaining at all; I just point out what 
Dunn is committed to. 
I see two different solutions to the problems outlined about Dunn’s approach. The first 
is amenable to Dunn’s overall proposal that the laws of the special sciences be given due weight 
in the similarity ordering. But what is their due weight? Granting them fourth importance spells 
trouble, as we have seen. What about promoting them to second order, thereby degrading match 
in particular facts to third order? Dunn does not discuss this suggestion. The example from 
biology can be used to rule it out. Assume we reject (E22). Yet surely we could tailor particular 
facts in the counterfactual situation such as to get our biological laws unviolated in spite of the 
lightning, say by removing the decisive region (the region that is decisive in the counterfactual 
situation) from the zone of lightning to a more quiet place such as to arrive at our DNA. This 
requires us to change particular facts aplenty but does not have to violate any (actual) laws. Our 
rejection of the above counterfactual testifies against our holding onto the laws of the special 
sciences at any cost in particular matters of fact. 
If the laws of the special sciences sometimes counterfactually depend on particular 
matters of fact, there seems only one way left to accommodate them: Lewis’s second criterion 
must not be demoted but differentiated. Laws of the special sciences not entailed by the 
fundamental laws are traded against match in facts. But how to weigh them? Drawing on a 
relative naturalness order of facts envisaged by Lewis and John Hawthorne, Dunn depicts a 
hierarchy of laws of the special sciences (p. 89). This naturalness order could give rise to a 
hierarchy of weights imposed on both facts and laws of the special sciences. Not all facts have 
the same weight. By default, more natural ones count more than less natural ones, more general 
laws (say those of chemistry) count more than less general ones (say those of biology), or, as 
Dunn suggests, laws count less the more exceptions they allow, and so on (p. 95). And laws of 
 
149 One may doubt that such deviant biological systems are microphysically possible. But there will be other 
examples; one is my scenario of the Elga world conflicting with the Past Hypothesis such as to violate the laws of 
thermodynamics. 
 84  
 
the special sciences may be traded against match in particular facts. This seems a promising 
way of differentiating Lewis’s treatment. The second criterion could be amended thus: 
 
(2´) It is of second importance to maximize the weighted sum of matching particular facts and 
laws of the special sciences. 
 
However, we might have to give up Lewis’s cherished idea of a handy system of priorities. It 
will prove to be extremely complicated to spell out the weighted sums of facts and special laws 
on which the ordering of worlds depends. 
And there are two devastating problems: 
(a) It is doubtful that the naturalness ordering allows us to deal with the contingency of 
biological laws as depicted in the lightning counterexample. The criterion does not give the 
decisive region R1 more weight than other regions; R1 just happens to be the right place at the 
right time to give rise to the laws of biology. Match in laws of the special sciences is integrated 
into the third criterion such as to be traded against match in facts; so there is no reason why to 
hold onto the actual region R1 as decisive for the laws of biology rather than to hold onto these 
laws themselves. The alternative solution I will present seems superior in dealing with this 
issue. It pays due respect to the decisive role of R1. 
(b) We cannot easily dismiss the Elga world. Perhaps due to their importance in the 
system of sciences, the laws of thermodynamics get enough weight to outdo any advantages in 
particular matters of fact the Elga world may have, for instance in virtue of convergence at a 
very early stage of the world; but this is by no means sure. 
Intimidated by this outlook, we might prefer a different way of saving Dunn’s proposal 
from the pitfalls I have outlined. I shall consider several alternatives.  
 
Alternative solutions 
 
As for the first alternative, it can be derived from a closer look at the Albert–Loewer recipe. 
From an isolated viewpoint of statistical mechanics, our world with its characteristic 
thermodynamic asymmetry seems very amazing.150 Many philosophers and scientists feel the 
need for an explanation. A prominent explanation is the Albert–Loewer recipe. To repeat, the 
recipe comprises: 
 
‘(i) the Newtonian dynamical law: F = ma; (ii) the Past Hypothesis: the initial conditions are low entropy; 
and (iii) the Statistical Postulate: there is a probability distribution uniform on the standard measure over 
those regions of phase space compatible with our empirical information.’ 
 
Assume the Past Hypothesis describes a huge fact about the early universe. Under determinism, 
the antithermodynamic processes at the Elga world violate the Past Hypothesis on a large scale. 
After all, Elga’s paradigm process is coniform. It ends with a tiny divergence but spreads the 
further backwards we move in time. So it requires a huge change in the initial conditions of the 
universe. 
Thus, there is an easy amendment of Lewis’s default metrics, which demotes Elga 
worlds from being closest. Lewis denies that any particular physical fact whatsoever should 
form part of the ideal physical theory. His idea of such a theory is enshrined in his best system 
analysis. A scientific system is best iff it strikes the best balance of simplicity, fit and strength. 
Such a system will largely consist of laws. But it might also contain certain facts, provided 
these facts contribute enough to its strength: 
 
 
150 Huw Price, ‘Boltzmann’s Time Bomb’, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 53 (2002), 83–119.  
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‘The ideal system need not consist entirely of regularities; particular facts may gain entry if they contribute 
enough to collective simplicity and strength. (For instance, certain particular facts about the Big Bang might 
be strong candidates.) But only the regularities of the system are to count as laws.’151 
 
In light of these considerations, the following amendment of Lewis’s default metrics is 
suggestive:  
 
(1´) It is of the first importance to avoid a big, widespread, diverse departure from the ideal 
physical theory. 
(2´) It is of the second importance to maximize the spatio–temporal region throughout which 
perfect match of particular fact prevails. 
(3´) It is of the third importance to avoid even a small, localized simple departure from the ideal 
physical theory. 
(4´) It is of little or no importance to secure approximate similarity of particular fact, even in 
matters that concern us greatly. 
 
Instead of laws, the default metrics resorts to the actually true physics, including both 
regularities and, perhaps, particular facts of special importance, for instance facts about the Big 
Bang. This minimal amendment preserves the complete spirit of Lewis’s metrics.152 It deviates 
from the original metrics just in case the Past Hypothesis does not qualify as a law but as an 
especially significant fact to be included in the ideal physical theory. To be sure, the amendment 
won’t work if the Past Hypothesis or some comparable explanation of the thermodynamic 
asymmetry does not figure in the ideal physical theory. But it would be surprising if physical 
theory fell completely silent about one of the most striking structural features of our world.  
There is an alternative for how to use the Past Hypothesis. If the Past Hypothesis is 
granted the status of a fundamental law, it introduces a fundamental asymmetry. The Past 
Hypothesis breaks the symmetry between the past and the future. In fact, any explanation where 
a fundamental nomic necessity underlies the thermodynamic asymmetry is likely to conflict 
with Elga’s template. The Elga world would be demoted from closeness. Elga would only have 
taken into account part of the actual fundamental laws of nature. However, there are many 
reservations about this solution. Shouldn’t the semantics of counterfactuals be neutral to 
particular developments in physics? Moreover, there are reasons why the Past Hypothesis does 
not qualify as a Lewisian law: (i) the Past Hypothesis is no regularity, (ii) entropy is no perfectly 
natural but a high–level organizational property (Dunn, pp. 83–84). Thus, the outlook of a 
solution which takes care at once of Elga’s and Bennett’s problems is doubtful. 
 
Dunn and the Schaffer–Kment remedy 
Problems with other convergence worlds 
 
I have pinpointed intrinsic problems of Dunn’s approach. There is an argument why Dunn’s 
overall strategy is not recommendable to save Lewis from convergence objections. Elga worlds 
are only one sort of convergence worlds threatening Lewis’s semantics. There are other such 
worlds as witnessed by the many examples varying the so-called future–similarity objection.153 
Some of these examples are thermodynamically perfectly inconspicuous. For instance, there is 
a variation of the original Nixon case: a beetle is placed in a causally isolated box, which has 
 
151 David Lewis, ‘New Work for a Theory of Universals’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 61 (1983), 343–
377 (p. 367). 
152 One might feel concerned that even a large–scale albeit not varied violation of the initial low entropy condition 
does not count as a big violation. Yet I do not see what could prevent tailoring the vague boundary of big and small 
deviations such as to fit my needs. 
153 Initiated by Fine’s famous Nixon–example, overview of the literature in Schaffer, ‘Counterfactuals’, Kment, 
‘Counterfactuals and Explanation’. 
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only one connection to the rest of the world: there is a wire transmitting a signal to a doomsday 
machine. The signal can be activated by the beetle. But the beetle does not activate the signal. 
Shortly afterwards the whole box is cleanly disposed of. We accept 
 
(E23) If the beetle had activated the signal, doomsday would have occurred. 
 
But it would have taken only a small miracle to interrupt the signal.154 
 
I will now summarize the most eligible recipe on offer that allows both to save Dunn’s 
account from the intrinsic problems discussed above and to dispel convergence worlds of 
whatever kind, including the Elga world. As we have seen in discussing Morgenbesser cases, 
Schaffer demands that one should only maximize match in facts ‘from those regions causally 
independent of whether or not the antecedent obtains’.155 Kment replaces Schaffer’s criterion 
by a sameness–of–explanation clause: match in facts should count as far as their explanatory 
history is the same.156 
When we consider the minimal variation of our world that goes together with 
implementing an antecedent situation, it is a matter of course that some things will also vary: 
those which depend on the antecedent situation or the situation replaced by the antecedent 
situation. So match in these things should not count. In the actual world, the causal history of 
the post–convergence facts includes cracking the egg, in the Elga world, it does not. Since 
match thus achieved does not count, the Elga world is disqualified by the criterion ‘match in 
facts’. Thus, the Schaffer–Kment approach helps Dunn to avoid one problem: Elga’s world may 
prevail what concerns match in post–antecedent facts compared to divergence worlds with a 
short past, but this prevalence is due to match in the convergence region; and since the 
antecedent obtaining or not figures in the causal–explanatory history of the convergence region, 
match in this region does not count. The Schaffer–Kment remedy can also be used to evade 
another problem of Dunn’s: we may extend the irrelevance of facts downstream from the 
antecedent to laws as far as the obtaining or non-obtaining of the antecedent figures in the 
latters’ explanatory history.157 In the lightning situation where it is open whether the actual 
biological laws will be violated or not, their preservation does not contribute to closeness as the 
antecedent figures in the explanatory history of their being violated or not. 
Yet Dunn has no reason to be comforted: the Schaffer–Kment argument supplants 
Dunn’s. It demotes Elga’s world without any appeal to laws of the special sciences. And it has 
important advantages in terms of theoretical economy; it also removes other convergence 
worlds against which Dunn’s argument is of no avail, for instance smoothly converging worlds. 
Since preventing Elga worlds is the only motivation Dunn provides for his proposal, Dunn is 
preempted.158 
One may feel concerned that the Schaffer–Kment approach does not fit into the 
dialectical context of Dunn’s:159 Dunn aims at a Lewisian response to Elga’s counterexample. 
 
154 Cf. Wasserman, p. 59. 
155 Schaffer, ‘Counterfactuals’, p. 305. 
156 Explanatory history not restricted to causal explanation, but more broadly confined, in order to account for 
counterlegals. I mention Schaffer and Kment as the most recent versions of the account, though Kment refers to a 
more remote ancestry (Kment, p. 273). 
157 Kment on similarity to world w:  
 
‘1. It is of the first importance to ensure sameness of laws. 
2. It is of the second importance to avoid big alien violations of the laws of w, provided the conformity to the relevant laws has 
the same explanation as in w.’(Kment, p. 296, m.e.). 
 
158 There is a vague hint at an independent motivation (Dunn, p. 81 ann. 9). 
159 This concern has been voiced by an anonymous referee. 
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Lewis wants to use counterfactuals to analyse the notion of causation. So to avoid circularity, a 
Lewisian response might be bound to avoid causal notions as used by Schaffer and Kment. 
Even supposing the Schaffer–Kment approach diverges from Lewisian orthodoxy while 
Dunn’s approach preserves it, it seems still worthwhile to consider the former as a competitor 
for Dunn’s overall aim of providing a convincing similarity metrics which meets Elga’s 
objection. Faced with the problems of Dunn’s account, an appropriate reply to Dunn may just 
put up an alternative which is independently plausible and allows both to remedy certain flaws 
of Dunn’s approach and to meet Elga’s objection, even at the price of running counter to 
Lewis’s further metaphysical ambitions. Then the price of orthodoxy can be better judged. 
Moreover, since Dunn and Lewis insist that a similarity metrics should be judged mainly by 
getting intuitive counterfactual verdicts right, we may feel encouraged to tackle Lewis’s 
analysis of counterfactuals as an autonomous topic – to be treated independently of the further 
metaphysical use in analysing causality it may then be put to. And if we disregard the analysis 
of causality, the Schaffer–Kment approach seems no less orthodox than Dunn’s; the former 
includes explicitly explanatory relationships, the latter an additional type of laws over and 
above the fundamental level where the other criteria are situated. 
Anyway orthodoxy is unlikely to be an all–or–nothing matter. The Schaffer–Kment 
approach is Lewisian in sharing Lewis’s truth–condition for counterfactuals and most of 
Lewis’s four–part lexical similarity ordering. Moreover, far from announcing his ideas as 
running counter to Lewis’s aims, Schaffer takes great pains at reconciling the use of causal 
terms with Lewis’s metaphysical ambitions: 
 
‘Might one adopt both a causal independence account of counterfactuals, and a counterfactual account of 
causation? Is the resulting circularity problematic? Ontologically speaking, I see nothing problematic here. 
The truth about both counterfactuals and causality still supervenes on the arrangement of events. Or at least, 
nothing here contradicts that. The causal and counterfactual facts can still, for instance, be regarded as ‘co-
supervenient’ upon a Humean base. If there were a problem, it could be a conceptual problem. One would 
lose linear definability – no ordered chain of definitions could wind from the Humean base up through the 
conceptual superstructure. But perhaps linear definability was never in the offing. Because concepts do not 
have definitions.’160 
 
Schaffer intimates that preserving Lewis’s conception of supervenience matters more 
than the non-circular definability of causality by counterfactuals: the truth about both causality 
and counterfactuals supervenes on the mosaic of events; but there is no non-circular definition 
of concepts like causality. 
In sum, in advocating the Schaffer–Kment approach, I do not trade a Lewisian for an 
un-Lewisian approach, but at worst a more against a less orthodox Lewisian one. Preserving a 
counterfactual analysis of causality should go as one asset among others into the trade–off rather 
than be put up as the shibboleth of Lewisian and non-Lewisian approaches. And weighing the 
question of causality against the advantages of the Schaffer–Kment approach, I think the latter 
better qualifies as an amended Lewisian view than Dunn’s. 
 
The Problem of amazingness 
 
So far the Schaffer–Kment approach seems to be the best strategy against Elga’s argument. Yet 
the following reasoning calls for a more differentiated view: while a similarity metrics is 
ultimately to be judged by getting intuitively plausible counterfactuals right, it might be 
heuristically important for devising this metrics to give a more fine-tuned diagnosis what guides 
our intuitions in eschewing the Elga world. The reason is that the intuitive examples often 
 
160 Schaffer, ‘Counterfactuals’, pp. 307–308. 
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display some common feature that is relevant to finding both general criteria of similarity and 
paradigm counterfactuals that could be crucial to testing them. 
Besides subsuming Elga’s example under the future similarity objection, a further 
classification is tempting and has not been told apart from the future similarity objection for a 
long time. As Elga grants, the thermodynamically reversed world is amazing. Lewis himself 
discusses amazing convergence for indeterministic worlds.161 However, in the aftermath of 
Lewis’s and Elga’s discussion the issue of amazingness and the future similarity objection have 
somewhat grown apart: unremarkable convergence worlds like Wasserman’s beetle and the 
worlds to be discussed below have been developed; and other counterexamples to Lewis’s 
standard analysis show that there is a problem with amazing worlds as candidates for closeness, 
which is independent of the convergence problem. Consider 
 
‘(D39) If I had dropped the plate, it would have fallen to the floor. 
[… ] there is a small chance that the consequent fails to obtain, given the antecedent. Thus, the following is 
tempting: 
(D40) If I had dropped the plate, it might have flown off sideways’.162 
 
(D40) seems acceptable if we take into account quantum physics.  
But in Lewis’s original theory, (D39) and (D40) are contradictory. As a consequence, if 
‘might’–counterfactuals like (D40) are true, most everyday counterfactuals like (D39) seem 
false. If the world where the plate flies sideways can be somehow prescinded from worlds like 
ours, the problem disappears. This example testifies to an independent problem of amazing 
candidates for closeness, which should not be simply classified together with the future 
similarity objection ((D40)–antecedent–worlds do not converge to ours). Yet both difficulties 
are connected; as Elga shows, future match can be easily achieved provided circumstances are 
allowed to be amazing. The amazingness problem common to Elga’s case and the above 
example of the plate flying sideways is that our intuitive verdicts against counterfactuals 
supported by amazing candidates for closeness, such as (E14) (‘...Gretta wouldn’t have taken 
an egg out of the refrigerator’) as supported by the Elga world and (D40) (‘...the plate might 
have flown off sideways’), do not seem backed by Lewis’s original criteria. The reason for 
eschewing the plate scenario arguably lies in the latter’s being amazing; and this reason in 
principle also applies to the egg–scenario. 
When Elga published his counterexample, the future similarity problem and the problem 
of amazingness had not yet been as clearly separated. Elga’s counterexample exemplifies both 
problems, the future similarity problem and the problem of amazing candidates for closeness. 
For this reason, the challenge posed by Elga may be interpreted as anticipating both problems 
further developed by subsequent literature (although Elga had in mind only the convergence 
problem). 
So to do justice to the full dialectical impact of Elga’s challenge, it seems important to 
also discuss the Elga world as an instance of an amazing world, independently of its already 
being covered by a strategy against future similarity. For there will be examples of the 
amazingness problem where the strategy against future similarity does not work (the plate 
scenario). The systematic question arising from this discussion is how to supplement the most 
eligible solution to the future similarity problem by an answer to the problem of amazingness. 
I think that in this respect, too, the superiority of the Schaffer–Kment approach to Dunn’s 
becomes obvious. Moreover, just in case these approaches do not work, it might be interesting 
that there is an independent strategy against Elga’s counterexample, which arises from the 
latter’s entanglement with amazingness. 
 
161 Lewis, ‘Counterfactual Dependence’, p. 63. 
162 Williams, ‘Chances’, p. 386. 
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Lewis treats amazing convergence as a problem of indeterministic worlds. He 
introduces the non–standard reading of ‘might’ exploited by Dunn and discards amazing worlds 
as exhibiting quasi–miracles. Yet firstly, as witnessed by the Elga world, the problem of 
amazingness is not confined to indeterministic worlds. The assumption of determinism does 
not rule out (D40). Perhaps our world is microphysically configured such as to allow for a world 
where a small miracle leads to the plate being dropped and flying off sideways. Secondly, Lewis 
had a hard time spelling out what constitutes a quasi–miracle.163 The problem is not the mere 
improbability of some course of events: 
 
‘What makes a quasi–miracle is not improbability per se but rather the remarkable way in which the chance 
outcomes seem to conspire to produce a pattern. If the monkey at the typewriter produces a 950–pages 
dissertation on the varieties of anti–realism, that is at least quasi–miraculous; the chance keystrokes happen 
to simulate the traces that would have been left by quite a different process. If the monkey instead types 950 
pages of stumbled letters, that is not at all quasi-miraculous. But given suitable assumptions on what sort of 
chance device the monkey is, the one text is exactly as improbable as the other.’164  
 
If we follow Lewis’s suggestion, the question becomes how to spell out remarkability 
here. The most thorough present proposal to spell out typicality vs. remarkability in terms of 
objective random properties is 
 
‘[… ]to look, not at the probability of a particular outcome arising, but at the probabilities of a suitable set of 
properties which that outcome instantiates. When considering the outcome of flipping a fair coin, ‘all heads’ 
is a low-likelihood property (in the infinite case, it is probability 0 that the outcome has this property). 
‘Having as many heads as tails, in the long run’ is a high-likelihood property (In the infinite case, it is 
probability 1 that the outcome has this property).’165 
 
Being remarkable is defined in contrast to being random: remarkable situations fail to 
instantiate a suitable range of high-likelihood properties.166 For instance, any particular 
sequence of infinitely many coin tosses has probability zero. The intuitively remarkable 
sequence all heads is as probable as a particular sequence of as many heads as tails. Yet only 
the latter instantiates the high–likelihood property ‘as many heads as tails’.  
 Drawing on his definition of remarkability by a lack of high–likelihood properties, 
Robert Williams modifies Lewis’s criteria: it is of first importance to avoid atypicality of the 
world as a whole (by the lights of the probabilistic laws of nature), of second importance to 
maximize the spatio–temporal region of perfect match, of third importance to avoid localized 
atypicalities, all judged from the evaluation world (usually the actual one. Williams’ proposal 
gives a flavour of what we might aim at even for deterministic worlds. The Elga world as an 
instance of the amazingness problem can be dismissed due to its partial failure to instantiate 
high–likelihood properties.167  
 
163 Lewis, ‘Counterfactual Dependence’, p. 50. 
164 Lewis, ‘Counterfactual Dependence’, p. 60, my emphasis. 
165 Williams, ‘Chances’, 409, cf. Adam Elga, ‘Infinitesimal Chances and the Laws of Nature’, Australasian Journal 
of Philosophy, 82 (2004), 67–76 (p. 71). 
166 Williams, ‘Chances’, pp. 409–410. 
167 Williams, ‘Chances’, p. 418. Here is why I doubt that the proposal works as it stands. As Ryan Wasserman 
notes, pace Lewis and Williams we do not accept 
 
(E24) If there had been a trillion coin tosses and I had bet against them falling all heads before, I would have won 
(cf. Wasserman, p. 62). 
 
There seems to be a parallel to the lottery paradox in epistemology. Perhaps a solution to the latter could be worked 
into Williams’ criteria such as to take care of this counterexample. 
A low entropy boundary condition as it might be invoked in the foundation of thermodynamics also spells trouble. 
It provides a reason to deem our world atypical as a whole (cf. Price, p. 111) Yet just in case the initial condition 
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While any of the independently motivated accounts, Williams’ answer to the 
amazingness problem and the Schaffer–Kment answer to the future similarity objection, rule 
out the Elga world as a competitor for closeness, both approaches might be necessary to take 
care of the different counterexamples that have been subsequently developed to bring out the 
pure voice of the two independent problems. So Williams’ amendment of Lewis may 
supplement the Schaffer–Kment approach, each meeting one of the two problems enshrined in 
Elga’s example. In principle, Dunn’s and Williams’ proposals seem reconcilable as well. Yet 
they sit awkwardly with each other. While each is sufficient to dismiss the Elga world, the 
unremarkable examples of the future similarity objection remain untouched. So the explanatory 
overkill is not allayed by complementarity in other cases. 
 
 
of low entropy is both amazing, contingent, and unavoidable, we might accommodate it by subordinating the other 
default criteria of similarity to the following requirement: 
 
It is of first importance that the overall structure of our world (the evaluation world) be preserved. 
 
The low entropy boundary condition and fundamental laws may amount to overall structural features to be 
preserved. 
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2.4.2.2 Bennett Worlds 
 
Having discussed amazing convergence worlds, I shall present a further problem for Lewis’s 
standard analysis of counterfactuals. It arises from a counterexample of Jonathan Bennett’s. As 
I will argue below, Bennett’s example is a precursor of the more elaborated counterexample of 
Adam Elga’s. Nevertheless it deserves more than historical attention. The argument used in its 
motivation is very different from Elga’s. Moreover, as we will see, it poses a threat which is 
independent of Elga’s challenge. Elga’s challenge requires that his imagined world competes 
with Lewis’s own candidates for closeness to the actual world. In contrast, the mere possibility 
of Bennett worlds menaces Lewis’s semantics. Closeness does not matter. Curiously, Bennett 
himself denies that Lewis has to bother. So does Lewis, but for very different reasons. And 
both, I contend, are wrong: Bennett worlds spell trouble for a core tenet of Lewis’: the 
asymmetry of post–determination. The asymmetry of post–determination in turn is required for 
Lewis’s default ordering of similarity to support the right counterfactuals. I begin with outlining 
the purported asymmetry of post–determination and its role in Lewis’s argument.  
 
The asymmetry of post–determination 
 
I confine my attention to determinism: two worlds which abide by the same laws either always 
or never perfectly match in facts. I repeat Lewis’s similarity ordering of worlds for the sake of 
convenience: 
 
‘(1) It is of first importance to avoid big, widespread, diverse violations of law [big miracles]. 
(2) It is of second importance to maximize the spatio–temporal region throughout which perfect match of 
particular fact prevails. 
(3) It is of third importance to avoid even small, localized simple violations of law [small miracles]. 
(4) It is of little or no importance to secure approximate similarity of particular fact, even in matters that 
concern us greatly.’168 
 
Lewis purposively builds no asymmetry of time into his metrics. But such an asymmetry 
arises from the contingent features of worlds like ours, says Lewis: given the actual past, a 
contrary–to–fact antecedent P can be brought about in a very short time span by a small miracle. 
The small miracle is an event em which is unlawful, judging from the actual laws, but not from 
the laws of the closest antecedent world. Before em, the actual world w0 and the closest P–world 
wP perfectly match. However, there is no comparable small miracle which could undo P and 
achieve perfect match afterwards. The reason is that in worlds like ours, any event leaves a 
plethora of traces. These traces amount to post–determinants. 
Consider: 
 
(A33) If Nixon had pressed the button, there would have been a nuclear holocaust. 
 
To Lewis, the antecedent event takes just a small miracle. The miracle brings about a divergence 
from some suitable point in actual history such as to make Nixon press very shortly afterwards. 
In Lewis’s example, some additional neurons fire spontaneously in Nixon’s brain. Maximizing 
perfect match in particular facts weighs more heavily than a small miracle. Thus, the closest 
world wN where Nixon presses the button will be a world which is perfectly like the actual 
world w0 up to a small miracle. This miracle leads to the antecedent event.  
Yet Lewis denies that the same recipe can be applied after the antecedent has occurred. 
The reason is that  
 
 
168 Lewis, ‘Counterfactual Dependence’, pp. 47–48. 
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‘[… ]Nixon’s deed has left its mark on the world[… ] There are his fingerprints on the button. Nixon is still 
trembling[… ] His gin bottle is depleted. The click on the button has been preserved on tape. Light waves 
flew out of the window, bearing the image of Nixon’s finger on the button, are still on their way into outer 
space. The wire is ever so slightly warmed where the signal current passed through it. And so on, and on, and 
on.’(p. 45) 
 
It would take a big miracle to undo all the traces Nixon’s deed has left. A big miracle would 
consist of many small unlawful events (relative to the actual laws) of different kinds. Take a 
world where Nixon presses but which perfectly reconverges to the actual one. The perfect future 
match thus gained cannot outweigh a big miracle. In contrast, take a world where the lawful 
consequence of pressing, a nuclear holocaust, ensues. This world is more similar than a 
reconvergence world with a big miracle. The result is the intuitive asymmetry of counterfactual 
dependence: future events counterfactually depend on past ones, but (usually) not the other way 
round.169 
Why does it take unlawful events to undo all these many traces? Why can’t most of them 
be disposed of in a lawful way? Here the asymmetry of post–determination becomes crucial. 
Many of the traces envisaged by Lewis are not mere traces. A trace, I presume, is whatever can 
be used as evidence for its cause. Lewis’s traces additionally give rise to partial post–
determinants. Under determinism, any complete cross–section of the world and the laws entail 
any other. Over and above this entailment relation, the past is vastly overdetermined by the 
future, says Lewis. For any normal event e, there are many independent post–determinants at 
any point in time after e has occurred. A post–determinant is a set of facts which together with 
the laws of nature entails e. Many independent minimal cross–sections of the world amount to 
post–determinants over and above the complete cross–sections.170 But usually there are 
relatively few minimal pre–determinants before e has occurred which together with the laws 
entail e. Lewis’s favourite example are parts of a circular wave. These parts are taken to post–
determine a point-sized source as their origin (p. 50). The symmetric fundamental natural laws 
would also allow for waves contracting inwards and so predetermining a point-sized target. But 
this de facto does not happen. A note in passing: the wave and the related cases I am going to 
present are of course just toy examples. In order to really entail an earlier event, a realistic 
minimal post–determinant would normally have to be overwhelmingly complex. But I am 
confident that nothing hinges on the details of the toy examples.  
Lewis relies on the asymmetry of post–determination to ensure that reconvergence of 
antecedent worlds to the actual one usually needs a big miracle. Any event e which occurs 
actually but not in some contrary–to–fact antecedent world leaves many post–determinants. The 
(antecedent +) reconvergence world would have to perfectly match the future of the actual 
world. Consider facts which actually post–determine e as far as they occur after convergence. 
The reconvergence world must display these facts. But at the reconvergence world, they must 
not post–determine e. e has not happened. In contrast, the actual post–determinants plus the 
actual laws entail e. Thus, a break in the actual laws (i.e. different laws) is necessary for e not 
to have happened in the reconvergence world. So if there are sufficiently many and varied 
independent minimal post–determinants, reconvergence will need many and varied small 
miracles. These varied miracles add up to a big one.  
The asymmetry of post–determination is of crucial importance to the success of Lewis’s 
default similarity metrics. Without this asymmetry, Lewis could not tell why it takes a big, 
widespread violation of the actual laws to undo the many traces of a normal antecedent event. 
He could not exclude that almost all traces are lawfully effaced. For example, he could not 
exclude that the closest world where Nixon presses the button is a reconvergence world: almost 
 
169 I incur no commitment as to how facts, events, and ways of talking about them are to be understood. 
170 Respectively the intersection of any complete cross–section of the world at a time with the light cone of e in a 
relativistic world. Independence of cross–sections requires that they do not share any crucial part or ancestry where 
they could all be undone by one small miracle occurring after e. 
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perfect future match would be achieved by lawfully effacing almost all the many traces of 
Nixon pressing the button. Under determinism (as understood by Lewis), admittedly this match 
could not be perfect. Perfect reconvergence always needs a miracle, but without vast 
overdetermination of past facts by partial future cross–sections, that miracle might be a small 
one. Without the asymmetry of post–determination, Lewis’s default similarity metrics would 
not deliver the asymmetry of counterfactual dependence. The asymmetry of post–
determination, I am going to show, is put into doubt by the very possibility of Bennett worlds. 
Lewis feels the imminent threat, but he mistakenly thinks there is a simple remedy: 
distinguishing Bennett worlds from worlds like ours. 
 
Bennett worlds 
 
Here is Lewis’s recipe of a Bennett world:171 
 
‘Begin with our base world w0, the deterministic world something like our own. Proceed to w1, the world 
which starts just like w0, diverges from it by a small miracle, and thereafter evolves in accordance with the 
laws of w0. Now extrapolate the latter part of w1, backwards in accordance with the laws of w0 to obtain what 
I shall call a Bennett world. This Bennett world is free of miracles, relative to w0. That is, it conforms perfectly 
to the laws of w0; and it seems safe to say that these laws are the laws of the Bennett world also. From a 
certain time onward, the Bennett world and world w1 match perfectly, which is to say that w1 converges to 
the Bennett world. Further, this convergence is brought about by a small miracle, the very same small miracle 
whereby w1 diverges from w0[… ] Thus the Bennett world is a world to which convergence is easy, since w1 
converges to it by only a small miracle.’(p. 56) 
 
The thrust of a Bennett world is the following: take a candidate world w1 which diverges from 
a base world w0, let it be the actual one, by just a small miracle. Take the future of that world. 
Revert that future so that it becomes the past, which is compatible with the symmetric laws. 
What we get is a world on which w1 by just a small miracle.    
Bennett worlds would be a counterexample to the claim that there can be no lawful  
convergence of worlds. Yet Bennett himself denies that Lewis has to bother: 
 
‘All he claims is that it takes a large miracle to produce a convergence between the actual world (or one like 
it) and a plausible candidate for the title of closest P–world, where P is the antecedent of any counterfactual 
we are trying to evaluate; and I have no argument to show that any of those convergences could be produced 
by a small miracle.’172  
 
The Bennett world wB does not converge to the actual world w0 but to the antecedent world w1. 
wB cannot compete with w1 for closeness to the actual world w0. Unlike w1, it displays a huge 
mismatch in pre–antecedent facts. And it displays mismatch in post–antecedent facts. So it 
seems that Lewis does not have to bother. The question becomes: why does he nevertheless 
take pains at discarding Bennett’s example?  
Lewis does not precisely tell what difficulty the Bennett world would pose. He contents 
himself with arguing that Bennett worlds are not worlds ‘like ours’ (p. 58). To begin with, 
unlike our world, Bennett worlds are deceptive: 
 
‘A Bennett world is deceptive. After the time of its convergence with w1, it contains exactly the same apparent 
traces of its past that w1 does; and the traces to be found in w1 are such as to record a past exactly like that of 
the base world w0. So the Bennett world is full of traces that seem to record a past like that of w0.’(pp. 57–
58) 
 
In what ways is the Bennett world deceptive? Bennett helps us to understand what Lewis has 
 
171 Jonathan Bennett, ‘Counterfactuals and Temporal Direction’, The Philosophical Review, 93 (1984), 57–91. 
172 Bennett, Conditionals, p. 64. 
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in mind. Assume wB converges to w1: 
 
‘At least for a while after T the history books, geological and archaeological records, etc. of w0 are exactly 
like those at w1, the world at which through a small miracle Nixon presses the button (If not, then we can say 
that if Nixon had pressed the button the history books and other records would instantly have been changed; 
which is absurd) [… ] their long-term pasts are grossly different; so wB must be chock–full of deceptive 
records in a way that w0 is not.’173 
 
The Bennett world is deceptive: its pre–antecedent section largely diverges from the common 
past of w0 and w1. Nevertheless its post–convergence section from some point onwards contains 
all the post–antecedent facts which the actual world w0 shares with w1 (i.e. facts which are not 
abolished by the latter’s divergence from w0). Indeed this does seem very unlike our world. Our 
world, we think, contains reliable information which points to our past. In contrast, wB contains 
information which merely purports to point to our past. 
Lewis presents an even stronger claim: some of the information about the actual world 
w0 as   preserved in w1 amounts to actual post–determinants of events at w0. But as far as wB 
does not encompass the actually post-determined events (due to its past divergence from w0), it 
cannot contain the latter’s post–determinants either: 
 
‘To be sure, any complete cross section of the Bennett world, taken in full detail, is a truthful record of its 
past; because the Bennett world is lawful, and its laws are ex hypothesi deterministic (in both directions), 
and any complete cross section of such a world is lawfully sufficient for any other. But in a world like w0, 
one that manifests the ordinary de facto asymmetries, we also have plenty of very incomplete cross sections 
that postdetermine incomplete cross sections at earlier times. It is these incomplete postdeterminants that are 
missing from the Bennett world. Not throughout its history; but the postdetermination across the time of 
convergence with w1 is deficient.’(pp. 57–58) 
 
So Lewis has given good reasons to deem the Bennett world very peculiar. It looks like 
a giant conspiracy, some Potemkin village deluding its wretched inhabitants into thinking they 
are in w0. This is not a world like ours. 
 
Bennett worlds vs. post–determination 
 
We might feel comforted. Bennett himself grants that wB is no menace to Lewis’s metrics. And 
Lewis has shown that it is a world not like ours. Ought we to feel comforted? I doubt it. Lewis 
has given no reason to deem wB impossible. In fact, he apparently regards it as perfectly 
possible. We can extrapolate w1, the closest world where Nixon presses the button, forwards 
from Nixon pressing the button in accordance with the laws common to w1 and w0. There is 
only one difference in these laws: at w1, they allow for the miracle to bring about the pressing 
event. Now take the cross–section of w1 at the time when Nixon presses the button. Surely we 
can also extrapolate backwards from that cross–section in accordance with the laws of w0.174 
The small miracle lies in the past of the pressing event. So taken in isolation, the cross–section 
of w1 when Nixon presses the button seems perfectly in tune with the laws of w0. The laws are 
assumed to be symmetric. So if there is any problem with extrapolating backwards, there should 
also be a problem with extrapolating forwards in according with the actual laws (to derive the 
future of Lewis’s w1).  
Now if wB is possible, the asymmetry of post–determination is in bad shape (at least 
post–determination from those post–antecedent regions where w0 and wB match, i.e. do not 
come apart due to the small miracle, Nixon’s pressing and its horrid aftermath). We have seen 
 
173 Bennett, Conditionals, p. 295. 
174 which, I repeat, are the laws of w1. There is only one difference: what is a small miracle, judging from the laws 
of w0, is perfectly lawful at w1. The mere event of Nixon pressing the button does not violate any law. 
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that Lewis wants to account for the small miracle by an exception clause (pp. 54-55, see below). 
For any point in spacetime outside the precise spatiotemporal location of the small miracle, the 
laws of w0 and wB are the same. I propose that this isolation of the small miracle gives rise to 
the following claim: as far as facts which are partial post–determinants for some pre–divergence 
event e at w0 are preserved at wB, the same goes for their status as partial post–determinants. If 
they post–determine e at w0, they also post–determine e at wB.  
Consider the following exemplary pre–miracle event: at some time t briefly before the 
miracle, Nixon was calm. But assume that, after pressing the button, he was very excited. Call 
his actual calm state of mind at t SC, his extremely excited state of mind SB. Assume SB would 
have to have occurred at wB at the same time at which SC occurred at the actual world and the 
Bennett world. If there is overdetermination from the future, there will be many actual post–
determinants for SC. Several of them survive the dramatic events the small miracle initiates at 
w1.
175 In his argument that wB is not like our world, Lewis must invoke these post–determinants. 
For otherwise he could not explain why wB is deceitful, lures us into thinking that, say, SC has 
obtained while SB has (and the same for other events before the time of the miracle).  
As an example of such an undisturbed post–determinant, take the electromagnetic waves 
emitted by SC on their way into outer space. Or take an encephalogram of Nixon which is 
transmitted to some safe place (Brezhnev’s bunker, say). The Bennett world wB, perfectly 
matching wN, the worlds closest to actuality at which Nixon presses the button, after the latter 
converges on it, will contain precisely those images (post–determinants) of Nixon’s actual state 
SC which are shared by w0 and wN. Yet at wB Nixon was in a quite different state SB. Since there 
is no relevant difference in laws between wB and the actual world, wB must break the lawful 
post–determination relationship between Nixon’s actual (w0) state SC and the later images of 
SC. At wB, SC does not occur (Nixon is not calm) but the later images of SC do (the 
encephalogram showing the calm state). Thus, wB must obey different laws. But it is assumed 
to perfectly abide by the very same laws of w0 which ensure the lawful post–determination 
relationship. So wB cannot break the relationship.  
One has to go, either the Bennett world or lawful post–determination by the images of 
Nixon’s state of mind. And the same argument applies to any actual event eDb which occurs at 
the actual world w0 but not at the Bennett world wB: the possibility of wB shows that no fact 
which is preserved in the closest button-pressing world wN (and thus wB) actually amounts to a 
post–determinant of eDb. This is, I surmise, what bothers Lewis about wB and has him insist that 
it is not a world like ours. But Lewis does nothing to dissolve our dilemma: one has to go, 
Bennett worlds or the asymmetry of post–determination. It is not the closeness of wB to w0 but 
the very possibility of wB that is irreconcilable with the asymmetry of post–determination. And 
if wB is possible (as anyone involved in the debate seems prepared to grant), it is clear that 
partial post–determination has to go. To repeat: for any actual event which is different in the 
actual world and the Bennett world, this event cannot be post-determined by some partial cross–
section of w0 as far as that cross–section is preserved at wN (and wB). 
We may deny that this blow is fatal to Lewis’s argument from post–determination. After 
all, many actual partial post–determinants remain: facts at w0 which would not have to be 
preserved in wN and wB because the diverging events initiated by the small miracle interfere. 
For instance, Nixon’s actual calm state SC may be recorded at the actual world w0 by his official 
biographer who enjoys privileged access to the leader of the free world. But alas, at the 
 
175 Assume that, our world being relativistic, precisely in the light cone of the small miracle, there is no perfect 
match between w0 and w1. Thus, all post–determinants of pre–antecedent events at w0 which do not lie within the 
light cone are preserved at w1. As far as they lie after the time of convergence with w1, they must be preserved at 
wB, too. Moreover, even in the region without perfect match, a great many particular matters of fact will be 
preserved. Even a very forceful antecedent event like Nixon’s pressing the nuclear button will leave many actual 
facts unaltered, waiting for a post–apocalyptic historian to recollect the days before the nuclear holocaust. One 
should expect all these facts which are preserved at w1 and wB together with facts outside the miracle’s light cone 
to provide a sufficient basis for overwhelmingly many post–determinants at w0. 
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holocaust worlds wN and wB, he is among the first victims before he can record Nixon’s state 
of mind. The extremely faithful and reliable record may serve as a post–determinant of Nixon’s 
state of mind at the actual world without disturbing noise from wB. 
 Not so. For the problem spreads. Candidates for counterfactual antecedents are many 
and varied. Any possible state of affairs can serve as the antecedent of countless non-vacuously 
true counterfactuals. And as far as such a state of affairs can be reached by a small miracle, the 
recipe of the Bennett world can be applied. Bennett worlds abound. Thus we have a general 
recipe against post–determination. I do not maintain that the recipe will work everywhere, but 
its range of application is wide. Any candidate d for post-determining a normal event e can be 
ruled out, provided there is a contrary–to–fact antecedent proposition P which fulfils two 
conditions: (i) there is a Bennett world which converges to the closest P–world; due to the 
Bennett world’s past mismatch with w0, e does not occur at the Bennett world. (ii) e and d are 
preserved at the closest P–world; due to the latter’s perfect future match with the Bennett world, 
d does occur at the Bennett world. There are reasons why these conditions are easily fulfilled. 
Any event can be subject to a counterfactual claim. And for this counterfactual claim, a Bennett 
world can be conjured up which converges to the closest antecedent world. So the history of 
the world between e and its purported post–determinant d abounds with opportunities for 
Bennett worlds which contain d but not e.  
Summarizing, Bennett worlds shed grievous doubts on Lewis’s original argument for 
the asymmetry of miracles. This does not mean that there is no asymmetry of post–
determination.176 There might be problems with other premises of Lewis’, for instance the very 
idea of small and big miracles. These premises drive his acceptance of Bennett worlds. My 
point is just that Bennett worlds pose a more dire threat to Lewis’s argument than Bennett and 
Lewis suppose. Bennett worlds target the very heart of Lewis’s reasoning. The explicit aim of 
Counterfactuals and Time’s Arrow is to account for ‘the mysterious asymmetry between fixed 
past and open future’ in terms of the asymmetry of counterfactual dependence (p. 38). And the 
argument from the asymmetry of post–determination is crucial to derive this asymmetry of 
counterfactual dependence (given the perfectly symmetric similarity metrics). Bennett worlds 
threaten this core argument of Lewis. 
 
Are Bennett worlds possible, after all? 
Problems with miracles 
 
One big question deserves closer scrutiny: is Lewis really committed to the possibility of 
Bennett worlds? The laws of the closest counterfactual world w1 are the laws of the actual world 
w0. There is only one difference: one event which from the perspective of the actual laws is 
unlawful, a small miracle, is perfectly lawful from the perspective of the laws of w1. Lewis does 
not specify what the laws of w1 look like. But in one place he discusses what could be the 
 
176 There are independent reasons to doubt the asymmetry of post–determination, however. Jeffrey Dunn questions 
the wave–example: 
 
‘A set of propositions about a small portion of the wave, however, is not sufficient for its emission from a point. 
To get sufficiency, we must add the further information about what is happening outside this region. Perhaps, for 
example, the small part of the wave is not a part of a spherical wave at all, but merely a part of space that is 
identical to what this part of the wave would be like, were there a wave.’(Dunn, p. 78) 
 
The explanation of a partial cross–section of the world is sensitive to the rest of this cross–section, just as the 
explanation of a portion of a spherical wave is sensitive to information about the rest of the wave. Dunn even 
intimates that for any normal event, there is only one minimal post–determinant at a time: the complete cross–
section of the world (respectively the complete cross–section within the light cone). But his argument does only 
show that we should be wary of too simple post–determinants. I surmise that Dunn has already in mind Elga’s 
counterexample to the asymmetry of post–determination. I will come to that example in due course. 
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blueprint of these laws. Lewis compares the laws of three worlds. One is a world with our laws, 
let it be the actual world w0. The second is described as follows: 
 
‘the best way to write down its laws would be to write down the laws of the first world, then to mutilate them 
by sticking in clauses to permit various exceptions in an unprincipled fashion. Yet almost everything that 
ever happens in the second world conforms perfectly to the laws of the first.’177  
 
The third world is a world with elegant, simple, powerful laws like ours, ‘except for a 
change of sign here, a switch from inverse square to inverse cube there, and a few other such 
minor changes.’(p. 55) The laws of the third world in themselves look more similar to those of 
the first world than the laws of the second. Nevertheless, the first and the second world are more 
similar to each other, says Lewis. For the elegant, simple laws of the third world lead to huge 
changes in particular matters of fact. Hence a world where the laws are subject to exception 
clauses can be closer to ours although these laws look gerrymandered. So Lewis’s picture must 
be that the laws of w1 are the laws of w0 save for an exception clause. The exception clause 
does not surface except where the small miracle em occurs. It must not only allow for the miracle 
but (together with the facts of w1) determine it. The rest of w1 perfectly obeys the laws of w0. 
This is why Lewis says ‘it seems safe to say that these laws are the laws of the Bennett world 
also.’ If w1 apart from em perfectly abides by the laws of w0, the symmetry of the laws of nature 
requires that one can extrapolate backwards from any post–em cross–section of w1 in accordance 
with the laws of w0. 
Lewis’s treatment of the small miracle em has sparked criticism. em is miraculous from 
the perspective of w0. And it must be amazing from the perspective of w1, too. Both worlds 
share the same history up to em. Hence even a super–scientist at w1, knowing all of history 
before em and possessing ideal capacities of theory–formation, could not have the slightest 
suspicion that em would occur. These vague worries have recently been more thoroughly spelled 
out by Stephen Barker. When we write a suitable exception clause such as to allow for em into 
the law, 
 
‘[… ]we are assigning physical significance to bare particularity itself. That’s objectionable. In physics we do 
not attribute nomic relevance to bare particularity: physical objects have the status of bundles of generic 
properties.’178 
 
It won’t do to assume that some alien quantity surfaces just once in the whole universe, says 
Barker. A lawful relationship would require certain systematic variations of the quantity in 
question under slightly varying conditions.179 It seems weird to claim that such variations of the 
conditions which determine em are never instantiated in w1. And lossy laws which can be 
violated are not reconcilable with determinism.180 
One may use these considerations to question the whole construal of wB (wB perfectly 
conforms to w1 in post–antecedent facts while abiding by the actual laws). Assume the laws of 
w1 cannot be the laws of w0 plus an exception clause. There must be a more substantial 
difference in laws. This difference in laws is likely to be manifested in the future of w1. Since 
the Bennett world wB abides by the actual laws and w1 by substantially different laws, the 
former cannot simply roll back the future of the latter. The ubiquity of Bennett worlds can be 
denied. However, the premise that the laws of w1 substantially diverge from the actual laws is 
fatal to Lewis’s conception of miracles. For the substantially different laws of w1, which is 
supposed to be the closest antecedent world, would give rise to big, widespread miracles, 
judging from the actual laws. Lewis’s whole metrics under determinism is built around the 
 
177 Lewis, ‘Counterfactual Dependence’, p. 55. 
178 Stephen Barker, ‘Can Counterfactuals Really Be about Possible Worlds?’, Noûs, 45 (2011), 557–576, (p. 567). 
179 Barker, ‘Counterfactuals’, p. 568. 
180 Barker, ‘Counterfactuals’, p. 569. 
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distinction between small and big miracles. Thus, he has no resources to rule out the possibility 
of Bennett worlds. 
 
The parallel to Elga’s counterexample 
 
We might still share Lewis’s amazement: the Bennett world abounds of traces which point to 
events which did not occur. How could it manage to manufacture all these traces? As we have 
seen, Adam Elga has presented a closely related counterexample to Lewis’s analysis.181 It may 
reveal the deeper physical rationale of Bennett worlds. Assume the laws of deterministic 
statistical mechanics are the only ones that count. Any process which exhibits the normal 
thermodynamic asymmetry, i.e. an increase in entropy, can be approximated up to a small 
miracle by a completely different, thermodynamically abnormal process. Take any normal 
antecedent: there will be an antecedent world which converges to the actual one by a small 
miracle. 
We should expect a Bennett world to display a trace-making process of the sort 
envisaged by Elga. Such a process is the only candidate which explains all the misleading traces 
of a past that is not past of the Bennett world. Nevertheless, the Elga world is not a Bennett 
world. Firstly, the Bennett world wB converges to w1, Elga’s world converges to the actual 
world w0. Moreover, the Bennett world perfectly abides by the laws of w0 while Elga’s world 
does not. There is a small miracle. Nevertheless, the comparison of both worlds is fruitful. It 
also allows us to show why Bennett worlds are interesting in their own right: while Elga aims 
at presenting a world which competes with divergence worlds for closeness to the actual world, 
Bennett worlds do not compete for closeness. Their mere possibility poses difficulties to 
Lewis’s asymmetry of post–determination. 
I look at strategies to defend Lewis against Elga. It is interesting to see whether they 
work against Bennett worlds, too. Most of these counterstrategies concern the claim that Elga 
worlds compete with divergence worlds for closeness to the actual world.  
The most prominent response in the literature is Schaffer’s, which I already rehearsed 
in the chapter on Morgenbesser cases: match in facts should not count in the closeness ordering 
as far as facts are causally dependent on whether the antecedent obtains or not. This demotes 
the Elga world from being a closest antecedent world, provided its advantages in terms of 
perfect future match are confined to the region which is causally dependent on whether the 
antecedent obtains or not. But Schaffer’s amendment does not save the asymmetry of post–
determination from Bennett worlds. For it is not their closeness but their very possibility that 
conflicts with the asymmetry of post–determination. 
There is another line of response. Bennett reports Lewis’s own reaction to Elga’s 
counterexample: 
 
‘The worlds that converge onto worlds like ours are worlds with counter-entropic funny–business. I think the 
remedy – which doesn’t undercut what I’m trying to do – is to say that such funny–business, though not 
miraculous, makes for dissimilarity in the same way miracles do.’182 
 
Assume the Bennett world exhibits an anti-thermodynamic process of the sort developed by 
Elga. Then this passage also enshrines Lewis’s last word on Bennett’s counterexample. Still 
Lewis does not question the very possibility of Bennett or Elga worlds. Rather his strategy is to 
assimilate the role of counter-entropic funny–business to that of miracles. To save Lewis’s from 
counterentropic worlds as competitors for closeness, no amount of match in particular facts 
must be able to compensate for such funny–business. For if the world stretches further into the 
future than into the past, the future match of the Elga world may largely outdo the past match 
 
181 Elga, ‘Statistical Mechanics’.  
182 Bennett, Conditionals, p. 296. 
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of Lewis’s candidate worlds. The role of funny–business in the similarity metrics must be 
comparable to the role of a big miracle. Unfortunately, Lewis did never provide a general 
criterion for funny–business. And even if he had succeeded in demoting counterentropic worlds 
from closeness, this would not have saved the asymmetry of post–determination. For the very 
possibility of Bennett worlds is sufficient to refute it.  
The parallel to Elga’s thermodynamically reversed processes underpins the 
microphysical possibility of Bennett worlds. But it also shows what is puzzling about them. 
From an isolated viewpoint of statistical mechanics, our world with its characteristic 
thermodynamic asymmetry seems very amazing. There is a proposal which might indeed take 
care of both Elga’s and Bennett’s challenges. If the Past Hypothesis is granted the status of a 
fundamental law, it introduces a fundamental asymmetry. The Past Hypothesis breaks the 
symmetry between the past and the future. In fact, any explanation where a fundamental nomic 
necessity underlies the thermodynamic asymmetry is likely to conflict with Bennett’s and 
Elga’s template. The Elga world would be demoted from closeness. As for Bennett worlds, 
surely a great portion of them could be ruled out as unlawful. They are metaphysically 
impossible because they cannot both share our fundamental laws and perfectly converge to 
some closest antecedent world like w1. While some uncertainties would remain, this might be 
sufficient to uphold the asymmetry of post–determination. If there is a necessary fundamental 
asymmetry, the possibility of any particular Bennett world is doubtful. Lewis’s suspicion that 
counter-entropic funny–business makes for dissimilarity could be confirmed without altering 
his metrics. Funny–business makes for dissimilarity because it violates fundamental laws on a 
large scale. However, as we have seen, there are many reservations about this solution. 
 
Is there smooth convergence to the actual world? 
 
I shall discuss a more daring claim: for any counterfactual antecedent world, there is a Bennett 
world that smoothly converges on it. Moreover, there are amazing counterentropic worlds like 
Elga’s, which converge on the actual world by a small miracle. Yet couldn’t it be that there are 
also worlds that smoothly converge on the actual world without any counterentropic funny–
business. To make this idea more vivid, I develop an argument of my own why convergence 
lurks everywhere. All the counterexamples considered so far demand a peculiar arrangement of 
facts, in the actual world or in the counterfactual worlds under discussion. The counterfactual 
Elga world contains an amazing antithermodynamic region; so it can be ruled out by 
stigmatizing thermodynamically awkward situations. Other examples discussed explicitly 
display particular configurations in the actual world like the beetle in the box; so they are not 
pervasive. In contrast, the worlds I imagine are intrinsically perfectly inconspicuous. And the 
recipe guiding their production may be applied anywhere; they are candidates for closeness 
whatever the antecedent situation considered in a counterfactual is. This casts doubt on any 
normal counterfactual, construed à la Lewis. Moreover, smooth convergence as opposed to 
Elga’s amazing convergence provides a good opportunity for a principled discussion of Lewis’s 
overall anti–convergence arguments.  
As an example of two set–ups which are qualitatively identical in all relevant respects 
save one, I contrive two containers of gas. Assume for simplicity that the gas is energetically 
completely isolated from the environment.183 At t0, the two sets of gas molecules in the two 
containers are qualitatively identical, there being only one difference. For each molecule in one 
container save a small local group, there is a perfect physical counterpart in the other (same 
relative location, velocity and so on). The tiny difference the diverging molecules make will 
soon spread until at t1 the two containers are temporarily very unalike. Now consider the 
following case: at t2, a very long time has passed for the containers to develop in accordance 
 
183 Sklar, p. 669. 
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with the laws of thermodynamics. Both containers are intrinsically perfectly inconspicuous, the 
gas is evenly distributed and so on. Yet at t2, both are qualitatively almost identical, save some 
small local group of molecules. Only some tiny deviation from the actual laws would be 
necessary to bring about perfect correspondence. The velocities of the individual molecules are 
not precisely reversed as in the Elga world; instead, an extremely smooth and inconspicuous 
transition over a very long time span leads from divergence increasing to divergence decreasing. 
Starting from a tiny divergence, we eventually arrive at a comparably tiny divergence. Such a 
situation will be astronomically improbable compared to the overwhelming majority of 
alternative, more strongly divergent configurations of molecules which realize the general 
container scenario. Still it is possible in the following sense: while under determinism, the 
detailed initial conditions constrain the lawful development of the containers to uniqueness, my 
general description of the example is reconcilable with many such developments, one of them 
being (near) convergence. If we consider sufficiently many pairs of containers which conform 
to my general description, some of them will qualitatively converge to each other up to a small 
miracle. The very idea of smooth convergence is to use time to smoothen a development that 
would otherwise have been amazing and in need of a big miracle. Time is traded for 
amazingness. 
Now instead of two actual containers, imagine an actual container and its counterfactual 
variation. The small divergence is due to a small miracle. The container being energetically 
isolated, the rest of the world makes no difference. We seem bound to reject 
 
(E25) If there had been a tiny group of divergent molecules in the container, after sufficient 
time the latter would have been completely as it will actually be. 
 
Yet judging from Lewis’s criteria, we cannot simply reject this conditional; for just as in the 
example of the two actual containers, there is the possibility of the counterfactual container 
smoothly converging to the actual one. 
There are two main arguments against smooth convergence. 
Convergence worlds violate ubiquity of traces. 
Convergence worlds are microphysically impossible for other reasons than the ubiquity of 
traces. 
As for the first Lewis rules out convergence by a small miracle. Either convergence 
worlds display an enduring lack of perfect match in post–antecedent facts, or perfect match is 
achieved at the price of a big, widespread miracle (p. 46). Once it has somewhat spread, 
divergence cannot disappear without a big miracle:  
 
‘Because there are many different sorts of traces to be removed, and because the traces spread out rapidly, 
the cover–up job divides into very many parts[…] Different sorts of unlawful processes are needed to remove 
different sorts of traces.’(p. 47) 
 
The one argument of Lewis’s that would substantiate this claim is overdetermination from the 
future: the facts at our world are such that for any normal event e, there is a plurality of different 
partial cross–sections of the future which together with the laws entail e. This lawful entailment 
can only be contravened by breaking the laws. For any of these cross–sections, it takes at least 
a small miracle to undo it given the event e. The small miracles needed to undo many such 
cross–sections add to a big miracle. When there is sufficient over–determination from the 
future, there is just no way of achieving convergence by a small miracle (p. 57). However, as 
we have seen, Bennett and Elga worlds refute the asymmetry of post–determination. 
In sum, there may well be completely innocent, non-amazing, smooth convergence 
worlds. If such there are, it is highly doubtful that one of the particular remedies discussed so 
far is of any avail against them. 
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2.5. Typicality 
 
We have already seen that the difference between amazing and high–probability events may 
play a role in saving Lewis’s similarity metrics from new versions of the future similarity 
objection. There is a close relationship to the role of typicality in judging counterfactuals. I shall 
discuss this role with regard to a debate in the philosophy of thought–experiments, which is 
closely entangled with a highly relevant use of counterfactuals. 
Thought experiments are difficult to understand. In his The Philosophy of Philosophy 
Timothy Williamson has come up with a new puzzle and a proposal how to dissolve it.184 Any 
thought experimental description can be realized in a deviant way. Williamson suggests that 
the problem can be solved if thought experimental reasoning is analysed by counterfactuals. I 
defend the counterfactual account against two lines of criticism and three alternative proposals 
forwarded by Anna–Sara Malmgren, Jonathan Ichikawa, Benjamin Jarvis, Thomas Grundmann 
and Joachim Horvath. I present an interpretation of the pertinent counterfactuals. 
 
The problem of deviant realizations 
GC1 
At 8:28, somebody looks at a clock to see what time it is. The clock is broken; it stopped exactly 
twenty–four hours previously. The subject believes, on the basis of the clock’s reading, that it 
is 8:28.  
 
What has been called the Gettier intuition is ‘[… ]loosely put: the judgement that [the subject 
satisfying GC1] has a justified true belief without knowledge [NKJTB] [… ]’.185 As a 
consequence, knowledge cannot simply be justified true belief. The case description directly 
prompts the reaction that the subject has NKJTB. But neither does the description explicitly say 
so, nor is there any straightforward entailment relation between the explicit description and the 
prevalent verdict. The step from the former to the latter is far from trivial. For some situations 
where the description is fulfilled, it goes wrong. This can be illustrated by the following 
completion of the story:186 
 
GC2 
At 8:28, somebody looks at a clock to see what time it is. The clock is broken; it stopped exactly 
twenty–four hours previously. The subject believes, on the basis of the clock’s reading, that it 
is 8:28. The subject knew in advance that the clock had stopped exactly twenty–four hours 
previously.  
 
The situation described in GC2 is perfectly compatible with the original Gettier description 
GC1. Yet in that situation, it is not the case that the subject has NKJTB. The subject does know 
the time. GC2 is just one example of a whole class of completions where the usual Gettier 
verdict does not apply. Another class are completions where the subject lacks justification. 
 
Solution: The Counterfactual Account 
 
 
184 Timothy Williamson. The Philosophy of Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007). 
185 Anna Sara Malmgren, ‘Rationalism and the Content of Intuitive Judgements’, Mind, 120 (2011), 263–327 (p. 
264). 
186 Timothy Williamson, ‘Replies to Ichikawa, Martin and Weinberg’, Philosophical Studies, 145 (2009), 465–
476 (p. 467). 
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How are we to analyse our reasoning from the case description to the refutation of the JTB–
theory in light of deviant realizations? As a first stab, the following formalization is 
appealing.187 Start with the JTB–analysis: 
 
(F1) Necessarily, someone knows some proposition P if and only if she has justified true belief 
in p.  
 
(F1) is refuted by: 
 
(F2) Possibly, someone stands to some proposition P in the relation described by GC1. 
(F3) Necessarily, if someone stands to some proposition P in the relation described by GC1, 
she has a justified true belief in P without knowing P.  
(F4) It is possible that someone has justified true belief in P without knowing P. 
 
The argument falls prey to the problem of deviant realizations. Among the situations over which 
the strict conditional (F3) ranges, there is a situation as described by GC2. Since in a GC2–
situation, the subject does not have NKJTB, (F3) is false. Its failure gives rise to a strategy of 
dealing with deviant realizations: find a repair which explains and justifies our confident 
endorsement of the Gettier verdict notwithstanding deviant completions. 
Williamson proposes to replace the strict conditional (F3) by a counterfactual: 
 
(F3*)  If a thinker were related to a proposition P as described by GC1, she would have justified 
true belief in P without knowing P.188 
 
The main advantage of (F3*) compared to (F3) is that it is not falsified by the mere possibility 
of a deviant realization. According to the mainstream semantics of counterfactuals, (F3*) just 
requires that the subject has NKJTB in all closest GC1–situations.  
Some clarifications about the precise aim of the formalization are in order. Firstly, it 
applies to thought experiments in general, at least those refuting some necessity claim. 
Secondly, the common aim of all participants in the debate is to represent ‘our actual route’,189 
a formalization that establishes knowledge of (F4) and is psychologically plausible; it is 
sufficiently close to how a competent thought experimenter normally comes to accept (F4). I 
summarize the common aim as giving the normal route. It is crucial to keep this in mind for the 
following reason: GC1 might actually be realized in a deviant way. There are doubts as to 
whether the rational route to (F4) is the same whether that epistemic possibility is salient or not. 
To neutralize these doubts, I shall consider the situation of a normally competent pre–
Williamsonian thought experimenter sincerely testing the JTB–theory, say Gettier himself. My 
claim is not that, after Williamson, we read GC1 differently. I just want to remain neutral 
whether we read it differently in a context where deviant realizations are salient. 
I shall argue that some of the competing formalizations are rather fallback positions than 
representing the normal route. If we look for a fallback position, I offer the following 
replacement of (F2) and (F3*): 
 
(F2–F3°) there is an extended version v of GC1 such that,  
(i) it is possible that someone stands to a proposition P as described by v,  
 
187 Williamson, The Philosophy, p. 183. 
188 Williamson, The Philosophy, p. 195. 
189 Malmgren, p. 283, emphasis mine. Malmgren’s own explication is a bit misleading: ‘more precisely, a rational 
route from our actual intuitive judgement [to the refutation of the JTB–analysis], one that is plausibly available to 
us.’ Not any route from our actual intuitive judgement that is plausibly available to us is the actual route we 
normally take. 
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(ii) if a thinker were related to a proposition P as described by v, she would have justified true 
belief without knowledge that P. 
 
Assuming that any particular deviant realization can be stipulated away, (F2–F3°) would 
provide a deviance–proof formalization. It can be supported by the implicit generality of 
intuitive reasoning: in considering a story like GC1, we grasp a general pattern.190 So one might 
be expected to have a whole range of fitting cases within one’s purview. Such a grasp may 
provide a justificatory basis for (F2–F3°). While (F2–F3°) is as plausible, considered as a 
fallback position, as the rival accounts to be discussed, I deem it psychologically implausible 
as an account of our normal route. It is not what we have in mind when dealing with the GC1 
story. 
 
Criticism in literature 
 
Williamson admits that (F3*) is false if a deviant realization turns out to be actual (or closest). 
But, he says, we are disposed to come up with an amended story when GC1 unexpectedly 
fails.191 For instance, we might react to GC2 being actual by writing into the antecedent of the 
counterfactual ‘GC1 but not GC2’. However, this concession has not satisfied his critics. There 
are two main criticisms of the counterfactual account: 
 
(i) It is unconvincing as a psychological account of our normal route. 
(ii) It is epistemologically problematic: if this is how we actually reason, we cannot know that 
the JTB–analysis is false. 
 
I shall discuss these criticisms in due order.  
 
Psychological concerns 
 
The psychological criticism has been forwarded by Malmgren. She construes the task of the 
formalization as identifying the intuitive Gettier judgement. The intuitive judgement states the 
lesson to be drawn from the case. Malmgren argues that (F3*) cannot be the intuitive verdict. 
For the problem with deviant realizations reappears. If someone actually satisfies GC1 in a 
deviant way, say by satisfying GC2, (F3*) is false. In that case, we are disposed to retract (F3*). 
But we are neither disposed to change GC1, nor do we retract the intuitive Gettier judgement 
based on GC1. And that shows that (F3*) cannot ‘conform to our semantic intuitions about 
deviance’.192 (F3*) does not capture how the description of the case was meant.193  
I shall argue that there is no such clear psychological evidence against the counterfactual 
account. Firstly, I shall provide linguistic evidence that the intuitive judgement is sensitive to 
deviant realizations. Secondly, I shall question the purported role of a unique intuitive 
judgement in the formalization. Thirdly, I shall point to alternative explanations of our 
resilience to deviant realizations. 
Malmgren claims that we uphold GC1 and the intuitive judgement when a deviant 
realization turns out to be actual. This view is not shared by all of Williamson’s critics: as 
Jonathan Ichikawa admits, ‘It is fairly natural to respond to this sort of challenge with a further 
 
190 cf. Malmgren, pp. 290–297. 
191 Williamson, The Philosophy, p. 204. 
192 Malmgren, p. 278. 
193 ‘[… ]the envisaged (actual) realization of the case [… ] is clearly deviant. It requires that we read the case 
description in a way we know it was not meant to be read.’(Malmgren, p. 279) 
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spelling–out of the case to be considered.’194 In order to decide how we would respond, I use a 
linguistic test. The vulnerability of (F3*) to deviant realizations is confirmed by the following 
imagined dialogue, taking place in an epistemology class where GC1 is brought up as a Gettier 
story (I paraphrase the formal expressions to get the linguistic intuitions): 
 
Dialogue10 
John: ‘Imagine someone who looks at 8.28 at a clock which broke exactly 24h earlier. (F6) She 
has justified true belief but no knowledge that it is 8.28.’ 
Mary:  ‘Not necessarily: the clock at the wall has actually stopped 24h earlier. Betty is looking 
at the clock to see what time it is, but I have just told her that the clock has stopped 24h earlier.’ 
John: (F3*): #‘But if a thinker came to believe what time it is as described in my scenario, she 
would have justified true belief without knowing.’ 
 
It seems infelicitous to utter (F3*) once the actuality of a deviant realization has been raised to 
salience.195 This shows that (F3*) is vulnerable to deviant realizations. If Malmgren is right, 
one should expect the intuitive Gettier judgement to behave differently. And indeed 
Malmgren’s own formalization of the Gettier argument, which she designs to be invulnerable 
to deviant realizations, shows quite a different behaviour: 
  
(F5) It is possible that someone stands to P as in the Gettier case (as described [by GC1]) and 
that she has a justified true belief that P but does not know that P.196 
 
(F5) is perfectly fine within a variant of the epistemology class dialogue: 
 
Dialogue11 
John: ‘Imagine someone who looks at 8.28 at a clock which broke exactly 24h earlier. (F6) She 
has justified true belief but no knowledge that it is 8.28.’ 
Mary:  ‘Not necessarily: the clock at the wall has actually stopped 24h earlier. Betty is looking 
at the clock to see what time it is, but I have just told her that the clock has stopped 24h earlier.’ 
John: (F5) ‘But it is possible that someone in my scenario has justified true belief but does not 
know what time it is.’ 
 
So the test seems well-calibrated. Its outcome covaries with the sensitivity of the candidate 
formalizations to deviant realizations. Now if there is some independent informal way of 
expressing the intuitive judgement, we might use the test to check whether it behaves rather 
like (F3*) or (F5). I shall use ‘the intuitive judgement [… ]loosely put: the judgement that [the 
subject satisfying GC1] has a justified true belief without knowledge[… ]’.197 The Gettier 
verdict, loosely put, is 
 
(F6) A thinker who is related to proposition P as described by GC1 has justified true belief 
without knowing that p. 
 
In an epistemology class, one can put the Gettier verdict in this loose way. The audience will 
understand what is meant. Consider how it fares in a variant of the epistemology class dialogue: 
 
194 Jonathan Ichikawa, ‘Knowing the Intuition and Knowing the Counterfactual’, Philosophical Studies, 145 
(2009), 435–43 (p. 439). 
195 It seems that raising the mere metaphysical possibility of a deviant realization makes for infelicity. But this just 
shows that raising the metaphysical possibility of a deviant realization often will suffice to also raise its epistemic 
possibility. 
196 Malmgren, p. 281. 
197 Malmgren, p. 264. 
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Dialogue12 
John: ‘Imagine someone who looks at 8.28 at a clock which broke exactly 24h earlier. (F6) She 
has justified true belief but no knowledge that it is 8.28.’ 
Mary:  ‘Not necessarily: the clock at the wall has actually stopped 24h earlier. Betty is looking 
at the clock to see what time it is, but I have just told her that the clock has stopped 24h earlier’ 
John: (F6) #‘But someone in my scenario has justified true belief without knowing what time 
it is.’ 
 
Unlike John’s use of (F5), his use of (F6) seems infelicitous. So my test indicates that (F3*) is 
closer to (F6), the intuitive judgement, loosely put, than (F5). We may save (F6) if we read John 
as stipulating what his scenario is like, but this reading is not a matter of curse, and it does not 
serve the purpose of the thought–experiment. Whether someone has NKJTB should not be 
stipulated but follow naturally from considering the scenario. 
There are many uncertainties about this result. Perhaps (F6) differs in its felicity 
conditions from more concise ways of putting the intuition. Moreover, the test shows only that 
one would not utter (F6) after deviant realizations have been raised to salience, not that one 
would retract (F6). But Malmgren owes an explanation why her own formalization (F5) 
behaves so differently from (F6), the loose way she herself puts the intuitive judgement. In my 
view, the most promising explanation is that, in a normal epistemological context, deviant 
realizations are unintended because they do not come to mind. Yet when they are raised to 
salience, they cannot simply be dismissed as beside the point. We feel a pressure to react, 
however confident we remain about the overall pattern of Gettier–style examples, as witnessed 
by the following epistemology class dialogue: 
 
Dialogue13 
John: ‘Imagine someone who looks at 8.28 at a clock which broke exactly 24h earlier. (F6) She 
has justified true belief but no knowledge that it is 8.28.’ 
Mary:  ‘Not necessarily: the clock at the wall has actually stopped 24h earlier. Betty is looking 
at the clock to see what time it is, but I have just told her that the clock has stopped 24h earlier.’ 
John: #‘Oh come on. That is not how I intended the story’.  
 
Mary’s reaction should seem somewhat inappropriate and John’s reply perfectly in order if 
Malmgren were right. But what Mary says seems ok. And it would be much better for John to 
say: ‘I see. But a subject who is not told that the clock has stopped 24h earlier has justified true 
belief without knowing that it is 8.28.’ In sum, Malmgren’s claim that actually deviant 
realizations do not bother us is contestable. 
There are also doubts about Malmgren’s demanding use of ‘intuition’. Her argument 
targets the claim that (F3*) is ‘the intuitive judgement’. The counterfactual account does not 
entail this claim.198 So the argument that (F3*) behaves differently than the intuitive judgement 
does not prove the counterfactual account wrong. The requirement that the formalization is to 
identify some clear-cut intuitive judgement is not a matter of course. It comes with a certain 
bias in favour of Malmgren’s own account: to her, thought experimental reasoning proceeds 
via rational a priori intuition. As a consequence, there must be some clear-cut judgement that 
can be intuited a priori. Unless one accepts the rationalist account, there is little reason to insist 
that the formalization must identify such an outstanding intuitive judgement. Herman Cappelen 
notes ‘that it is exceedingly hard (I [Cappelen] argue impossible) to find a particular judgment 
(or set of judgments) in any of the alleged paradigmatic cases that there is agreement on 
 
198 Williamson himself states this claim, but in a rather detached way, indicating his reluctance about intuition talk: 
‘What is sometimes called ‘the Gettier intuition’ has been expressed by a counterfactual conditional in 
English…’(Williamson, The Philosophy, p. 195). 
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classifying as intuitive.’199 Even if we grant that there is something like the Gettier intuition, it 
does not follow that one precise step of the reasoning (F1), (F3*); thus (F4) has to be identified 
with the intuitive judgement. Perhaps the best candidate for the intuitive judgement is the 
informal  
 
(F6) A thinker who is related to proposition P as described by GC1 has justified true belief 
without knowing that P. 
 
But just as there is no guarantee that the formalization must be vulnerable to deviant realizations 
in the way (F6) is, as witnessed by the above dialogues, nothing guarantees that there is a unique 
intuitive counterpart to (F6) at the deeper level of the formalization. I will even consider an 
argument of Ichikawa and Jarvis’s which sheds doubt on the very possibility of identifying such 
a counterpart. 
Thus, the purported psychological evidence should not be put thus: we retain some 
precisely confined intuitive judgement regardless of deviant realizations. It should be put more 
cautiously: there is a feeling that the GC1–experiment would not be doomed just because a 
deviant realization turned out to be actual. Does this evidence suffice to refute the 
counterfactual account? I doubt it. There are several alternative explanations of the felt 
resilience. One explanation would be that we focus on the dialectics against the JTB–analysis. 
We feel that the overall case against the JTB–analysis is not damaged by deviant realizations. 
It would be a desperate move on the part of the traditional epistemologist to point to deviant 
realizations. Another explanation is that we find the task of providing an amendment trivial. 
Any particular deviant realization can be stipulated away when it turns out to be closest. We do 
not bother too much about actually providing an amendment. The story obviously instantiates 
a pattern that will sooner or later prove successful. The latter point can be supported by 
Malmgren’s own view that the concrete case described comes with a general grip on relevantly 
similar cases. This could explain one’s confidence that, if one particular description fails, there 
will be a fallback position. 
In sum, there is no compelling psychological evidence against the counterfactual 
account. 
 
Epistemological concerns 
 
I come to the epistemological concern voiced by Ichikawa: ‘…how do we know that the 
counterfactual is true? I believe that Williamson’s account renders it much too difficult to know 
the Gettier intuition.’200 In Williamson’s analysis, (F3*) must be known in order to know (F4) 
(NKJTB is possible). To Ichikawa, in order for (F3*) to be known, one must rule out the 
relevant alternative that a deviant realization like GC2 is actual. Since that alternative cannot 
be ruled out, it is very difficult to know (F4) via (F3*). But we do not find (F4) so difficult to 
know. So our normal route from GC1 to (F4) must be different. 
My reply to Ichikawa follows the thrust of Williamson’s overall theory of modal 
knowledge: modal knowledge is reducible to the well-established capacity of everyday 
counterfactual reasoning. Here is my core claim: according to our normal standards of knowing 
a counterfactual, (F3*) can be known, though one’s justification is defeasible by a deviant 
realization. Although we know (F3*) only if GC1 is not realized in a deviant way, normally we 
do not have to rule out that GC1 is deviantly realized in order to know (F3*). I remain neutral 
as to whether (F3*) can be known once deviant realizations have been raised to salience. Put 
yourself into a state of innocence before deviant realizations have been raised to salience. You 
 
199 Herman Cappelen, Philosophy without Intuitions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 55. 
200 Ichikawa, ‘Knowing the Truth’, p. 440. 
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do not pay special attention to them. (F3*) seems intuitively true, just as the Gettier verdict 
does. So nothing prevents you from using (F3*) to obtain the Gettier verdict. 
But why do we normally credit ourselves with knowing (F3*)? I shall consider two 
explanations without deciding between them. According to the first hypothesis, we take it that 
the actual world or the GC1–worlds closest to it do not realize GC1 in a deviant way. It is not 
that we explicitly believe or form some background hypothesis that there are no deviant 
realizations of GC1. In a similar vein, we do not explicitly believe that the zebra we admire in 
the zoo is not a cleverly disguised mule. One may compare our neglecting deviant realizations 
to the role of folk physics as Williamson describes it: folk physics is strictly false. So it is 
problematic to use it as a premise in reasoning about the actual world and counterfactual 
suppositions. Still it may form part of a reliable method of forming beliefs in certain areas. It 
‘may be stored in the form of some analogue mechanism, perhaps embodied in a 
connectionist network, which the subject cannot articulate in propositional form.’201 
Analogously, neglecting deviant realizations may just be part of some defeasible default 
heuristics of evaluating counterfactuals. If there is such a default heuristics, it is not 
confined to philosophical thought experiments. It also applies to dialogues like the 
following: 
 
Dialogue14 
John: ‘Is atropa belladonna very poisonous?’  
Mary: ‘Indeed. (F7) If someone were to eat 10 berries of atropa belladonna, she would die.’ 
 
We accept (F7) although there might be someone who has just consumed 10 berries of 
belladonna and the antidote. So (F3*) is in no way special. It stands and falls with our 
heuristics of evaluating many everyday counterfactuals. The default standards of 
justification are determined with respect to that heuristics. 
There is an alternative explanation why we judge (F3*) true. Perhaps (F3*) is read as 
something like a habitual. It closely corresponds to   
 
(F8) People have justified true belief without knowing that it is 8.28 when they are in GC1.  
 
For comparison, take 
 
(F9) Glasses shatter when dropped. 
 
The habitual (F9) can be true although many glasses actually have landed on soft carpets 
without shattering. I observe a certain tendency to accept the analogous counterfactual: 
 
Dialogue15 
The Savage: ‘are glasses damageable?’ 
Mary: (F10) ‘If a glass were dropped, it would shatter.’ 
 
(F10) seems perfectly all right as uttered by Mary. Both (F9) and (F10) are sensitive to deviant 
realizations: 
 
Dialogue16 
John: ‘Some glasses are packed in cotton wool.’ 
Mary: (F9) ‘#But glasses shatter when dropped.’/(F10) #’But if a glass were dropped, it would 
shatter.’ 
 
201 Williamson, The Philosophy, p. 146. 
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Normally, deviant circumstances are not salient. Then we accept (F9) and (F10) 
although it would be foolish to deny that some glasses have actually been dropped without 
shattering. It is a matter of further debate how to analyse counterfactuals like (F10).202 In an 
moment, I will sketch one proposal. In any case, if (F3*) is to be treated like (F10), and if I am 
right that (F10) is acceptable by normal standards, again Ichikawa’s criticism can be met. (F3*) 
comes in good company. It meets the normal standards of justifying counterfactuals. To be 
sure, reading (F3*) as something like a habitual conflicts with centering assumptions (a 
counterfactual P >> Q is false if P but not Q). Some philosophers find these assumptions non-
negotiable.203 To them, I offer my first alternative explanation.  
I shall give at least a sketch how one might spell out the analogy between habituals and 
counterfactuals. As we have seen in chapter (2.3.2.), there is linguistic evidence that, just as the 
definite article ‘the’ is a device of unambiguously referring to individuals, the subordinator ‘if’ 
is a device of referring to possibilities. Drawing on this evidence, the (simplified) standard 
analysis of counterfactuals can be interpreted in terms of definite descriptions:   
 
A counterfactual P >> Q is true iff the closest worlds such that P are worlds such that Q. 
 
Definite descriptions allow for a non-maximal reading. Imagine a teacher standing 
outside the classroom. Noise is coming from inside. The teacher may truly say  
 
(F11) The children are quarrelling 
 
although, strictly speaking, not all of the children are quarrelling. A discourse normally is a 
cooperative enterprise of exchanging the information most relevant to decision–making. There 
is a maximal reading of (F11) where all children in a contextually restricted domain (children 
in the classroom) are quarrelling and a non-maximal reading where some of the children are 
quarrelling. The latter is selected because it is more decision-relevant: if some children are 
quarrelling, the teacher should look after them. It makes only a minor difference whether all or 
some of the children are quarrelling. The issue is determined with respect to the decision 
problem: are any of the children quarrelling? It is answered by (F11), read as stating that some 
children are quarrelling. 
Given the close connection to descriptions, it is tempting to think that counterfactuals 
also allow for a non-maximal reading. Assume the teachers at a conference discuss their 
responsibilities. Responsibilities are determined with respect to classes assigned to teachers. 
One of the teachers may say:  
 
You can’t leave the children alone. 
(D42) If the children were left alone, they would quarrel. 
 
This may be perfectly assertable although it is based only on the observation that children in 
class often quarrel when they are left alone, and so there is no special reason to think that they 
will quarrel in all the closest scenarios where they are left alone. It may even be true if all the 
children in some class actually happen to be left alone but do not quarrel. This can be explained 
by reading the subjunctor ‘If…’ in (D42) non-maximally. Given a teacher’s responsibility for 
her classes, the issue that is relevant to the counterfactual is whether some (or sufficiently many) 
particularly close situations where children in class are left alone are situations where they 
 
202 Lars Bo Gundersen, ‘Outline of a New Semantics for Counterfactuals’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 85 
(2004), 1–20; Michael Smith ‘Ceteris Paribus Conditionals and Comparative Normalcy’, Journal of Philosophical 
Logic, 36 (2007), 97–121. 
203 Cf. Michael Fara, ‘Dispositions and Habituals’, Noûs, 61 (2005), 43–82; Walters, ‘Morgenbesser’s Coin’. 
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quarrel. The issue is also relevant to how fine-grained the closeness–ordering is. It seems natural 
that we do not merely consider the classes that were actually left alone. Assume only the quiet 
classes were actually left alone, but there are many aggressive classes around. These classes 
clearly are relevant to the teachers’ decision. And they should be relevant to evaluating (D42). 
In the same vein, in Dialogue15, what matters is whether glasses should in general be 
handled such as to prevent damage. (F10)(If a glass were dropped, it would shatter) raises a 
paradigm case of damage due to insufficient care: a glass shatters because it is dropped. (F10) 
answers the issue whether glasses are damaged in sufficiently many of these paradigm 
situations. The aim is some general maxim. I surmise an analysis along these lines where the 
issue is sufficiently general underlies our use of habituals. 
In the Gettier experiment, the overarching issue is whether (F1) (necessarily, one knows 
iff one has JTB). When it comes to evaluating (F3*), the Gettier counterfactual, it is already 
established that there are GC1–situations. We have to choose between a maximal and a non–
maximal reading of (F3*): according to the maximal reading, all closest GC1–scenarios are 
NKJTB–scenarios, according to the non-maximal reading, some of them are. We realize that in 
the context created by the overarching issue, what matters is whether some closest GC1–
scenarios are NKJTB–scenarios. This is the subordinate issue answered by (F3*). Accordingly, 
(F3*) is read as the claim that some of the closest GC1–situations are NKJTB–situations. It 
simply does not matter whether all (as contrasted to some) closest GC1–situations are NKJTB–
situations. What counts as ‘closest’, too, is determined with respect to the issue. Even if deviant 
realizations are actual, normal GC1–scenarios loom so large among the closest antecedent 
scenarios as to make (F3*) true. This reading allows us to explain our impatience with deviant 
realizations as noted by Malmgren. We feel that bringing them up does not contribute to 
answering the issue. 
I have argued that (F3*) is justified by our normal standards, and I have offered possible 
explanations of our justificatory practice. Now Ichikawa may present his epistemological worry 
as a sceptical challenge to this very practice. In that case, the sceptical challenge should be 
extended to all counterfactuals which are vulnerable to the epistemic possibility of deviant 
realizations, among them everyday counterfactuals like (F7) or (F10). Once the general 
dimension of the problem of deviant realizations is acknowledged, we have just one variant of 
sceptical alternatives raised to salience among others. There is no special reason why, of all, 
thought experiments should be exempted from such a general scepticism. It is no convincing 
objection to the counterfactual account that thought experiments would get enmeshed into a 
general scepticism about counterfactuals.  
I shall now critically review a proposal which comes quite close to the one I have just 
made. Alexander Geddes opts for a revival of Williamson’s counterfactual.204 His variant is:  
 
(F3N) If someone were to stand to a proposition P as in GC1, then, normally, she would have 
a justified true belief that P but know that P. 
 
How are we to assess (F3N)? According to Geddes, we have a ‘sense of normalcy’, which tells 
us how things normally go. This sense of normalcy tells us that, in a normal counterfactual 
situation in which Gettier Case is true, the subject of the case has NKJTB. For (F3N) to be true, 
our sense of normalcy had better be reliable in telling us the truth about counterfactual scenarios 
like the one considered in (F3N). In my critical assessment, I shall concentrate on the role of 
this reliable sense of normalcy in Gettier reasoning. 
 
No normalcy clause 
 
 
204 Alexander Geddes, ‘Judgements about Thought Experiments’, forthcoming in Mind. 
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I do not think that the role of normalcy in Gettier reasoning is adequately captured by (F3N). 
In this section, I shall outline my doubts: an explicit normalcy clause misses our actual route.  
The common aim of all participants in the debate is to render our, i.e. Gettier’s and his 
followers’ ‘actual route’.205 The actual route should be psychologically credible. It is a matter 
of further debate whether it amounts to a sound logical argument. The other participants in the 
debate seem to pursue the same aim.  
What is the actual route? Some guidance can be obtained from Gettier’s original 
presentation. He announced a counterexample to the view that JTB is necessary and sufficient 
for knowledge. He introduced his cases by ‘suppose’ and ‘imagine’ + indicative. This does not 
obviously square with the formalizations in terms of metaphysical modalities considered so 
far.206 Still Gettier’s lack of explicit modal fine-tuning might be explained by the immature state 
of modal metaphysics and epistemology at the time. He might have aimed at metaphysical 
necessity and possibility without making this explicit.  
Now Gettier did not hedge his claim by ‘normally’. He simply said: 
 
‘I shall now present two cases in which the conditions [justification, truth, belief] are true for some proposition, 
though it is at the same time false that the person in question knows that proposition.’207 
 
Here we cannot simply blame the state of the art in modal theory. Gettier could have been aware 
of deviant completions of his description, and he could have hedged his claim by ‘normally’. 
To be sure, he might indeed have had in mind a hedged claim. Perhaps he feared to distract his 
readers by adding ‘normally’. Still the most straightforward explanation of why he did not 
explicitly hedge his claim is that he simply did not reckon with deviant realizations. Nor did his 
successors until Williamson came. 
Geddes has surprisingly little to say about the sense of normalcy given its pivotal role. 
Here is a more informative passage: 
 
‘Now, we typically think of how things generally go in terms of the laws, norms and tendencies 
that we take to be in force. Keeping with this way of thinking, then, we can say that what is in fact 
normal for a scenario will be any feature whose absence from an instance of that scenario (in one 
of the worlds just mentioned) involves an exception to some relevant law, norm or tendency (that is 
in force across those worlds).’(Geddes forthcoming) 
 
For (F3N) to be true, there has to be some law, norm or tendency ruling out deviant 
realizations as exceptional. The notion of a tendency would need a lot of elaboration.208 Hence 
I focus on laws or norms.  
Assume there are laws or norms of epistemic appraisal which also bear on Gettier cases. 
Such laws or norms guide routine appraisals. They also inform our sensitivity to exceptions. 
Now Gettier cases do not form a natural epistemic category as characterized by its systematic 
connection to laws and norms of epistemic appraisal. Moreover, they are exceptions. When 
 
205 Malmgren, p. 283. 
206 Williamson, The Philosophy, p. 183, mentions Gettier’s use of ‘suppose’ + indicative, but then he says: ‘What 
is sometimes called ‘the Gettier intuition’ has been expressed by a counterfactual conditional in English…’(p. 195) 
207 Edmund Gettier, ‘Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?’, Analysis, 23 (1963), 121–123 (pp. 121–122). 
208 Candidates for explicating the notion do not seem promising: Millian clauses for causal laws (John Stuard Mill 
Mill, A System of Logic Ratiocinative and Inductive (London: Parker, 1843), p. 445) do not seem to apply. 
Dispositions (cf. Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1949), pp. 117–118, 131–133) 
enmesh us in unexpected metaphysical debates. A paraphrase like ‘most A’s are B’s’(T. Stephen Champlin, 
‘Tendencies’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 91 (1990), 119–133 (p. 132)) is problematic: we are not in 
a position to know whether most Gettier cases are (or would be) cases of NKJTB. The same goes for probabilistic 
judgements. A related proposal is to account for normalcy by high probability properties (Williams, ‘Chances’). 
But there is no reason to think that normal realizations of Gettier Case can be discerned in this way. 
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things go their normal way, they do not arise. A routine case of JTB is by a strange twist turned 
into a situation in which our belief might easily have failed to be true. 
We cannot have fully specific rules determining any single case. When we look for 
generalizations bearing on Gettier Case, candidates like the following spring to mind:  
 
(Rule) if someone has JTB that P, she knows that P, except if she hits the truth only by 
accident.209  
 
(Rule) has the right level of specification. It tells us what normally happens and specifies a 
range of exceptions. It supports counterfactuals like: if someone were to have JTB, she would 
normally have knowledge. A generalization of this sort, if any, is most likely to guide our 
judgement on Gettier Case. In light of (Rule), GC1 seems exceptional. Implicit reliance on 
generalizations like (Rule) explains why the JTB–theory of knowledge is tempting, and why 
we find Gettier cases surprising. (Rule) does not tell us anything about exceptions among 
Gettier cases. Given that Gettier cases are unusual, there is no reason to assume that we use 
more specific generalizations which take Gettier cases as the norm relative to which exceptions 
can be discerned. The only motive for this assumption could be that we dismiss realizations like 
GC2 as deviant. But as we shall see, there is an alternative explanation for our attitude towards 
them. 
 
Deviant realizations ignored 
 
Notwithstanding my reservations about an explicit normalcy clause tracking objective 
normalcy, I agree that a subjective ‘sense’ of normalcy plays a role in Gettier reasoning. 
However, I suggest not to construe it as a reliable capacity to track some objective feature of 
reality, but as a blindfold streamlining our fast and frugal practices of reasoning. We do not 
attend to abnormal realizations and hedge our verdict accordingly. Our ‘sense of normalcy’ 
simply makes us ignore them. One looks at the case and immediately classifies it as NKJTB, 
perhaps guided by a generalization as illustrated in the last section. 
To summarize my discussion of extant criticisms, so far there is no reason to give up the 
counterfactual account. To better appreciate the costs of giving it up, I shall critically examine 
further alternatives to the counterfactual approach in the literature. My result will be that they 
are more problematic than the original account they are to mend. 
 
Extant alternatives to the counterfactual approach 
A possibility claim 
 
If both the possibility and the actuality of deviant completions spell trouble for a formalization 
of Gettier reasoning, we might settle for a weaker claim which is not vulnerable to deviant 
realizations. Instead of claiming that all possible GC1–situations or some particularly relevant 
respectively close GC1–situations are NKJTB–situations where the subject has justified belief 
but does not know, it seems sufficient to claim that there could be a GC1–situation where the 
subject has NKJTB. The resulting candidate as proposed by Malmgren is  
 
(F5) It is possible that someone stands to P as in the Gettier case (as described [by GC1]) and 
that she has a justified true belief that P but does not know that P. 
 
 
209 Or: …might easily have been wrong, is wrong in some nearby possible worlds etc.. 
I use (Rule) only as an example without incurring a commitment to it. 
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From (F5), one can directly proceed to the denial of (F1), the JTB–analysis. (F5) seems perfectly 
proportionate to the task: it yields the intended conclusion while deviant scenarios do not bear 
on its truth.  
I have already critically discussed (F5) as part of my discussion of Malmgren’s criticism 
of Williamson, but I have not yet considered it as an alternative in its own right. shall begin my 
assessment of (F5) with criticism in literature. Then I shall discuss two criticisms of my own: 
firstly, (F5) is does not track our normal route but rather some fallback position. Secondly, since 
the Gettier description is conjoined with the NKJTB–result from the outset, (F5) is 
unpersuasive.  
Malmgren’s aim is to precisely identify the intuitive judgement that leads us from GC1 
to the conclusion that the JTB–analysis is false. It seems that acceptance of the formalized 
argument should be the shibboleth which allows to tell apart those who accept ‘the Gettier 
intuition’ and those who don’t. One should be considered as accepting the Gettier intuition 
precisely if one accepts (F5). Drawing on this requirement, Ichikawa and Jarvis provide the 
following counterargument: 
 
‘Malmgren’s version of the content of the Gettier intuition[… ] cannot make sense of the conflict between 
someone who accepts the Gettier intuition and someone who denies it. Indeed, someone who thinks that 
standard Gettier cases are knowledge, but who believes in NKJTB on other grounds will accept [5], but reject 
the content of the Gettier intuition. […] Suppose someone thinks that stopped–clock cases are knowledge, 
but thinks that, say, fake–barn cases or lottery cases are NKJTB. Then he will reject the content of the Gettier 
intuition elicited by the story […]; nevertheless, he should accept [5].’210 
 
The argument needs some interpretation. (F5) concerns a particular Gettier story. I have 
plugged in GC1 (the stopped clock case). It is not immediately transparent why the eccentric’s 
belief that fake–barn cases or lottery cases are NKJTB should make him accept (F5). But 
assume we can realize GC1 as a ‘fake–barn’ case: there are many fake clocks around. Then 
someone who believes that, normally stopped–clock cases are knowledge (say because the 
clock has been reliable sufficiently often before stopping), but believes that fake–barn cases are 
NKJTB, can accept (F5) because GC1 can be realized as a fake–clock case. 
This argument works against Malmgren. She says that (F5) just is the (GC1–related) 
Gettier intuition. The eccentric imagined by Ichikawa and Jarvis would deny that a person who 
non-deviantly satisfies GC1 has NKJTB. This is incompatible with accepting the Gettier 
intuition if anything is. But the eccentric would accept (F5). So (F5) cannot be the Gettier 
intuition. 
However, I do not think that (F5) stands defeated. (F5) can be put to a more modest use 
if one does not subscribe to Malmgren’s strong commitments. I have voiced doubts that the task 
of the formalization is to identify a unique intuitive judgement as the Gettier intuition. Once 
one drops the identification of (F5) with the Gettier intuition, Ichikawa and Jarvis’s 
counterargument is of limited avail against (F5): it is too demanding a requirement that an 
adequate formalization of the argument cannot be hijacked. Presumably any formalization can 
be accepted by someone who rejects the Gettier intuition but has arbitrarily weird other beliefs. 
To see this, consider the alternative lines of formalization, beginning with the counterfactual 
account. Assume Ichikawa and Jarvis’s eccentric additionally believes that all actual (or 
closest) GC1–cases are fake–clock cases. Then he will accept the reasoning (F1), (F3*); thus 
(F4). Now consider a necessity claim (F3). The argument (F1), (F3); thus (F4) could be 
acceptable to Ichikawa and Jarvis’s eccentric provided he additionally has the weird belief that 
any realization of GC1 necessarily is a fake–clock case. This belief is very weird indeed, but so 
are the beliefs imagined by Ichikawa and Jarvis. So there are doubts that the argument 
 
210 Jonathan Ichikawa and Benjamin Jarvis, The Rules of Thought (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) p. 
203 and ann.. 
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disqualifies (F5). If it hits (F5), it hits any other formalization, too. I note that this observation 
sheds further doubts on the project of identifying the intuitive premise in the formalization. Any 
premise hitherto considered can be accepted by someone whom we would not credit with 
accepting the Gettier intuition. 
There is a further compelling criticism of Malmgren’s proposal. Consider a 
misjudgement on the case: the subject neither has justification nor knowledge. This seems false. 
The most straightforward way of applying Malmgren’s proposal is to also put the misjudgement 
as a possibility claim. But the possibility claim is true! This is evidence that there is a difference 
between Malmgren’s possibility claim and the intuitive judgement. 
Coming to my own critical assessment, (F5) arguably does not represent the normal 
route but a fallback position. It is designed such as to evade the problem of deviant realizations. 
But that problem is simply disregarded in a normal Gettier reasoning. This impression is 
confirmed by my epistemology class dialogues. Consider again 
 
Dialogue11 
John: ‘Imagine someone who looks at 8.28 at a clock which broke exactly 24h earlier. (F6) She 
has justified true belief but no knowledge that it is 8.28.’ 
Mary:  ‘Not necessarily: the clock at the wall has actually stopped 24h earlier. Betty is looking 
at the clock to see what time it is, but I have just told her that the clock has stopped 24h earlier.’ 
John: (F5) ‘But it is possible that someone in this scenario has justified true belief but does not 
know what time it is.’ 
 
Dialogue11 perfectly illustrates the fallback role of (F5). John’s way of putting GC1 at the 
beginning seems perfectly in order. But it cannot be reaffirmed after deviant realizations have 
been raised to salience. Then we need something like (F5). This is evidence that we do not read 
John’s initial utterance as (F5). If the task were to provide a deviance–proof scenario from the 
outset, one would expect that either John’s way of putting the experiment is a non–starter, or 
that it can simply be repeated after Mary’s interpellation because what John really intends is 
something like (F5). I note that the alternative rival accounts to the counterfactual-based one 
face similar difficulties in explaining the infelicity of repeating (F6) in my Dialogue12 (…John: 
(F6) #‘But someone in my scenario has justified true belief without knowing what time it is.’). 
Just like Malmgren, they provide a deviance-proof candidate for the Gettier intuition. But if 
John had this candidate in mind, one would expect his repeating (F6) to be perfectly felicitous. 
We should take (F6) to stand for the deviance–proof intuition. At least John’s reaction in 
Dialogue12 should be perfectly fine (…John: #‘Oh, come on. That’s not how I intended the 
story.’). 
I come to my second criticism: (F5) integrates GC1 and the classification as NKJTB 
into one big possibility step. To see how problematic this integration is, consider: 
  
GC3 
At 8:28, somebody looks at a clock to see what time it is. The clock is broken; it stopped exactly 
twenty–four hours previously. The subject believes, on the basis of the clock’s reading, that it 
is 8:28. And the Subject has justified true belief but does not know that it is 8:28. 
 
GC3 seems inappropriate as a Gettier description. But if the whole thought experiment boils 
down to evaluating (F5), GC3 should be a perfectly fitting case description. There does not 
seem to be a relevant difference between (F5) and 
 
(F12) Possibly, GC3.  
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Why then does GC3 seem inappropriate? Why do we feel that it begs the question? I propose 
the following explanation: the persuasiveness of thought experiments is very sensitive to the 
way they are presented.211 For a counterexample to be convincing, it should first be accepted 
as a test case. The description should not provoke resistance from the outset. One should be 
wary of writing anything into a Gettier description that looks like prejudging whether the case 
is subsumed under justified true belief and especially knowledge. GC3 clearly fails in this 
respect.  
But (F5) seems problematic, too. It combines the seemingly neutral case description and 
the general classificatory task in one possibility claim. You are supposed to accept the 
description as a case of NKJTB from the outset. In processing ‘it is possible that … but does 
not know that p’, you realize from the outset that ‘but’ imposes a NKJTB constraint on the 
description. This is likely to provoke resistance. The psychologically convincing alternative is 
to separate the description and the classificatory task. First, there is the question whether to 
accept the test case as a suitable target of epistemic appraisal. It is a suitable target only if it is 
possible. So the acceptance step is associated with the possibility claim (F1). But its role goes 
beyond the possibility claim. When accepting the possibility claim, one should also accept the 
test case as uncontroversial. The description should be carefully designed to be readily 
acceptable. Once the case has been accepted, you proceed to the classificatory task. Does the 
test case fall under justified true belief? And does it fall under knowledge? The possibility claim 
(F1) together with the conditional claim (F3) or (F3*) perfectly instantiates this pattern. 
In sum, (F5) is immune to deviant realizations. But this advantage comes dear. The 
persuasiveness of the original Gettier experiment is endangered. 
 
Restricting the necessity claim 
 
Instead of replacing (F3) by a counterfactual (F3*) or a possibility claim, one may prefer to 
restrict the necessity claim. An explicit non–deviance or a ceteris paribus clause seem too 
uninformative.212 I consider two more informative ways of mending (F3). 
 
The thought experiment as a fiction 
 
Ichikawa and Jarvis propose to treat the Gettier description as an everyday fictional story. The 
concrete case descriptions used in normal thought experiments resemble fictional narratives. 
We all credit ourselves with the capacity of evaluating fictions. And we seem to eschew deviant 
ways of completing fictional stories. Consider GC1 as a minimalistic short story. There are 
more things true in the story than we are explicitly told (surely the subject in the story breathes 
air). But no one would deem GC2 true in the story. So one may use the fiction to determine the 
domain of the strict conditional as follows: consider the proposition Q which is true iff all that 
is true according to the GC1–fiction is true tout court. Replace (F2) and (F3) by 
 
(F2´) Possibly, Q. 
(F3´) Necessarily, if Q, someone has justified true belief but does not know some proposition 
P. 
 
(F2´), (F3´); thus (F4) refutes the JTB–analysis. 
 
211 ‘by presenting content in a suitably concrete or abstract way, thought experiments recruit representational 
schemas that were otherwise inactive, thereby evoking responses that may run counter to those evoked by 
alternative presentations of relevantly similar content. …’ (Tamar Gendler, ‘Philosophical Thought Experiment, 
Intuitions, and Cognitive Equilibrium’, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 31 (2007), 68–89 (p. 69)). 
212 cf. Malmgren, pp. 287–288. 
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In my critical discussion of (what I call) the fictional account, I shall stress the general point 
that fiction does not underlie the same constraints of conceptual coherence and logical 
consistency as a thought experiment. Then I shall present a concrete case where this leads to a 
misconstrual of a philosophically interesting thought experiment.213  
The fictional account presupposes that there is a precise correspondence between the set 
of fictional truths and the set of possible situations relevant to the thought experiment. This 
presupposition is not supported by the extant accounts of truth in fiction mentioned by Ichikawa 
and Jarvis.214 In Lewis’s counterfactual pattern of analysis, roughly P is true in a fiction iff it is 
true in the closest world where the story is told as known fact (variant: …and the common 
beliefs of the community of origin are true).215 This leads us back to the counterfactual account. 
If the latter has problems with deviant realizations, a fictional account drawing on Lewis’s 
analysis would have problems, too. In Kendall Walton’s pluralistic account, the explicit story 
functions as a prop. It invites us to engage in a game of make believe, guided by several 
conventional principles of generation. The constraints imposed on these principles of 
generation are too weak to ensure that the content of this make believe game can be mapped to 
propositional truths.216 So Ichikawa and Jarvis cannot use Lewis’s or Walton’s account but must 
come up with a picture of their own. 
How do Ichikawa and Jarvis ensure that the set of fictional truths corresponds to the 
right set of possibilities? A key (but not sufficient) requirement is the following: for any 
coherent thought experimental scenario, the set of truths which correspond to what is true in 
the description of the scenario, treated as an everyday fiction, must be perfectly coherent. I 
interpret coherence in a broad sense as logical consistency and conceptual coherence. In other 
words, truth in fiction is subject to the same constraints of preserving conceptual and logical 
truths as modal reasoning.217 If we accept the idea of conceptual coherence, this mimimum 
requirement seems crucial to the success of the fictional account. For assume there is a thought 
experiment where it is not met. Some description is perfectly coherent when treated as a thought 
experiment but not as a fictional story. Then we would clearly be bound to settle for the coherent 
scenario in the philosophical argument. But Ichikawa and Jarvis’s procedure would lead us to 
diagnose an incoherence: the thought experiment fails because there is no coherent proposition 
according to which what is true in the fiction is true tout court. This diagnosis would obviously 
be misplaced. 
Disregarding concerns about its sufficiency, I shall argue that even the minimum 
requirement of conceptual coherence is not always met. Fictional truth is not strictly bound by 
conceptual and logical coherence. As Gregory Curry notes, one may write a fiction where it is 
explicitly told that someone has refuted Gödel’s theorem.218 So far there is no problem for the 
fictional account. The fiction is inconsistent, and so would be a corresponding thought 
experiment. The problem arises when the story is implicitly incoherent. One may write a fiction 
where it is not explicit (or entailed) but only implicitly true that someone has refuted Gödel’s 
theorem. Assume the author of the story wants to make vivid what a superb genius her 
 
213 There is some debate on the fictional account (cf. Malmgren, pp. 303–306, Ichikawa and Jarvis, Rules, p. 210, 
Williamson, Replies, pp. 467–468). But I focus on a hitherto undiscussed and particularly relevant point. There 
are many other problems: Fictions are incomplete, possible worlds are not. Fictions come with their own 
explanatory patterns, which are not acceptable in philosophical arguments (cf. David Velleman, ‘Narrative 
Explanation’, The Philosophical Review, 112 (2003), 1–25 (p. 21)). It is not a matter of course that we have an 
epistemically firm grip on the implicit fictional truths. 
214 Ichikawa and Jarvis, Rules, 265. 
215 David Lewis, ‘Truth in Fiction’, in Philosophical Papers I (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), pp. 261–
280. 
216 Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make–Believe. On the Foundations of the Representational Arts 
(Cambridge/Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990), p. 42). 
217Cf. Jonathan Ichikawa and Benjamin Jarvis, ‘Thought–Experiment Intuitions and Truth in Fiction’, 
Philosophical Studies, 142 (2009), 221–246 (pp. 234, 237) 
218 Gregory Currie, The Nature of Fiction (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 69. 
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protagonist Schmidt is. She elaborates the ceremony where Schmidt is awarded the Fields 
medal for having refuted Gödel’s theorem.219 If the story is suitably told, no hoax, irony, or 
indication of error, we are quite ready to accept it as true according to the story that Schmidt 
has refuted Gödel’s theorem. Narrative plausibility trumps conceptual coherence and logical 
consistency. But the same would not follow in a literally identical thought experimental 
scenario (a philosophical thought experiment where metaphysical possibility and a fortiori 
conceptual coherence are to be preserved). Such a scenario underlies constraints of conceptual 
and logical coherence. One way of securing these constraints in the Smith story would be to 
interpret the story such that the laureate and the committee made a mistake. We are bound to 
an interpretation like this in considering the story as a thought experiment but not as a fiction.220 
In sum, the purported correspondence between fiction and thought experiments fails. What is 
perfectly coherent as a thought experiment may become incoherent as an everyday fiction.221 
Although my argument is sufficient to shed doubt on the fictional account, there is a 
fallback position: one may claim that the requirement of conceptual coherence is fulfilled for 
any interesting philosophical thought experiment which is not obviously absurd. For any such 
thought experiment, the corresponding everyday fiction is coherent. This claim can only be 
tested by going through a concrete counterexample. My example will be fission cases. I shall 
elicit how the fictional account misconstrues the dialectics of such cases. 
The outline of a fission case is the following: imagine a person P0, whose brain is 
divided into two halves and implanted into two bodies; two normally functioning persons 
emerge, P1 and P2, who are psychologically continuous with P0. Consider the following story 
template: 
 
GC4 
Someone undergoes fission. Both of the post–fission persons sincerely utter: ‘I remember the 
slightest details about my pre–fission life. I remember my early childhood, my grandparents 
when they were still alive….’ 
 
In that story, drawing on psychological continuity, both protagonists P1 and P2 seem to refer 
to P0 as ‘I’. Martine Nida–Rümelin argues that it is not possible for P1 and P2 to be both 
identical to P0. Only one of them can be P0. So there must be something over and above 
psychological continuity that constitutes personal identity.222 Assume Nida–Rümelin is right. 
Then in the course of a philosophical argument, we should read GC4 as saying that both P1 and 
P2 take themselves to be identical to P0, but not that they are identical to P0. However, when 
we read GC3 as a science fiction story, it does not seem illegitimate to read the story as one 
where both people are P0, provided their claims to identity are made vivid by their personal 
story. We do not have to go to the philosophy department to check whether that reading is in 
tune with our notion of personal identity. Still the story does not explicitly say that P1 and P2 
are identical to P0. Given these assumptions, we get a counterexample to the correspondence 
 
219 It is important that ‘for…’ is read intensionally: the prize committee’s opinion that Schmidt has refuted Gödel’s 
theorem is their reason why they award him the medal. 
220 I have been reminded that for instance in an ethical trolley experiment where the issue is whether to save the 
man who refuted Gödel’s Theorem or three other people, we might prefer to accept that Schmidt has refuted 
Gödel’s Theorem. Although this point sheds further light on our tendency to get the lesson right in spite of 
difficulties with the surface story (and further doubt on Ichikawa and Jarvis’s coherence thesis), I cannot pursue it 
here. 
221 I have encountered doubts about the idea of a ‘literally identical’ description, read as a thought experiment and 
as a fictional story. But the intuitive idea is plausible: GC1 can of course be read as part of an epistemological 
argument. And our conventions of telling fictional stories seem flexible enough to embed GC1 into a speech–act 
of story–telling (which may be represented by adding an ‘according to the fiction’–operator). Anyway doubts 
about the two readings would rather threaten Ichikawa and Jarvis’s account than my counterargument. 
222 Martine Nida–Rümelin, ‘The Argument for Subject Body Dualism from Transtemporal Identity Defended’, 
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 86 (2013), 702–714. 
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thesis. Read within the constraints imposed on modal reasoning, GC4 describes a perfectly 
coherent and possible scenario. But our reading of GC4 as a science fiction story is not bound 
to be coherent.  
However, shouldn’t the author’s intention of presenting a coherent story constrain our 
interpretation of the fiction such as to prevent the incoherent reading? No, that intention is 
irretrievably bound to the aim of presenting a philosophical argument. The context of that 
argument is blinded out when the story is treated as an everyday fiction. It would be arbitrary 
to preserve the intention of coherence and to blind out the argument context where that intention 
arises. 
I conclude that the fictional account is flawed. Fiction is not well-regulated enough to 
be used in a general analysis of Gettier-like thought experiments. 
 
A deviance-proof story 
 
Thomas Grundmann and Joachim Horvath have suggested that the story can be easily 
completed such as to exclude deviant realizations in a principled way. In my discussion, I shall 
use their Gettier example in order to make sure to get their proposal right:223 
 
GC5 
Smith believes that Jones owns a Ford, on the basis of seeing Jones drive a Ford to work and 
remembering that Jones always drove a Ford in the past. From this, Smith infers that someone 
in his office owns a Ford. In fact, someone in Smith’s office does own a Ford but it is not Jones, 
it is Brown (Jones sold his car and now drives a rented Ford). 
 
GC5 is subject to deviant realizations. For instance, Smith may have strong evidence that he 
regularly hallucinates people driving a Ford. Something has to be done to make the story 
deviance-proof. In Grundmann and Horvath’s hands, the final story becomes: 
 
GC6 
Smith justifiedly believes that Jones owns a Ford, on the basis of seeing Jones drive a Ford to 
work and remembering that Jones always drove a Ford in the past. From this belief alone, Smith 
logically infers, at time t, to the justified belief that someone in his office owns a Ford, which 
provides his only justification for that belief at t. In fact, someone in Smith’s office does own a 
Ford, so that Smith’s latter belief is true – but it is not Jones, it is Brown, and so Smith’s initial 
belief was false. (Jones sold his car and now drives a rented Ford.) Also, if Smith knows at t 
that someone in his office drives a Ford, then he knows this at t only in virtue of the facts 
described. 
 
GC6 then is inserted into the original strict conditional template: 
 
(F1) Necessarily, someone knows some proposition P if and only if she has justified true belief 
in P.  
(F13) Possibly, someone stands to some proposition P in the relation described by GC6.224 
(F14) Necessarily, if someone stands to some proposition P in the relation described by GC6, 
she has a justified true belief in P without knowing P.  
(F4) It is possible that someone has justified true belief that P without knowing P. 
 
 
223 Thomas Grundmann and Joachim Horvath, ‘Thought Experiments and Deviant Realizations’, Philosophical 
Studies 170 (2014), 525–533. 
224 I.e. someone occupies Smith’s role. 
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Grundmann and Horvath claim that an expert epistemologist normally reads GC5 as GC6. How 
does this square with the distinction between our normal route and a fallback strategy which I 
introduced in section 2? I interpret Grundmann and Horvath as proposing that (F13), (F14); 
thus (F4) represents the normal route, the route of a competent pre-Williamsonian thought 
experimenter who is to sincerely test the JTB–theory, rather than a fallback strategy. After all, 
Grundmann and Horvath argue that Malmgren’s (F5) is psychologically unconvincing because 
our actual reasoning is more complex. This argument would be of no avail if the aim were a 
fallback strategy.  
In my critical assessment, I shall provide two objections to the claim that GC5 is 
normally read as GC6. Firstly, analogously to GC3, there are doubts that GC6 fits the 
requirements of a persuasive thought experiment (as contrasted to GC5). Secondly, there is a 
linguistic gap in explaining why GC5 is read as GC6. So GC6 represents a fallback position 
rather than the normal route.  
I shall start with some friendly amendments. The conditions which are to ensure that 
Smith has justified true belief are flawed. To begin with the obvious mistakes: Smith cannot 
logically deduce the belief that someone in his office owns a Ford just from his belief that Jones 
owns a Ford. He at least needs the additional premise that Jones works in the same office as 
Smith. Moreover, what precisely does provide his only justification to believe that someone in 
his office drives a Ford? Not just his logical inference. Arguably he additionally must be 
justified in believing the premises of the inference at t. Since it is not obvious where his only 
justification should end, instead of which provides his only justification perhaps one had better 
demand that any justification of Smith’s proceeds via the logical inference mentioned in the 
text.  
Coming to my first criticism, as witnessed by GC3, it would be disastrous if the 
requirement that Smith does not know were explicitly written into the description. Grundmann 
and Horvath are careful to avoid it. Instead of Smith does not know, they use 
 
(F15) if Smith knows at t that someone in his office drives a Ford, then he knows this at t only 
in virtue of the facts described. 
 
The strategy is clear. In contrast to Smith does not know, the conditional claim leaves open 
whether Smith knows. Just in case he knows, there must be no other factors which contribute 
to his knowledge (as in the deviant story GC2).  
Does this strategy succeed? One condition of its success is that (F15) should be as 
readily acceptable as GC5. GC5 is perfectly down–to–earth and easy to understand. We are 
fairly confident that such a situation might occur in everyday life. (F15), in contrast, is not only 
more difficult to understand. Upon closer inspection, it should definitely give us pause. Given 
GC6 is a good Gettier story, the consequent of (F15) is impossible. For the sake of argument, I 
grant that ‘only in virtue of’ can be clarified. What is required is that nothing over and above 
the facts described turns one’s justified true belief into knowledge. If some set of facts described 
is sufficient to turn one’s belief into knowledge, no additional supplementary description 
consistent with the original description can interfere such as to prevent that one knows. 
Assuming GC6 is a good Gettier case, the facts described alone cannot turn one’s belief into 
knowledge, as witnessed by the epistemic accident which prevents that Smith knows. 
The impossibility of the consequent is problematic. Grundmann and Horvath motivate 
(F15) as follows: the conditional neither states nor logically entails the only fact about 
knowledge that ultimately matters for the thought experiment, namely, whether Smith 
knows that someone in his office owns a Ford. Whether (F15) is in accordance with this 
motivation depends on what ‘logically entails’ means. Assume P logically entails Q iff, 
necessarily, P  Q. Then (F15) does entail that Smith does not know, the consequent being 
impossible. We may adopt some more restrained notion of logical entailment. Still Grundmann 
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and Horvath’s motivation is insufficient to distinguish (F15) from absurd ‘refutations’ of the 
JTB–theory which are structurally similar to (F15): 
 
GC7 
There is a proposition P and a subject S such that S has justified true belief that P. And if S 
knows that P, two plus two does not equal four.  
 
Since GC7 describes a perfectly possible situation (provided the JTB–theory is false), we can 
infer (G9) (Someone could have NKJTB) from it. The JTB–theory stands refuted. And if (F15) 
‘neither states nor logically entails’ that Smith does not know, the same goes for GC7. A 
convincing formalization must conform to a stronger condition: it must also avoid any suspicion 
of indirectly stipulating that Smith does not know. As witnessed by our rejecting GC7, a 
conditional with an obviously impossible consequent intuitively counts as such an indirect 
stipulation.225 
For (F15) not to count as an indirect stipulation that Smith does not know, the 
consequent of (F15) Smith knows only in virtue of the facts described should not be too 
obviously impossible. The consequent of (F15) is impossible. But perhaps it is not too obviously 
impossible. There is a difference to the absurd Gettier case GC7. The impossibility of the 
consequent the subject knows only in virtue of the facts mentioned is not yet transparent to the 
reader who is still about to sincerely test the JTB–theory. Perhaps this epistemic gap is precisely 
what is needed for the case to look uncontestable. 
Consider one exemplary way for the reader to make up her mind about the requirement 
imposed by (F15). The situation described must be one where either Smith does not know or 
knows just in virtue of the facts described. The first disjunct Smith does not know already 
prejudges the classificatory step against the JTB–analysis. If she is to accept the test case, the 
reader should not feel from the outset that, by virtue of (F15), all GC6–situations are like that. 
So whether she accepts the case as uncontentious depends on her attitude towards the second 
disjunct. Since the latter is impossible, she should at least be doubtful about Smith does know 
only in virtue of the facts described. There is an urgent suspicion that (F15) can only be 
implemented by Smith not knowing. So instead of accepting GC6 as an uncontentious test case, 
she will feel the suspicion that somehow the claim that Smith does not know has been smuggled 
into it. At least a considerate reader should be expected to ruminate about (F15) in a way we 
simply do not find ourselves ruminating about GC5. To be sure, just as GC3, GC6 is a 
counterexample to the JTB–theory. But it is doubtful that it is as immediately persuasive a 
counterexample as the original descriptions GC1 and GC5. This in turn raises doubts as to 
whether GC5 is read as GC6 in a normal epistemological context where GC5 prompts 
immediate persuasion.226 
 
225 There is an analogy to ‘Dutchman’ conditionals like: 
 
(F16) If there will be a breakthrow on climate protection in the next two years, I am a Dutchman. 
 
Such a conditional serves to express one’s high confidence in the antecedent by adding a consequent which is 
certainly false. GC7 and (F15) play a somewhat similar role: in using a consequent which is necessarily false, they 
rule out situations where the antecedent obtains. 
226 I have been suggested that (F15) may be replaced by 
 
(F15’) Smith’s belief is based only on the facts described.  
 
I cannot exclude that something like (F15’) will work. But there are difficulties: there may be facts relevant to 
whether Smith knows which are not trivially captured by what his belief is based on. For instance, Smith may 
count as knowing because of certain background knowledge of his, which he fails to take into account when basing 
his beliefs on the facts described. Such uncertainties detract from the persuasiveness of the amended story. 
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Coming to my second criticism, Grundmann and Horvath claim that philosophers 
normally read GC5 as GC6. This is far from self-evident. GC6 is concocted by reasoning back 
from the Gettier intuition in light of deviant realizations. Grundmann and Horvath owe a story 
how GC5 naturally prompts the GC6–reading. One would expect something like a pragmatic 
implicature. This expectancy is not met. According to Grundmann and Horvath, the GC6–
reading is not a matter of normal linguistic competence. It takes an expert. But it remains 
completely open what guides the expert reading. The rival accounts considered in the last 
sections do not face this problem. Malmgren’s (F5) needs nothing over and above the literal 
case description, and the fictional account draws on our undeniable tendency to supplement the 
story by implicit fictional truths. As long as no comparable mechanism is specified, GC6 rather 
looks like a fallback strategy than like a normal reading of GC5.227 
In sum, the criticism of the counterfactual account is far from compelling, and the rival 
accounts face grievous difficulties. So I propose to reconsider Williamson’s elegant proposal. 
 
 
227 There may be a deviance–discarding mechanism which supplements the explicit description in our normal 
reasoning. But I doubt that the original deviance–discarding mechanism is captured by Malmgren’s possibility 
claim (F5), which just leaves the story as it is and adds a NKJTB clause, Ichikawa and Jarvis’s fictional account 
or Grundman and Horvath’s ad hoc ‘expert’ reading. If there is such a mechanism, it might well be captured by a 
refined version of the counterfactual account. 
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2.6. Will and Were 
 
Typical cases of counterfactuals are of the had–would–form. In such cases, the difference to 
indicative conditionals is clearly marked, as witnessed by the following Adams pair: 
 
(A11) If Shakespeare did not write Hamlet, someone else did. 
(A12) If Shakespeare had not written Hamlet, no one else would have. 
 
When it comes to present-and-future-directed conditionals, the distinction is not so clear 
any longer, as will become obvious in the section to come. In this section, I shall consider 
whether future-directed indicative conditionals can be read as counterfactuals. In the next 
section, I shall consider the distinction between ‘will’ and ‘were’. 
 
Can future indicatives be read as counterfactuals? 
 
Adam Morton argues that some future-directed indicative conditionals form Adams pairs. Lara 
is a bomb expert. Live bombs are marked. We cannot see the marks but Lara can. Most bombs 
are live. So we can say that  
 
(G1) If Lara touches the bomb, it will explode.  
 
But since Lara is very diligent, she won’t touch a marked bomb. So we can say that  
 
(G2) if Lara touches the bomb, it won’t explode. 
 
We can say this even if we do not at all believe that Lara touches it, i.e. even if we accept ‘it 
might not be (is epistemically impossible) that she touches it’.228 
Does (G1) express a subjunctive? There is a decisive counterargument. Seth Yalcin has 
pointed to the inadequacy of combining an indicative ‘If p’ and ‘It might be that not p’ (an 
epistemic possibility claim).229 The following seems infelicitous: 
 
(G3) #It is raining and it might be that it is not raining 
 
This holds as well for the conditional: 
 
(G4) #If it is raining and it might be that it is not raining, still the grass is wet. 
 
The above sentences either claim or invite to suppose as part of the informational state 
relevant to evaluating the epistemic modal that it is raining; so they exclude the epistemic 
possibility (within the supposition) that actually it is not raining.230 
In contrast, the subjunctive is in order: 
 
(G5) If it were raining and it might be that it is not raining, the grass would be wet. 
 
In the counterfactual scenarios relevant to assessing this subjunctive, it is raining; but it 
does not have to be part of the informational state relevant to assessing the epistemic modal that 
 
228 Cf. Adam Morton, ‘Indicative versus Subjunctive in Future conditionals’, Analysis, 64 (2004), 289–93 (pp. 
291-292). 
229 Seth Yalcin, ‘Epistemic Modals’, Mind, 116 (2007), 983–1026, p. 985. 
230 For a thorough account Yalcin, ‘Epistemic Modals’, pp. 998–999. 
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it is. Analogously, if Morton were right that ‘If Lara touches it, it will explode’ expresses the 
subjunctive mood, the following should be in order:  
 
(G6) # If Lara touches it and it might be that she does not touch it, the bomb will explode. 
 
For there should be a natural subjunctive reading of the indicative conditional. And charity has 
us choose this reading if available. But the conditional sounds infelicitous. So there is no 
subjunctive reading. 
In contrast, the following seems all right: 
 
(G7) If Lara were to touch it and it might be that she does not touch it, the bomb would explode. 
 
This conditional seems to have a counterfactual reading.231  
 
But Morton has not established that future–directed indicative conditionals can be used to 
express them. 
 
Future indicatives and were 
 
Having discussed Adams pairs, I shall now turn to future indicative and ‘were’–
conditionals. I take issue with two claims developed by Keith DeRose. DeRose concentrates on 
the role of conditionals in deliberation, but he draws general semantic consequences. 
Conditionals of deliberation must not depend on backtracking grounds. ‘Were’ed–up 
conditionals coincide with future–directed indicative conditionals; the only difference in their 
meaning is that they must not depend on backtracking grounds. I use Egan’s counterexamples 
to causal decision theory to contest the first and an example of backtracking reasoning by David 
Lewis to contest the second claim. I tentatively outline a rivalling account of ‘were’ed-up 
conditionals, which combines features of the standard analysis of counterfactuals with the 
contextual relevance of the corresponding indicative conditionals. 
DeRose addresses two questions, which are of crucial importance to a general theory of 
conditionals:232 (i) One main function of conditionals is practical deliberation. We deliberate 
what the consequences are given we perform some action. But what are the conditionals suitable 
for expressing such deliberations? (ii) There is a fairly standard view according to which 
indicative and subjunctive conditionals are distinguished by the latter usually expressing 
counterfactuals, at least when they are of the form: ‘If A had been the case, C would have been 
the case.’ But how are we to understand future–directed ‘were’ed-up conditionals (‘If A were 
the case (at some future time t), C would be’)? 
DeRose answers: (i) Practical deliberation usually proceeds by indicative conditionals; 
yet in order to be deliberationally useful, conditionals must not depend on backtracking 
grounds. (ii) There are no genuine future–directed counterfactuals expressible by ‘were’ed-up 
conditionals. What looks like a counterfactual, in fact roughly shares the semantics of indicative 
conditionals, although it slightly diverges in assertability conditions. 
I want to criticize both answers in light of some counterexamples. I argue for two claims: 
 
 
231 So it might give rise to a future Adams pair. However, although he grants this, Keith DeRose notes that the 
following pair is inconsistent: ‘If I put Eve into situation S1, she will sin; but if I were to put her into situation S1, 
she wouldn’t sin’(DeRose, ‘Conditionals’, p. 9) As a consequence, DeRose denies that a future–directed ‘If 
…were, …’ can be a counterfactual. In contrast, I think that combinations with ‘might’ provide evidence for a 
counterfactual reading. Yet DeRose’s example sheds further doubt on there being future Adams pairs. No Adams 
without Eve. 
232 DeRose, ‘Conditionals’. 
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1. What disqualifies conditionals for deliberational purposes is not backtracking.  
2. ‘Were’ed-up conditionals are not just souped-up indicative conditionals. 
 
Conditionals of deliberation may depend on backtracking grounds 
 
DeRose points out a problem of his central hypothesis that the conditionals of deliberation are 
indicatives. As the well-known counterexamples to evidential decision theory show, some 
indicative conditionals convey links which are merely evidential but not causal. These 
conditionals may give rise to ineligible courses of action if used in practical deliberation. To 
evade this problem, DeRose provides a criterion that allows to tell apart conditionals which 
may be used in deliberation and conditionals which may not. The former should not depend on 
backtracking grounds (pp. 28–30). An example: 
 
‘[… ]if Sophie is deciding between going to seminary or joining the army, and knows that (even after she has 
heard about the connection between her career choice and the likelihood of her having the condition) her 
choosing to go to seminary would be very strong evidence that she has a certain genetic condition that, if she 
has it, will almost certainly also result in her dying before the age of 40 years, she has strong grounds to 
accept that, very probably  
 
[G8] If I go to seminary, I will die before the age of 40  
 
Yet, as most can sense, this, plus her desire not to die young, provides her with no good reason 
to choose against the seminary, for she already either has the genetic condition in question or 
she does not, and her choice of career paths will not affect whether she has the condition.’(p. 
22) 
 
To DeRose, (P) is deliberationally useless because it is backtracking: 
 
‘Sophie’s grounds for (P) [… ] involve this backtracking pattern of reasoning. After provisionally making the 
supposition that she goes to seminary, she then reaches backward in the causal order to conditionally alter 
her view of what her genetic condition is (from agnostic to supposing that she (probably) has the lethal 
condition), to explain how that antecedent (likely) would become true, and she then conditionally reasons 
forward to her untimely death.’(p. 29) 
 
However, some recent paradigm cases presented by Andy Egan should give us pause. 
Egan heralds them as counterexamples to causal decision theory.  
 
‘The Psychopath Button 
Paul is debating whether to press the ‘kill all psychopaths’ button. It would, he thinks, be much better to live 
in a world with no psychopaths. Unfortunately, Paul is quite confident that only a psychopath would press 
such a button. Paul very strongly prefers living in a world with psychopaths to dying. Should Paul press the 
button? (Set aside your theoretical commitments and put yourself in Paul’s situation. Would you press the 
button? Would you take yourself to be irrational for not doing so?)’233 
 
By Egan’s lights, sound intuition has it that Paul should not press. As it seems, any reasoning 
that leads to this result irremediably depends on backtracking grounds. If Paul presses, he must 
have been a psychopath all along in order to do so; hence he will be killed. This reasoning 
exactly parallels DeRose’s example of Sophie, the difference being that only Paul’s conditional 
plays a role in evaluating the causal consequences of the choice to be made. There are some 
reservations about Egan’s examples. But I have not yet seen an argument that successfully 
 
233 Andy Egan, ‘Some Counterexamples to Causal Decision Theory’, The Philosophical Review, 116 (2007), 93–
114 (p. 97). 
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counters their intuitive pull.234 The lesson is that practical deliberation sometimes has to embark 
on backtracking considerations that lead from the chosen action to the causal structure that 
makes one choose it and that also bears on the causal questions of one’s action. Hence assuming 
that ‘were’–conditionals guide deliberation does not give us reasons to deny that they 
sometimes rest on backtracking.  
Independently of Egan cases, there is reason to doubt the backtracking diagnosis. 
DeRose’s main evidence is his version of Gibbard’s riverboat example (DeRose, Conditionals, 
pp. 21–25) as already quoted and discussed in section (2.2.): 
 
‘Sly Pete and Mr. Stone are playing poker on a Mississippi riverboat. It is now up to Pete to call or fold. My 
henchman Zack sees Stone’s hand, which is quite good, and signals its content to Pete. My henchman Jack 
sees both hands, and sees that Pete’s hand is rather low, so that Stone’s is the winning hand. At this point, the 
room is cleared. A few minutes later, Zack slips me a note which says ‘If Pete called, he won,’ and Jack slips 
me a note which says ‘If Pete called, he lost.’ I know that these notes both come from my trusted henchmen, 
but do not know which of them sent which note. I conclude that Pete folded.’ 
 
Assume Zack at some point accepts a future-directed conditional: 
 
(G9) If Pete calls, he will win 
 
Jack, in contrast, knows that Pete has the losing hand. So he justifiedly accepts 
 
(G10) If Pete calls, he will not win 
 
As DeRose notes, when the conditionals are reported to Pete, (G10) is useful in 
deliberation but (G9) is not. DeRose’s explanation is that (G9) depends on backtracking 
reasoning: if Pete plays, that will be because he has the higher card; but then of course he will 
win. (p. 29)  
Judging from the Sophie case, we should expect backtracking to go as follows: Zack arrives at 
(G9) by ‘provisionally making the supposition’ that Pete calls and then ‘reaching backwards in 
the causal order’ such as to revise his beliefs about Pete’s playing dispositions. Sophie must use 
the supposition of her going to seminary as evidence for a certain causal order to arrive at (P). 
That’s why her reasoning does depend on backtracking. Nothing like that has to occur in Zack’s 
reasoning. Without reaching backwards in the causal order from the supposition that Pete calls, 
he can derive (G9) from independently justified assumptions about Pete’s using method M: 
arrange for knowing the cards! Call precisely if you are signalled that you have the higher cards! 
Hence (G9) does not depend on backtracking reasoning.235 
What disqualifies (G9) for Pete’s deliberational purposes is that for (G9) to be 
acceptable in the first place, Pete must use method M. (G9) would be undermined if he were to 
use (G4) instead of M to reason: ‘If I call, I will win. So I should call.’ In contrast, (Oc) does 
not exhibit this pattern of dependence. More generally, a conditional is useless in a 
deliberational process when it is acceptable only provided the deliberational process does not 
depend on this very conditional. 
 
234 Doubts about Egan cases are expressed by Frank Arntzenius, ‘No regrets, or: Edith Piaf Revamps Decision 
Theory’, Erkenntnis, 68 (2008), 277–297; John Cantwell, ‘On an Alleged Counter–Example to Causal Decision 
Theory’, Synthese, 173 (2010), 127–152. 
235 In spite of these shortcomings, we might reckon the ‘that will be because’–template a shibboleth of useless 
conditionals. Indeed this template might provide some evidence against a conditional being deliberationally useful. 
It indicates that the conditional draws on causal facts that are ‘sunk’. Yet there are counterexamples which are less 
demanding than Egan cases: ‘Should I go to the exhibition? I should go only because I appreciate the artworks for 
their own sake. If I go, that will be because of my snobbery and not because of my appreciating the artworks for 
their own sake. So I should not go.’ Note that unlike Egan, one does not have to claim that a certain choice is 
ultimately preferable but only that these considerations play a legitimate role in deliberating action. 
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 ‘Were’ed-up conditionals are not just souped-up indicative conditionals 
 
By DeRose’s lights, ‘were’ed-up conditionals coincide with indicative conditionals, the 
difference being that they can be used to convey that the antecedent is probably false and that 
they are unassertable when the corresponding indicative conditionals for their assertability 
depend on backtracking reasoning  (pp. 37–38).  
My criticism takes three steps. (i) I outline a counterintuition which I take to show that 
DeRose’s solution is wrong. (ii) I summarize the main evidence assembled by DeRose. (iii) I 
indicate an alternative way of dealing with this evidence, which combines features of the 
standard analysis of counterfactuals with the contextual relevance of the corresponding 
indicative conditionals. 
 
Problems of DeRose’s reading 
 
Why is DeRose’s approach problematic? I think the immediate intuition how to deal with 
‘were’ed-up conditionals is to assimilate them to other subjunctive conditionals. As a 
consequence, the following reasoning of David Lewis’s seems to apply. Lewis famously 
eschews backtracking counterfactuals. Yet he allows for certain exceptions triggered by 
suitable contextual clues which override the standard non-backtracking solution: 
 
‘Jim and Jack quarreled yesterday, and Jack is still hopping mad. We conclude that if Jim asked Jack for help 
today, Jack would not help him. But wait: Jim is a prideful fellow. He never would ask for help after such a 
quarrel; if Jim were to ask Jack for help today, there would have to have been no quarrel yesterday. In that 
case Jack would be his usual generous self. So [G11] if Jim asked Jack for help today, Jack would help him 
after all.’236 
 
Nothing seems to preclude modifying Lewis’story as follows: Just replace the last sentence by 
‘So if Jim were to ask Jack for help later today, Jack would help him after all.’ This is 
infelicitous by DeRose’s lights.237 But it seems perfectly in order.  
 
DeRose’s evidence 
 
To appreciate DeRose’s evidence, consider the problem of future Adams pairs. The classical 
Adams pair is this: 
 
(A9) If Oswald didn’t kill Kennedy, someone else did 
(A10) If Oswald hadn’t killed Kennedy, someone else would have (DeRose, Conditionals, p. 
2) 
 
The following seems perfectly acceptable: 
 
(G12) If Oswald didn’t kill Kennedy, someone else did; but if Oswald hadn’t killed Kennedy, 
no one else would have. 
 
In contrast, the following future-directed pair sounds inconsistent:  
 
 
236 Lewis, ‘Counterfactual Dependence’, p. 33. 
237 Curiously DeRose accepts that ‘were’ed–up conditionals might be used in this way provided the backtracking 
reasoning is explicit (p. 35 ann. 31). But I do not see how this concession can be reconciled with his overall account 
of their meaning and purpose: ‘Were’ing–up is a device of clearly marking out conditionals as based on the right 
sorts of grounds to be deliberationally useful.’(p. 38) 
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‘[G13] If I put Eve into situation S1, she will sin; but if I were to put her into situation S1, she 
wouldn’t sin.’(p. 9)  
 
While DeRose is more cautious (p. 10), one may take the Eve–pair to provide further evidence 
against future Adams pairs than the one I have given above. No Adams without Eve. DeRose’s 
approach neatly explains why Eve sounds inconsistent: ‘Were’ed-up conditionals just coincide 
with indicative conditionals in the relevant respects. The independent lesson to draw is that (a) 
there is an intimate connection between an indicative and the corresponding ‘were’ed-up 
conditional; the indicative is not reconcilable with the contrary ‘were’ed-up conditional. 
Yet the riverboat example teaches an opposing lesson. While Zack justifiedly accepts 
 
(G9) If Pete calls, he will win, 
 
according to DeRose, he should reject (p. 32) 
 
(G10) If Pete were to call, he would win. 
 
Gibbard prefers a nearness analysis of (G10) as it is standard for subjunctives of the ‘had-
would’ type.238 In contrast, DeRose maintains: 
 
‘Gibbard’s response is to place [G9] and [G10] on opposite sides of the great semantic divide among 
conditionals. [… ]though I agree with Gibbard that [G9] seems right and [G10] wrong for Zack, the difference 
between the two conditionals seems slight and subtle. They seem to mean approximately the same thing, 
which, together with the sense that one seems right and the other wrong here produces a bit of a sense of 
puzzlement about the situation.’(p. 33) 
 
DeRose’s account is to dissolve this puzzlement. In contrast to (G9), the ‘were’ed-up (G10) is 
unassertable because it rests on backtracking grounds. Yet if DeRose’s evidence so far shows 
anything, then only that (b) sometimes there is a divide between the indicative conditional and 
its ‘were’ed-up version; one is assertable while the other is not. I am not sure about DeRose’s 
intuitions about (G10), but I shall accept them for the sake of argument. 
This lesson is enforced by a further argument of DeRose’s. Indicative conditionals 
underlie a paradox (pp. 16–17). The following reasoning seems all right: 
 
(G14) Either the butler or the gardener did it. 
(G15) Therefore, if the butler didn’t do it, the gardener did. 
 
So does the following: 
 
(G16) The butler did it. 
(G14) Therefore, either the butler did it or the gardener did it.239 
 
But we cannot reason as follows: 
 
(G16) The butler did it. 
(G15) Therefore, if the butler didn’t do it, the gardener did. 
 
 
238 Gibbard, pp. 228-229. 
239 I am not so sure whether this really seems compelling to the untutored. But let us grant the point. 
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While DeRose has it that future indicative conditionals underlie the paradox, he reports mixed 
intuitions as to whether ‘were’ed-up conditionals do (pp. 36–37 ann.). His explanation is this: 
We cannot simply reason 
 
(G17) Either the butler or the gardener will do it. 
(G18) Therefore, if the butler were not to do it, the gardener would. 
 
For when we accept (G17), still we cannot be sure that the assertability conditions of (G18) are 
met. Backtracking reasoning might be involved. There are two concerns about this argument: 
Firstly, assume we check and rule out first that any of our premises depends on backtracking; 
then the reasoning should seem convincing. If we are still reluctant, this calls for a different 
explanation. Secondly, why are the results mixed? If DeRose were right, every competent 
speaker should feel the same about (G17)–(G18). 
 
How to deal with DeRose’s evidence 
 
Given my intuitions about Lewis’s Jim–and–Jack example, I need a way of reconciling lesson 
(a) and (b) that diverges from DeRose’s: 
 
(a) the close connection between indicative and the corresponding ‘were’ed-up conditionals 
that rules out Eve 
(b) the difference between indicative and corresponding ‘were’ed-up conditionals that accounts 
for  
–(G9) being assertable but (G10) not 
–the paradox of indicative conditionals pertaining to future-directed indicative conditionals but 
not clearly to their ‘were’ed-up version. 
 
Ad (a) A leitmotiv of DeRose is that indicative and ‘were’ed-up conditionals are too 
close to each other to be placed on ‘opposite sides of the great semantic divide’. Yet this can be 
accommodated as follows: The factual/counterfactual–distinction is not as well marked with 
respect to the future as with respect to the past. This distinction is crucial for the sharp boundary 
between indicative and subjunctive conditionals as it is manifested in past-directed Adams 
pairs. We take the past to be fixed. Past-directed indicative conditionals are assessed by 
(hypothetically) taking the antecedent to be part of the fixed past. When they give rise to Adams 
pairs, the antecedent situations of past-directed subjunctive conditionals are taken to be ruled 
out by the fixed past. In contrast, we are prone to regard the future as not yet fixed. There is a 
tendency towards considering the antecedent of a future-directed conditional as an option that 
has not yet been ruled out and is not predetermined to come about either. As a consequence, the 
demarcation of future indicatives and counterfactuals tends to become obliterated. This is the 
reason why future indicative conditionals and their ‘were’ed-up variants are so close to each 
other; and why the very same antecedent possibility that is envisaged in the indicative partner 
of an alleged future Adams pair like Eve is counted among the antecedent possibilities relevant 
to evaluating the contrary ‘were’ed-up version. In the very same scenario of Eve being put into 
situation S1, she would have both to sin and not sin for the conditionals to be reconcilable. Yet 
by opting for the ‘were’ed-up version we express that we feel hesitant about the antecedent 
situation coming about in due course, i.e. in the way the indicative conditional conveys; as a 
consequence, we normally open the range of situations relevant to evaluating the ‘were’ed-up 
version for the standard ways we take a counterfactual antecedent situation to come about. 
There are different ways of further elaborating these findings. I want to keep my 
approach as simple as possible. To start with, although one should wary of going ‘Into the 
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swamp’ of indicative conditionals (De Rose, pp. 39-40), I need some minimal common ground 
between indicative and (a standard view of) subjunctive conditionals: 
 
A conditional ‘If A, C’/’If A were the case, C would be’ is true/assertable iff C in all salient A-
situations. 
 
I hope that my use of this vague condition squares with DeRose’s Ramseyan account: ‘…one 
is positioned to assert [the indicative conditional] A→C if and only if adding A as a certainty 
to one’s belief set would put one in a position to assert that C.’(p. 15) Nothing I say should 
preclude the situations salient in indicative conditionals from being those that vindicate one’s 
beliefs about the actual world updated with the certainty A.  
I combine this with a simplified standard closeness analysis of ‘were’ed-up conditionals. 
Just let the salient A–situations be those that are closest or most similar to the actual situation. 
When we ask ourselves how the antecedent A might come about, the A–situations envisaged in 
the future indicative spring to mind. Drawing on the Ramsey test, I surmise that these situations 
are those that make our belief system updated with A true. We usually reckon them among the 
closest A–situations with regard to which the subjunctive is assessed. 
 I suggest the following constraint on ‘were’ing–up:  
 
Eve–constraint  
Whenever a future-directed indicative conditional ‘If A, C’ is assertable, an A–cum–C– 
situation must be among the closest situations relevant to evaluating its ‘were’ed-up versions.  
 
More precisely, whenever the indicative conditional is assertable, the contrary ‘were’ed-up 
version ‘If A were the case, C would not be the case’ is not. Yet in evaluating the ‘were’ed-up 
conditional, we also attend to ways in which we take a standard counterfactual situation to come 
about; hence the A–cum–C–situations envisaged in the indicative conditional normally are only 
one among several candidates for the closest A–situations. As a consequence, the assertability 
of the indicative conditional normally is not sufficient for the ‘were’ed-up version being 
assertable as well. Pace Gibbard, I think that DeRose is completely right not to simply place 
indicative conditionals and their ‘were’ed-up versions on ‘opposite sides of the great semantic 
divide’. Yet I follow Gibbard’s nearness analysis. As far as the great divide exists for future-
directed conditionals, it cuts through ‘were’ed-up conditionals.  
Ad (b) There is an eligible explanation of our rejecting (G10): A standard Lewisian 
analysis is available which parallels the notorious Nixon example: 
 
(A33) If Nixon had pressed the button, nuclear holocaust would have ensued. 
 
Lewis proposal under determinism is this: By default, we take a small miracle to bring 
about Nixon pressing the button, say an additional neuron firing in his brain. Under 
indeterminism, some comparable chance process makes Nixon press the button. We do not 
resort to Nixon’s reasons for pressing the button or the like.  
This analysis may be transferred to (G10): We take a small inconspicuous divergence 
to bring about Pete calling. We do not resort to Pete’s reasons for calling or the like. So we do 
not care about Pete knowing the cards of his opponent and reacting rationally. Since we do not 
posit a connection between Pete’s calling and the distribution of cards, we have no reason to 
assume that Pete will win in all salient situations.  
    However, taking into account the constraint that rules out Eve, we cannot simply settle 
for Lewis’s criteria. (G9) seems less clearly distinguished from (G10) than  
 
(C2) If Pete called, he won 
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is distinguished from 
 
(G19) If Pete had called, he would have won. 
 
as uttered by Zack from an ex post perspective yet given the same evidence. 
This can be explained by the asymmetry between past-directed and future conditionals. 
Lewis’s criteria are partially overridden by the Eve–constraint: The antecedent–cum–
consequent–situations that are salient in (G9) are among the closest situations considered in 
evaluating (G10). So we tend to amend Lewis’s criteria by this constraint. But this is 
reconcilable with our adhering to them to a certain extent. Among the closest situations 
considered are situations where Pete’s calling comes about by a small miracle or the like. This 
accounts for our rejecting (G10).  
Concerning Lewis’s Jack–and–Jim example, the nearness account explains why we 
accept 
 
(G20) If Jim were to ask Jack for help, Jack would help him after all. 
 
Since we tend to rule out that Jim will ask Jack, we do not feel inclined to the indicative 
conditionals 
 
(G21) If Jim asks, Jack will / will not help him. 
 
If we deem them unassertable, the Eve constraint is not binding. In this case, the ‘were’ed-up 
conditional is treated according to a standard nearness analysis and converges to the 
counterfactual 
 
(G11) If Jim asked for help today, Jack would help him after all. 
 
But assume we are pressed about the indicative conditional (‘yes, but if Jim asks?’). If we deem 
an indicative conditional assertable, the context has us rather accept ‘if Jim asks, Jack will help 
him’. Then the Eve constraint supports the ‘were’ed-up version. 
A general concern: How can situations that are framed so differently, on the one hand 
in terms of the Ramsey test, on the other hand in terms of Lewis’s small inconspicuous 
divergence count as equally close? Due to the specific openness we accord to the future, we 
waver between two quite different options for closeness: The first is to take the antecedent A 
as a new piece of evidence in light of which we revise our view of the actual situation. So we 
consider the situations that make true our system of beliefs about the actual world updated with 
A. Yet by the subjunctive mood, we signal that we do not simply take the actual situation as 
giving rise to A in due course. Hence we also consider the closest situation which is different 
from the actual course things will take. That closest situation is not reckoned a candidate for 
updating our beliefs about the actual world. It is distinguished from the actual world by a small 
inconspicuous divergence (miracle) that brings about A. 
The remaining task is to account for the mixed results regarding the paradox of 
indicative conditionals. To begin with, although the reading just developed is the default 
reading, there may even be a reading of (G10) in which the situations that are salient in (G9) 
completely override Lewis’s criteria. One may attend exclusively to the features which guide 
(our prediction of) Pete’s rational deliberations: Pete knows the cards of his opponent, he knows 
the rules of the game, he aims at winning and so on. I have suggested that these are the relevant 
features common to situations that make true our belief system updated with ‘Pete calls’. Under 
these circumstances, the closest situations in which he calls will be situations in which he wins. 
 130  
 
As a consequence, in one non–default reading ‘were’ed-up conditionals come close to the 
corresponding indicative conditionals, perhaps so close as to coincide with them. Yet we do 
not settle for this reading unless there are sufficient clues enforcing it.  
On this basis we may account for the paradox of indicative conditionals. Those who 
deem the inference (G17)–(G18) invalid, treat the ‘were’ed-up conditional according to a 
default nearness analysis modified by the Eve constraint. For instance, they take into account 
that while the gardener is innocent, the butler is about to do it but some small miracle interferes. 
Hence they deny that if the butler were not do to it, the gardener would. Those who tend to 
accept the inference follow the contextual pull of assimilating it to the corresponding indicative 
conditional. Where may this pull come from? (G14)/(G17) focus attention on the possibilities 
of the butler and the gardener doing it. In order for the indicative conditional (G15) to follow 
from (G14), one must rule out any further possibilities as salient.240 The contextually relevant 
situation in which the butler does not do it is one in which the gardener does.  
The result is a neat picture of ‘were’ed-up conditionals: 
 
‘Were’ed-up conditionals conform to the standard analysis of counterfactuals, the difference 
being that Lewis’s default criteria are either  
– partially overridden by the Eve–constraint (the standard case) 
or 
– completely overridden by the situations that are salient in the corresponding indicative 
conditionals (given certain contextual clues). 
 
 
 
240 Otherwise one could not assert that the gardener did it upon adding that the butler did not do it as a certainty to 
one’s belief system. 
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3. Conclusion 
 
I have introduced (1.) the standard view of counterfactuals: 
 
First, counterfactuals have truth–conditions.  
Second, these truth–conditions can be spelled out in terms of possible worlds. 
Third, the possible worlds deciding on the truth of falsity of a counterfactual are those that 
minimally differ from the actual world. 
 
I have presented (2.) challenges to the standard view. I summarize the results: (2.1.) there are 
no sufficient reasons to preserve inferences that are invalid in the standard semantics. (2.2.) 
Counterfactuals do not form ‘disturbing noise’ but teach interesting lessons on Gibbard cases. 
(2.3.) There are ways of accommodating lottery phenomena by minimally amending the 
standard semantics. (2.4.) The future similarity objection and (2.5.) the distinction between 
deviant and normal antecedent scenarios raise formidable difficulties to spelling out the 
standard account, but there are promising strategies of meeting these difficulties. (2.6.) 
Uncertainties about the modal status of the future are reflected in future-directed ‘were’-
conditionals. 
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